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Intolerable working conditions provoked UNC 
cafeteria workers--most of them black women-- to . walk off 
their jobs . Although unprecedented, the strike came at a 
time and place that were already ripe for confrontation 
over labor, racial, and student issues. With negotiations 
at an impasse, scuffles between student strike supporters 
and opponents prompted campus administrators to close 
Lenoir Dining Hall. At the insistence of North Carolina 's 
governor, Lenoir was reopened under guard of the state 
patrol , thereby invigorating debate about academic freedom 
and the university's pol itical integrity . Later, the 
governor forced the evacuation of the building which strike 
supporters occupied. The four -week strike ended when, 
after extraordinary procedures, state employees throughout 
North Carolina received a twenty-cent increase in the 
minimum wage. This study surveys conditions prior to the 
walkout, outlines strike events chronologically, and assesses 
the assumptions and strategies of participants. 
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PREF.ACE 
The early years of my life were spent in Durham, 
North Carolina , on an unpaved elm-lined street that ran 
a ridge and kept separated the poor neighborhoods--on e , 
black; the other, white- - which crowded close from either 
side . One evening under the corner streetlight which was 
a frequent gathering place for neighborhood kids, my older 
brother Winston got into a wrestling match with a black 
friend . The two were serious but not angry . A mixed 
crowd including me , barely ten years old , clustered around 
urging them on . From the tangle of grunts and arms and legs, 
my brother got the upper hand and pinned his oppon ent to 
the ground . Still flailing but on his back and definitely 
beaten, the black guy cast plaintive glances up at us 
bystanders, particularly at me I thought . "Hey," he 
shouted , "Get this nigger o,ff me l " In a flash I gained 
some new though vague perception about the way life was 
in the South in the 1950s. 
I attended Durham ' s segregated public schools, and 
then in the early 1960s followed a number of my friends 
north to New Engla~d for private school and college. When 
I returned to the South in the summer of 1969 , it was to 
be a teache r in the public schools of Chapel Hill. While 
v 
in the North , I had felt the nation ' s turmoil , and was 
prepared to find changes as well in the North Caro lina 
that I had left . One bit of evidence for such change was 
the article I had read in the N~-Y~~k-Iim~ about Chapel 
Hill ' s new bl ack mayor , Howard Lee . Neve rthel ess , when 
that first su l t±y July day draped itself heavily about me , 
I sensed that however changed, this still was home . On 
the first day of schoo l-- a hot August day -- and my first 
day of teaching , one of my seventh - grad e history stud ents-
to - be made the fo l lowing public pronouncement : "That ol' 
hank i e ain ' t gonna teach me nothin ' . ," I knew then that the 
South hs£ changed and that I still had a lot to l e arn . 
Fo r sever al years I remai n ed on the faculty , at tempt -
ing with question ab l e success to disprove the foregoing 
predicti on , and discovering in the process that 1 enjoyed 
studying history , whether my students did or not . I heard 
of the reputation of the history department at the University 
of North Carolina , and was attracted particularly to the 
idea of oral history . I believed t h at history for broadest 
truth and value needed the l ively human voice to complement 
the written word . I enrol l ed in graduate school and took 
among oth er courses a class taught by Jacquelyn Hall , 
director of the Southern Oral His tory Program . We read , 
We wrote, we criticized - -the normal graduate school tasks--
and we set out to write as a group research project, a history 
of th e 1969 strike by workers in the UNG food service . 
vi 
The project suited a class in oral history . The 
strike appeared to be a significant historical event which 
had happened at a particularly volatile time in the history 
of the nation and the South. We suspected that the mood 
and tone of the strike -- its passions and its problems - -
would be found in the voices of oral sources , not between 
the covers of a book. Th e strike had been a dispute of 
workers (women , mostly) against management . It reverber-
ated with sharp racial overtones and involved also students , 
facu l ty , administrators , police , and state politicians . As 
we began our research , our class found that contemporary 
accounts of the strike were inconsistent and that journal-
istic interest had di ed as quickly as it had been born , as 
so o n a s th e s tr i k e w a s no 1 o n g er " n e w s • " And y et , a r o u n d 
Chapel Hill we found many people who still , in 1974 , felt 
freshly touched by the 1969 foodworkers ' strike . 
The class project proceeded with vigor . We read 
through written material , and interviewed nearly three 
dozen of the strike ' s principal participants . We discussed 
our findings with one another ; we criticized one another ' s 
interview techniques ; we suggested to one another places 
to go and peop l e to see for further information. But 
alas , completion of the project was more than the class 
could manage o Although individual versions were presented 
in summary , we never wrote a comprehensive history of 
th e strike. 
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I intended personally to see our class project 
thr ough to its end , but could not afford the luxurious pain 
of graduate school . In 1975, I left Chapel Hill to be the 
prin c ipal of a school in southwest Virginia. I took 
thoughts of the foodworkers with me. Several years later , 
I was able to recommence my efforts to complete the food-
work e r project . I found that by then my perspective had 
changed. Not only did I have to relearn what had happened 
in 1969, I also had to revise much of what I had learned 
in 1974 during the class project . 
I thought that I still understood the strengths of 
oral history. Skillfully used , it can plug the holes left 
in written accounts and can give an even t ' s participants 
the voices that they deserve and otherwise might not have 
in written history . Oral history , of course , has its 
limitat ions . One is the availability of sources . A 
r esearcher understandably wants to interview people who 
are most accessible to him. Those sources , however , are 
not necessarily the ones who can give the most accurate 
or most representative account of a past event . Another 
problem is memory itself. Peop l e remember an event in 
different ways , according to the intensity of their original 
involvement and their experience since . Memory fades; it 
distorts and reconstructs past events in the changing 
context of current history. I discovered , for instance , 
that what a participant remembered in 1979 might well be 
d i ffe rent from what he saw during 1969 and from what he 
thought in 1974 when he was first interviewed about the 
strike . I had to be wary of the tendency to assume that 
what appeared to be the best recall in the present was in 
fact the best account of the past . 
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Clear perception of the events in the spring of 
1969 was made more difficult by that strike ' s chronological 
proximity to another workers ' strike at UNC less than a 
year lat er . The second strike , in numerous ways similar 
to the first , contained many of the same participants . 
Looki ng back years later , these participants often had 
trouble distinguishing between the two strikes. A history 
of the second strike should be written- - as an event , it 
was a logical sequel to the first --but my concentration 
here is on the first . 
In spite of the pitf~lls , I found oral sources to 
be extremely useful . I was struck by the freshness of 
language , place , and detail which was sti l l in the minds of 
the protesters , like the foodworkers , who had made no 
written records of the events of 1969 . I found that the 
statements of those who had had positions of university 
leadership were also useful , but in a different way . Their 
memory tended to reconstruct not the languag e and visual 
detail of particular incidents so much as it gave an 
overriding view of the strike as an abstract part of the 
larger prob l em of university governance. Protesters during 
the strike had demanded specific changes in the circumstances 
of their everyday lives; interviewed later , such participants 
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quite willing to discuss what had personally motivated 
their act i ons during the strikeo In contrast , interviews 
wi t h administrators showed them to have retained a sense 
of themse lve s as guardi ans of institutio nal roles; in their 
de scriptions they were thus more relu ctant to disclose 
pers onal feelings apart from those roles . Th e accounts of 
other partic ipant s , such as UNC facu lty member s and students , 
general ly combined elements of both concrete detail and 
abstract principle. 
In piecing t ogeth er a history · of the strike , I found 
that the various accounts presented div ers e prob l ems of 
scholarship . My object was to reconcile the oral accounts 
with on e another and with the available written records , 
which came chiefly from n ewspapers and university ar chives . 
Since I have placed the words and thoughts of others in the 
context of my own narrative , I cannot avoid distorting the 
meanings originally intended . But such are the problems of 
any historian. I have tri ed to po r t ray t h e strike chrono -
logically and also to analyze conditions which preceded the 
walkout and to assess the underlying assumptions and 
strategies of participants in tho se 1969 ev ent s . I h ope 
that the inclusion of ora l sources and the attempt to 
understand th e motivations of participants will give the 
strike a richer and truer history than would othexwise 
be possib leo 
This project was conceived in the Southern Oral 
History Pr ogram. Jacquelyn Hall , her co ll eague Bi ll Finger , 
x 
~ranscribers , and members of the oral history classes in 
~he spring and fall o5 1974 deserve credit for an enormous 
amount of work . Working with them was for me an invaluable 
experience . The people I have met while trying to find out 
.about the strike have continued to be an inspiration . The 
foodworkers especially have been kind to me and tolerant 
of my questions . Jackie Hall has been the best of advisers --
me with advice and showering me with patience . 
and Joel Williamson have given me generous counsel 
and encouragement . Brother Winston (a master now at 
1
wrestling with words) , brother Jim (who said my writing 
was readable) , and my mother (who has endured the company 
.of her son , the curmudgeon) have all helped to keep my 
loose ends from unraveling . Through it all I have felt , 
as I had at the scuffl e under the streetlight more than 
twenty years before , th at I was learning something important 
~ 
~ about the subtle ties and ambiguities of human relationships 
- and language , even if I was not sure what to make of that 
knowledge . 
Where are the men who will fight against the will 
of the majority? ..• Where are the l oyal North 
Caroli ni ans who will let nothing stand in the way 
of progress? Where are our leaders? 
J. Carlyl e Sitterson , UNC student , 1931 
Everybody ' s name is Mary Smith tonight. 
Elizabeth Brooks , foodworker, 1969 
CH APTER I 
INTRODUCTI ON 
,· 
On Sunday afternoon , 23 February 1969 , the seventeen 
the University of North Carolinal food service 
prep ared for dinner as usual in the campus's Pine Room 
cafet er iao As the four o ' clock opening time approached , 
workers --mostly black women who had for years cooked 
served meals to the university community- - took their 
~laces behind the serving counters . But when Pine Room 
supervisor Ottis White opened the door and UNG students 
began to crowd into supper lines , the cafeteria workers 
walked out from behind their counters and sat down together 
at a table in the dining room . 2 
Students stood banging on the counters with their 
trays as supervisor White approached the seated foodworker 
group to ask , "What in the wor l d i s going on? " Someone 
told him , "We ' re on strike ," whereupon he turned to Mary 
--------
111 University" refers to UNG at Chapel Hill, unless 
the Conso lidated University is specifiedo The latter 
comprised four campuses in early 19E9 (Chapel Hill , Raleigh, 
Greensboro , and Charlotte) and was in the process of adding 
Wilmington and Asheville campuses . The state of North 
Car olina also supported a regional university system and 
other col leges . 
2Qyrh~m_MQ~nins_tl~~~lg , 24 February 1969; 
Q!2~n~QQ~Q_Q2ilY-~~~2 , 24 February 1969; R~l~ish_~~~~-£IlQ 
QQ~~~Y~L , 24 February 1969 . 
3 
f Smith , an empl oye e of eight yea:::s , and said , "Mary , com ~ 
bac k here to the office , I want to talk to you ." Mary Sm i th , 
describ ed by a co-worke r as "like a mother" to the other 
employees , was a woman of strong influence among them . If 
' the men of managment could persuade her , t hgn s he would 
tell the others , "We' re going back to work , " and they would 
"jus t go back to work ." But it did not happen so simply . 
Instead , foodworker Elizab eth Brooks spoke up to White : 
"You can ' t talk to Mary in the office ; • you 'l l have to 
talk to al l of us . o • Everybody ' s name is Ma1·y Smith 
tonighto" 
Frustrated , Ottis White call ed in George w. 
Prillaman , the director of the university ' s food services. 
Prillaman "yelled out" in a "real heavy voice"--one of the 
reasons employees were frightened by him , according to 
' Elizabeth Brooks-- "Mary Smith ! • I want to speak to you ! " 
1. Again Elizabeth Brooks spoke up , "Y ou can ' t speak to Mary 
Smith . You have to speak to the groupo" Prillaman per -
sist ed , calling out again to "Mary ." This time Mar y Smith 
herself answered him : "Mr . Pri llaman, we 'r e a group now 
and so you ' ll have to talk to al l of us . 113 
Mary Smith and Eli z abeth Brooks were cousins , both 
3Quotat i o ns from Elizabeth Brooks , interview by 
Beverly W. Jones , 22 October 1974 , Southern Oral History 
P~ogran Collection (herei nafter cited as SOHPC) , in the 
Southern Historical Collection , Univers ~ty of North 
• Carolina Library , Chapel Hill. See also Elizabeth Brooks 
into:?rvi09·:: ?y auth o r , 13 September 197 9 , SOHPC ; ;rnd 
' Verli 0 ~oc rs interview by Beverly Jones , 1 9 Octobe r 1974 , 
SOHPC . 
5 
employment else where . 5 Most wo r kers initially ~ad ~ound the 
routine of their jobs accep tab le and the camarade=ie of 
fellow wo r kers 9njoyable. Thei= employer , the university , 
was a stable and respected ins titu tion; it had no history 
of signif icant labor unrest . Labo r unions , wh i ch h ad had 
a dif f icult enough t i me o rganizing privately - owned 
bu sinesses in the South , st eered away from UNC. State 
statute prohib ited bo th the formation o f u ni ons by public 
employees ~ nd coll ective bargaining by public agencies . 6 
With his paycheck a s ervice worker at UNG also received, 
uns i gned, a sense of place and of belonging to tradition . 
Certainly the university had a proud traditi o n . 
Since 17 95 , when students were first adm i tted , the na tio n ' s 
o ldest s tate unive r sity had established itself as one of 
the country's pre-eminent academic institutions . Except 
for the state governm ent , the Chapel Hill campus was, 
accord ing to J. Carlyle Sitterson , "p:robably the single 
most influential fo:rce i n t he histo:ry of the state . "7 
Si tter son, a North Carolina native and a graduate of the 
u niversity at Chapel Hi ll, had been a d i stingui shed UNC 
p rofessor of .American history for two decades , dean of the 
university ' s College of Arts and Sc i ences for another , 
5Arthur J . Beaumont , interview by a•Jthor , 
17 November 1974 , SOHPC . 
6 Elizab eth Tornquis t , "Organizing Labor in North 
Caro lina , " Ne.:::L.§Q1!1h , Spring 1970 , pp . 57 - 69 . 
7J. Carl y le Sitterson , intervie w b y D'Ann M. 
~ a~pbe il , lC Dec~~ber 1974 , SOHPC . 
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in their thi=~~es . They had been Teared in large farm 
families in piedmont North Ca~ o lina and were now mothers of 
their own families in towns close to Chapel Hill . Mary 
Smith had six chi l dr e n and commuted to wo r k from Durham. 
Elizabeth Brooks , two years younger , had nine c~ildren and 
commuted from Hi ll sborough . Neither woma n had sought her 
job because of economic desperation . While acc ompanying a 
friend to Chapel Hi l l in 1961, Mary Smith had been offered 
a food service job without even asking foT it. She accepted , 
expecting to stay only temporarily . For Elizabeth Brooks , 
once her ch il dren were old enough to attend school , the 
adventure of getti ng out of the house and earning extra 
money prompted he r "to do s omething I had never done before . "4 
Her job with the uni versity foo d service had begun in 
September 1968 . 
The oth e r wo r kers i n the university cafete r ia 
service had taken their jobs fo r a variety of reaso n s . To 
them , as to Mary Smi th and Eli zabeth Brooks , prospective 
university wages an d be n efi ts seemed adequate , not extrav -
agant but bette r than those offered for comparable work by 
private emp l oyers nearby . The job of cooking , serving , and 
cleaning required l i ttle advanced training or education . 
Indeed , the university had a reputation for providing jobs 
for unskilled workers who raight be able to find no 
4 El izabeth Brooks interview , 13 September 1979 . 
Other ba ck ground from Mary Smith interview by author , 
i e S ~ptADbe r 1979 . 
and, since 19 6 6 , the chancellor of the Chapel Hill campus 
of the Consolidated Unive r sity of North Carol~n3 . 
Before the town of Chapel Hill existed, UNC had 
provided the services traditionally needed to support its 
notable academic enterprises. Even after Chapel Hill came 
to surround the university , UNC maintained a virtual 
monopoly on the provision of such basic communal utilities 
as water , e le ctr icity , telephone , l odgi ng , laundry , and 
meals. The university food service in particular , under 
the directio n of UNG graduate George Prillaman since the 
early 1950s , capitalized on the price stability following 
World War II to become an "extraordinarily successful" 
operation . Headquartered in the center of campus , at 
Lenoir Hall , and featuring a home-cooked forty-cent 
" s tudent special" which was , according to Carlyle 
Sitterson , a "wonder to behold , 118 the cafeteria service 
provided more than a place to eat . Lenoir Hall became , 
in the words of law pr ofessor Daniel H. Po l litt , "a club -
house for the carnpus ." 9 
Po ll itt and many other professors used L enoir Hall 
as an informal adjunct to their off i ces . It was the place 
whe re a cup of coffee cost a nickel and all refills were 
free . Psychologically as well as physically , Lenoir Hall 
9o~niel H. Po ll itt , interview by author , 
4 S <o> p t'?r.io~ r 1 97 ? , SOHPC. 
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was the hub of the university community, an institution 
within an institution. Its manager , G~orge Prillaman, 
received rec og nition for his skills by being elected 
president of the National Association of College and 
University Food Services in 1967 . 
While UNG for reasons of custom and financial 
succ ess maintained operation of its non-academic services, 
historical tradition , together with the force of North 
Carolina law , had long caused UNG to reserve its academic 
services exclusively for white people . Not until 1951 , 
and then under the pressure of litigation, had the univer-
sity admitted its first black students in the graduate 
programs of law and medicine . The blacks were given 
segregated living quarters on campus and were assigned at 
football games to the endzone "colored section" away from 
o th er stud en t s • Al thou g h th e f e w b 1 a c k s i n UN C ' s 
professional schools were soon granted full privileges 
7 
by the administration , the UNG Board of Trustees reaffirmed 
its policy against the admission of black undergraduates . 
Blacks who wished to attend North Carolina ' s public colleges 
still had to choose , as they did in other southern states , 
among exclusively black institutions . In 1955 , however , 
a federal district court ruled in £A~~12~ v . ~~~~g_Qi 
I.IJJ..s..t££~_.oi_~n1~2~~1~~-~J_N.Q.l:~b-~~A~lin~ that the famous 
.E..!:.O.l:..D v • .E.o.il..d decisior. of the prP.vious year applied " with 
:::ven '] reat<?r force to students of maturP. age" than to 
I 
8 
younger children . The university subsequently admitted its 
first three ~l a c~ undergraci~ates . 10 
Through th ~ later 1950s and early 1 960 s , the 
volatile ~s su es of race rela t ions &nd public school 
desegregat!o~ w~re the f ocus of much national and southern 
atten t ion . ~any changes took place in North Carolina and 
in the s, u ~h , bu~ for a variety of reasons , traditi on held 
st r o n g and int ~g£at ion came slowly . Although in 1968 the 
state had a black population of 24 percent , blacks made up 
l ess than 1. 5 percent of th e student enr o llm e nt at the 
university in Chapel Hill --107 out of 11 , 010 undergraduates 
were b lack; :ess than 4 percent of the graduate students 
we re b lack . 11 Not until 1966 had UNC-CH appointed its first 
black p r ofass or . None of the top-leve l UNC administrators 
was black . At the same time , except for the janitors in 
the gym , who traditionally were white , n e arly 100 percent 
of the university ' s non-academic service personnel--janitors , 
10Neal Cheek , "An Historical Study of the Adminis-
trative Actions in the Racial Desegr egation of the University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill : 1930-55 11 (Ph . D. diss er-
tati on , University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill , 1973) . 
11Minutes of Faculty Council meeting , 6 December 1968 , 
citing report of Committee on the Treatment of Minorities 
(Jo Dickson Phillips , chairman) , from the Chancellors ' Records : 
Sitt e rs on Series , f ile o n Faculty Affairs , in the University 
of North Carolina Archiv ~ s at the Universi ty of North Carolina 
Library (hereinafter cit 0 d as UNC Archives) , Chapel Hillo 
Also see c ontemporary ne ~~p ap~r accounts oi the commit tee ' s 
report . See refer enc "' a d:· ca J e later to th-= Phil li ps 
Comm i t tee in the "Report o f the Faculty Advisory Committee 
t o the Chancel l or ••. a n th .: Ad1nission Policies and 
Practic~s of th"? Univ~r s i t·1 a s such Po lici'!s :ind Practic~s 
A 7f~c t Minority S'-ud ? n t~ '.' (c;·, ,:irl r- s H. Lo ng , c l: air :::.:.i n) , 
l~: .J u n ·~ .!. ·) ( ) . 
9 
. d l ,., mai s , and foodwo r kP.rs -- were black .- - Even as the decade of 
th~ sixties drew to a close , a distinctive color line per -
-
sisted at UNC . 
When Mary Smith , Elizabeth Brooks , and the other 
Pine Room wo r kers walked off their j obs in February 1969 , 
everyday reality had for them l ong since supplanted senti -
mental attachment to universi ty tradition . By then the 
emp l oyees knew that SP.Veral dozen UNC b l ack students would 
support their action , but t hey had no way of knowing how 
the rest of the campus would respond to their walko ut . 
Nonetheles s , the workers seemed convinced of the justice 
of their cause and of the message they meant to convey that 
working conditi ons in the fo od service . had l ong been 
worsening . The deterioration had been accompanied by a 
heightened awareness on the part of individual employees 
that they were not alone in th e ir problemso Workers had 
already tried both individually and collectively to 
communicate their grievances to director Georg e Prillaman 
and to othe r administrators responsible for managing the 
food service. At every turn , claimed the workers , they had 
been ignored . Their walkout came about because it wa s , 
according to Mary Smith , "just the on ly thing that we knew to 
do. We couldn 't ge t any attenti on · any othe r kind of way . 1113 
12oan i el Pollitt interview, 4 September 1979. 
13Mary Smith , int e rview by Valerie Quinn~y , 
10 April 1974 , SOHP Co 
The employees beli~ved that if the university 
regarded its food service as successful , then success was 
10 
a veil covering unfair treatment of service workerso The 
employees felt that if the university valued it s commitment 
to academics , then it should commit itself as well to the 
needs of black people and to non - academic workers in 
particular . If tradition meant that employees had to work 
under intolerable conditions , then that tradition must 
be broken . 
CHAPTER I I 
0 THE GRIEVANCES 
Mary Smith remembered that as a littl e girl she 
tried with her siblings to make ends meet by working on a 
neighbor 's adjoining Alamance County farm (their mother had 
died when Mary was seven years old) . The neighboring 
landowner , she said , would "treat us different" from the 
way he tre ated his own family ; he would "make us stay out 
in the hot sun . . • scold us •• • make us eat last," and 
for pay he gave "whatever he wanted to give us . " At work 
in the UNG food service--what she called her "first public 
job" --Mar y Smith found to her chagrin that the treatment of 
employees reminded her of the demeaning experiences of her 
ch ildhood . "I just saw it all over again , " she said . 1 
Although Mary Smith did enjoy her cafeteria work 
well enough to stay years beyond her original intentions , 
she said that she had noticed ever since she had been there 
the methods by wh ich management had "shortened" the paychecks 
·~ 
of foo dworkers. In August 1968 , for instance , the State 
Personnel Department and the university had announced that 
a fifteen-cent increase in the minimum wage - - to $1 . 60 an hour --
1 M a r y Smith , int er vi P. ws by Bev P. r 1 y Jone s , 
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wou~d be effect iv e fo~ all st a te employees on the first of 
~ Qc toberoL Those employees in the bottom wage scales ~bvi -
0 usly expected to benef i t from the i mp r oved minimum ra te . 
But in pr actic e not all of th o se employees profited from 
t he announced change . Some workers making $1 . 45 an hour 
said that t h eir wages did no t change at all; at least one, 
Grace Har ri s , a dishwasher in the Pine Room for several 
years , continued to earn $1 . 25 an hour long after 1 October . 
Even experienced workers who already made $1 . 60 an hour were 
disgruntled because , t hey said , their salaries stayed 
unimprov ed while new and temporary empl oyees suddenly began 
making as much as theyo 3 
In December 1968 , the State Personnel Board 
authorized the university to give selective merit raise s 
(applicable only in the lowest salary ranges) to some of 
the experienced full - time workers . Although such raises 
wer e t o have become effective 1 January 1969 , 4 by late 
2J. Carlyle Sitterson , statement released 16 August 
1968 , Chancellors ' Records : Sitterson Series , file on 
Strike : Non-Academic Workers 1968-7 0 , in the UNC Archives . 
Under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act , the university 
h ad until 1 February 1971 to comply with the $1 . 60 minimum 
wage . As a point of comparison , state statute in 1968 
mandated a $1 . 00 minimum (soon to be raised to $1.25) for 
pri vate empl oyees . Nominally, therefore , both the state and 
the university paid public employees in exces s o f the 
min i mum guidelines . 
3Elizabeth Brooks and Mary Smith , interview by 
author , 18 September 1979 . 
4Fred B. Haskell to Deans , Department Chairmen, 
Dir ectors , and Manag ers , 9 January 1969 , Business and Finance 
Divisi on Records , f il e on Food Servi ce , in the UNC Archiv 0 s . 
Me mo randum #106 outlines the cri te ria , subject to the avail -
ability of funds , for determin ing which employees should 
receive the increase. 
13 
February, after th~ee biweek ly paychecks , eligible food-
workers had received neither the pay increase nor a 
satisfactory explanation from management for the delayo 
Even more exasperating for workers was the knowledge that 
even if the October and January pay raises had been received, 
neither increase would have applied to employees in higher 
salary classificationso 5 These workers said that the 
university food service did not give them either the auto -
matic or merit raises they deserved . Some "re al smart 
ladies," said Mary Smith , "v ery neat and dependable , • 
had been there five or six years and nev er gotten a raise . " 
Through personal experience , Mary Smith had learned 
of another method by which wages could be shortened . On 
her way to the infirmary one day to have a cut hand tended 
to , . she had seen on her food service application that she 
was classified as a dishwasher . She was surprised , she 
said , because "I never worked in the dish water • • •• 
I was cooking every dayo"6 Dishwashers were on a lower pay 
scale than cooks. Although by 1969 Mary Smith had sue-
ceeded in getting her own cla ssificat i on upgraded, she was 
not alone in thinking that management intentionally confused 
employee job descriptions . Elizabeth Brooks discovered that 
Sunder the State Personnel Act , each job classification 
was assigned a salary grade . Within each grade were six 
levels (steps) of pay , based on experience . At the first 
two steps ) annual raises w~re supposed to be automatic; at 
the other steps, incremental raises were based on merit 
(and subject to th~ availability of funds) , with 
mana g ement th~ judg~ of performance . 




















she and most others were subject to whatever duty the 
supervisor and the exigencies of the day demanded . She 
might be required to substitute for an absent colleague by 
tending simultaneously the main serving line , the sandwich 
counter , and the salad bar ; or , if a male employee was 
absent , she might have to li ft heavy pots , set dish trays 
on a high conveyor , move thirty-gallon trash containers , 
or mop floors after the meal . The workers said that they 
were continual ly being held responsible for extra duty; 
it was not just an occasional occurrence . In short , said 
Elizabeth Brooks , women were "just working all over the 
plac e . 117 Spec i fic job descriptions would probably have given 
sup e rvisors the flexibility to assign "other related duties" 
to employees , but the UNC cafeteria workers said that they 
had never seen a written description of their basic duties . 
The workers reported that management used other 
clas sification practices to deny them rightful recompense 
and benefits . According to employees , they were told that 
a new or " tempoxary" woxkex was entitled to be promoted to 
a permanent position after working full time fox a proba-
tionary period of ninety days . Under State Personnel Act 
xegulatio n s , a permanent worker would gain better job 
security , eligibility for automatic and mexit pay raises , 
and more generous sick-day , vacation , holiday , and 
, 
7 Elizabeth Brooks interview , 22 Oc tober 1974 ; 
al so int erview with Elizabeth Brooks and Mary Smith , 
18 Sept ember 1979 . 
-retirement benefits . But th e clas sif i catio n system in the 
UNC dining halls , said the workers , was predictable only 
15 
in the way that it did llQ1 work . Emp l oye es li ke Pau l Byrd 
were hired for threg months , laid off , th en hired aga in . 
Other fu ll - time employees remain ed classified and paid , 
month after month , as part - time help . Often , for employees 
l i ke Amy Lyon s --a " temporary " worker for t hr ee years -- the 
ninety-day deadline for graduating into the relative 
security of permanent st atus would quietly come and go , 
unrecognized by manag ement . 8 
Whether they were officially considered permane nt 
o r no t, emp l oyees said that overtime pay was a prob l em . The 
federal Fair Lab or Standards Act as amended in 1966 stipu -
lated that the univ ersity owed employees tim e -and-one-half 
pay for all overtime work . Workers said that i f th ey spent 
extra time on t he job , howev e r , manag ement customarily 
c arried the additional hours as regular wage s over to the 
next pay p eri od. Or if work e rs were given time off in li eu 
of ov ert ime pay -- normal university policy , intended to cut 
expenses fo r labor--workers were rarely given an hour and 
a half off for each overtime hour worked . 
The problem of extra ti me spent away fr om home had 
long been compounded f or many workers by the f ood service 
system of split shifts, a r outine by which an employee 
might work breakfast , be off several hours , then work 
81bid . ; al so Ma ry Smith int erview , 10 April 1974 . 
16 
_- iunch , be off , then work supper . During th~ off-duty hours , 
workers were f re e from job responsibility (the food service 
provided t hem with no special recreation or job - training 
facilities) , but the system demanded that workers remain 
away from their homes and families for twelve hours or more 
in order to be credited for eight hours of work . Mary Smith 
and others in the Pine Room worked uninterrupted eight-hour 
shifts. Nonetheless , she worried about the split shift as 
it pertained to other foodworkers on campus and she shared 
with nearly all of them yet another demanding aspect of 
food service employment : that of working on weekends . 
Mary Smith said that she had worked every Sunday and many 
9 
Saturdays for eight years without a weekend off . 
Foodworkers felt that management had taken unfair 
advantage of them , not only by shortening their money and 
benefits , but even more importantly , by denying them human 
respect . In other circumstances , employee Sarah Parker ' s 
10 
assertion that "we were people" might seem curiously 
unnecessary ; in the context of the food service , however , 
her statement can be understood. Time and again, workers 
., 
bad been unsuccessful in their attempts to get supervisors 
to address them as "Mr . " or "Mrs ., " even though the use of 
"courtesy titles" was part of the university ' s stated 
:):>ersonnel policy . Employees said that often they received 
...__.__ ______ _ 
10sarah Parker , interview by Beverly Jones , 
::;;;:•) ;:i a r ch 1 975 , SOHP C. 
17 
messages long after the actual call, with the 
esul t b e ing confusion and family hardship . One work~r , 
was told as she got off work one evening that 
er father had died early that morning . Empl oyees could 
' ~ f course expect to be fired if they arrived at work under 
' the influence of alcohol , but they said that supervisors 
\, co u 1 d come i n d r i n k i n g o " 0 n e sup er vi s o r i n p art i cu 1 a r 
only was drunk but also regularly carriPd a gun on 
the job. No wonder then that a worker asking a supervisor 
about a pay shortage would resent the ir ony of the response, 
"You've got enough to get drunk ono 1111 
By 1969, the sexual and racial divisions in the 
cafeteria service had fueled the workers' frustration. 
Supervisors were always white and nearly always male . The 
workers- - except for the cashiers , some chefs, and part - time 
UNG student help -- were black and nearly all female . No 
food serve r had been promoted to supervisor . In the Pine 
Room, Mary Smith , respected by her colleagues as a "very 
strong and hard-working woman , 111 2 had performed supervisory 
functions; she had filled out requisition orders, trained 
new workers for their various jobs, and sometimes super -
visors for theirs . Something besides ability seemed to 
llMary Smith interview , 10 April 1974; Eliz abeth 
Brooks and Mary Smith interview, 18 September 1979 . 
12Freddie Parker , int ervi ew by Beverly Jones , 






nave kept her from officially becoming a supervisor . 13 
If the university had been forced publicly t o answ er 
que s ti on s about discrimination , then it might have s ought 
t echnical refuge in its exemption from the federal Equal 
Opportunity Employment Act , Title 7 of which prohibited 
racial discrimination in hiring and promotion practices . 14 
More likely, however , the university would have claimed that 
vestig e s from the "old order" of management--stemming from 
the time when UNC was an institution for whites and dominated 
by males--could not be easily or quickly excised . Workers , 
f or their part , seem to have been concerned more with the 
c onduct than with the color or sex of their supervisors . 
I t was insensitive supervisory behavior that they abhorred . 
Elizabeth Brooks cited what was to her an egregious example : 
when Pine Room employees were hard at work , with the line 
o f waiting students "out the door" and workers "running all 
ov er" trying to get the meal served , supervisor Ottis White 
would refuse to help , standing instead at his office door , 
s t aring like a guard over his prisonerso 15 
The habits and attitudes of supervisors seem to 
h ave played a major role in aggravating t~e employees ' 
dissatisfaction with their working conditionso Still , the 
13Although not acknowledged by management , Mary 
Smi t h seems to have met minimum education and experi ence 
r <?quirements as set by the state for "food service supervisor . " 
14Daniel Pollitt interview , 4 September 1979 0 
15Elizabeth Bro oks interview , 13 Septemb er 1979 . 
19 
workers would have probably agreed that a certain amount 
of friction could be expected in the everyday rela t i o ns hip 
between employee and supervisor . When the Pine Room workers 
walked off their jobs on 23 February , howev er , their anger 
went beyond shift supervisors and beyond normal disagree -
ments with management; it focused on what workers saw as 
a system of organized oppression directed by George 
l Prillamano Prillaman hired the supervisors . They were l 
~ under constraints imposed by him , even if they did no t take 
I 
., 
I all managerial cues from him . Prillaman intentionally and 
successfully , said the workers, kept everyone in the food 
service afraid of him . Some employees felt that Prillaman 
wanted to hire illiterate service workers not from any 
i nter est in their social welfare , but rather because he 
could more easily tak e advantage of them . If a job candi-
dat e had difficulty filling out th e application , said Mary 
16 Smith , Pri llaman hired him . 
Employees made a catalogue of other exampl e s of 
Pril laman's transgressions . Foodworkers had pay deducted 
f or their meals whether they ate or not , but workers said 
that Pril laman did not hesitate to have Mary Smith cook 
steaks for him to take out to his family and friends . 
Before he went to the beach , work ers said , he loaded his 
station wagon with supplies from Lenoir Hall ' s ki tchen . 
Although s~ch stories we r e not always verifiable , worke rs 
--------·-
16Elizabeth Brooks and Mary Smith intervi ew , 
l a Sep tembe r 1 979 . 





seemed to have fixed the image of these episodes in their 
. d 17 m1n s . Into the same pattern of perception fit the 
employees' suspicion that Prillaman was intentionally 
keeping them underclassified and was stashing away 
shortages in their paychecks . 
Yet in spite of their obvious resentment about the 
way George Prillaman managed the UNC food service , at the 
time of their walkout the workers did not demand his ouster 
nor that of any other individualo Employees may have 
believed that Pril lam an ran the plantation , but they 
suspected that his system of administration must have been 
at least tacitly countenanced--perhaps even colluded with --
by university and state officials at higher levels . How 
else, workers · asked themselves , could so littl e action 
have been taken , over so long a time , to rectify such 
evident injustices? 
Not surprisingly, over the years a smattering of 
individual complaints had come to the attention of dining-
hall supervisors and director George Prillaman . By March 
1968, awareness of growing discontent among non-academic 
employees had prompted UNC administrative officials to 
draw up and disseminate detailed procedures by which an 
employee could resolve his grievances . Step one of those 
17Ibid .; Verlie Moore interviP.w , 1 9 October 1974 ; 
interview with Elsie Davis, Verli~ Moo re , Oveata Compton , 
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procedures cal l e d f or an appeal to the employee ' s admini G-
trative supPrior or to the univ ersity personnel director . 18 
By conferring with George Pr ill aman, food se rvic e employees 
were thus following established univ ersity poli cy . 
Prillaman oversaw the operation of six campus 
dining fac iliti es . Since his L enoir Hall office was in t h e 
same bui lding as th e two central cafeterias (the Pine Room 
downstairs specialized in short - order food; a larger dining 
hall was on the first floor) , Prillaman was particularly 
accessibl e to those workers . Not all empl oyees had th e 
courag e to speak to Pril lam an face-t o-face about questi ons 
left unsolv ed by supervisor s . Those individu als who did 
try to talk wit'h Prillaman reported that "he would always 
put Os off." Sometimes he refused to meet with workers , 
saying that h e did not hav e time . Sometimes h e met with 
them but denied the validity of their complaints, saying , 
ac cording to Mary Smith , that emp loy ees were "dumb . 1119 
Often , however , Prillaman promised to giv e th eir grievances 
his ser ious con s ideration , usually asking in r eturn for 
their patient understanding of the limitations he faced in 
coordi nating policies of a food service bound by compli -
cated university and state regulati ons. 
18J. Carlyle Sitterson , "Appeal Procedures ••• " 
memorandum to all univ e rsi ty employees , l Marc h 1968 , 
Chancellors ' Records, fi l e on Str i ke : Non-Academic Work e rs , 
Ad -H oc Committee o n Grievanc es , UNC Archives . 
19Mary Smith interview , 9 Octobe r 1 974 ; Eliz abeth 







By the fall of 1968 , howeve~, the workers felt that 
they had given Prillaman more time and understanding than 
Iesults justifiedo To Elizabeth Brooks , a relative new-
comer t o th e P i n e Room st a f f , P r i 11 am an ' s p r om i s e s " r e a 11 y 
got next to me • o • I had been raised that you do what 
you say o •• I just always asked questions and tried to 
find out whyo I had to have an answero 112° Frustrated 
by what they saw as Prillaman's failure to respond, some 
work e rs, without intending to abandon the channel through 
Prillaman, decided to make additional appeals to other 
authorities. 
Several employees attempted to check irregularities 
in their pay with the university ' s payroll office . They 
discovered that Prillaman kept a separate set of books in 
his office and that the payroll department was reluctant 
to question paychart figuxes submitted by the food service 
office. Also in the fall, five workers journeyed to 
Raleigh, hoping to see state personnel director ~laude E. 
Caldwell about job-classification problems . Once there, 
without an appointment , the workers were shuffled among 
suboFdinates and their problems given a promise of attention. 
Instead of an investigation by state officials , however , 
the workers said that they received only a letter thanking 
them for their visit. 21 
20Elizabeth Brooks interview, 22 October 1974 . 
21 Elizabeth Brooks , interview by oral -history class , 
14 Nov pmber 1974, SOHPC; Elizabeth Brooks and Mary Smith 
interview , 18 September 1979 . 
The university's 1968 appeal procedures held that 
an employee could , if reluctant to meet first with his 
administrative superior (Prillaman in this case), appeal 
directly to the university's personnel director. In 
October, a group of employees sent a typed memorandum to 
the "Employers of Lenoir Dining Hall." Beginning with the 
stat eme nt that "W e , the workers of Lenoir Dining Hall , 
suggest the following changes for the improvement of 
23 
Emp loyer-Employee relationship , " the memo listed twenty-one 
t . f . t 22 sugges ions or improvemen • How the employees conveyed 
their list up through administrative channels is unclear, 
but even if the workers did not intend to follow estab-
lished procedure , UNG personnel director Fred B. Haskell 
did see their list . 23 Haskell normally reported to the 
university business office . After an administrative 
reorganization in November 1968 , he become responsibl e 
directly to the chancellor ' s office , where Claiborne S. 
Jones, assistant to the chancellor , was also chairman of 
the University Personnel Council . 
Various individual workers also talked to James 
Arthur Branch in the fall of 1968 . They hoped that Branch 
22rn the Business and Finance Division Records , 
file on Food Services , UNG Archives , there are two such 
memos. On e , dated 18 October 1968, had eleven suggestions; 
the other had the same first ten, skipped #11, and added 
ten more . See note below for evidence of all twenty-one . 
23Fred B. Haskell to J . C. Eagl es , 5 November 1968, 
nemo with detailed comments about the list of twenty-one 
s~ggest ions drawn up by Lenoir Hall employees , Business 









would help because , having been b usin ess manager of the 
university before taking a leav e of absence in 1966 , he 
was an administrator with whom many foodworkers were 
p er s on a 11 y a c qu a i n t e d • .As d i r e c tor o f aux i 1 i a r y 
enterprises and services since his return to UNC in 
September 1968 , Branch had th e authority to investi gate 
Prillaman ' s operation of the dining halls and to report 
his fi ndings directly to Joseph C. Eagles , Jr ., UNC 
vice chanc ellor for business and finance . .According 
to the foodworkers , Branch cautioned them against 
expecting instant results but seemed sympathetic to 
their requ ests . 
By the end of 1968 , therefore , the foodworkers 
had informed all levels of th e administrati on of th eir 
difficulties . 24 In the weeks that followed , employees 
s aid th at they noticed a reduction in split shifts but 
saw no other evidence that the university was concerned 
about their well-being . As employee Verlie Moore 
remembered , there was still "fresh good food , but that 
was the only thing . 1125 
24Additional evid e nce of the admini s tr ation ' s 
awareness comes from an age nd a for a "Food Servic e 
Co nference " which list s Prillaman , Branch, Eagle s , and 
J on e s amo ng the participants planning to discuss the 
fo odworkers ' suggestioAs for improv eme nt, 22 October 1968 , 
Busin ess Records , UNG Archives; see also speech by 
Chanc ellor Sitterson , 11 March 1969 , which refers to 
his knowl edge of those suggestions. 
25v er li e Moore in terview , 19 October 1974; 
24 
El izabeth Brooks a nd Mary Smith interview , 18 September 1979J 







Although the foodworkers saw little proof of the 
iversity's interest , the administration had bPen aware 
r. 
.· r some time that the no n - academic area of its operation 
eeded serious attention . Even before Carlyle Sitterso n 
as appointed chancellor in 1966 , the food service in 
articular was facing an uncertain financial futurP. . 
If• 
Nati onal and regional inflation rates w0 re accelerating . 
c 
fCompelled by the North Carolina General Assembly to 
• f 
1maintain a self - supporting meal service, the university 
found that rising supply , overhead , and labor costs were 
making self-sufficiency more difficult to achieve . Under 
line-item budgeting , a system in which expenditures and 
r eceipts had to balance for · each separate function , the 
university could not transfer funds internally to an area 
of particular n eed , such as the food servic e , without 
sp ecial authorization from the General Assembly . 26 
Although wages for North Carolina ' s state employees were 
not particularly high , the un i versity ' s administrative 
flexibility was limited nonetheless by the non-discr e -
25 
ti onary wage scales prescribed by the State Personnel Board . 
Economic aggravation came in 1965 when the state 
stopped paying for employee fringe benefits , requiring 
inst e ad that enterprises lik e th e UNG food service pay 





for such extras out of operating receipts . The financial 
squeeze intensified at UNG in Chapel Hill with the opening 
of Chase Cafeteria . Built over George Prillaman ' s objection 
that without a mandatory meal - buying program UNG could not 
guarantee nece ssary stude nt volume , 27 Chase became , as 
campus security chief Arthur J . Beaumont phrased it , 
"a boondoggle . o o an architect ' s dream and a cook ' s 
nightmareo 1128 UNG students ate at Chase much less than 
officials had anticipated . Inst ead of increasing food 
service income , Chase drain ed the cash reserves built up 
at Le no i r Hal 1 • 
Complications continued after 1966. The new 
chancellor , Carlyle Sitterson , had distinguished himself 
in academic life during his forty previous years at the 
university , but he was not as familiar with non-academic 
affairs . At a time of rapid overall unive rsity growth 
(enrollment rose from just over 11 , 000 students in 1963 
to nearly 17 , 000 five years later) , Sitterson found himself 
dependent for business advice on the existing core of 
university administrators . The staff that dealt with the 
multi-million dollar non- academic operation was already 
undermanned , however ; it subsequently was crippled when 
James A. Branch , the only administrator who in Sitterson ' s 
27 George w. Prillaman , interview by author , 
6 September 1979 . 
28 Arthur Beaumont interview , 17 November 1974 . 
•I 
estimation "had any real knowledge of the people in that 
area of the university , 11 29 resigned in July 1966 from his 
post as business manager . 
Then , as of February 1967 , UNC and other state 
educational institutions were brought under the Fair Labor 
27 
Standards ~cto This act required the university henceforth 
to comply with federal guidelines for both minimum wages 
and rates of overtime pay . Chancel l or Sitterson informed 
all university administrative offices of the need for 
adhering to the new regulations and "just assumed , " he 
said later , that his instructions wou l d be foll9wed . 
Meanwhile , circumstances in the business office left 
George Prillaman with the primary responsibility for 
deciding how to maintain financial self-suffi ciency in the 
food service . Prillaman , realizing that "the measurement 
as to whether he was doing his job was in effect how well 
he could keep costs in l ine , 1130 c onsidered al ternative 
ways of making the food ser vice a t l east solvent, if 
not profitable . 
Prillaman might have sought a solution in higher 
meal prices . But that avenue seemed blocked by a noticeable 
change in student eati ng habits ; rather than being satisfied 
with a hearty fare of meats and vegetables , students seemed 
29 Car l yle Sitterson interview , 10 December 1974 ; 
30 rbid .; see also correspondence with administrators 
about compliance with Fair Labor Standards Act , Chancellors ' 




inclined to snack in their dormitory rooms or somewhere 
Although historically the university had not had 
~ worry about competition from Chapel Hill eating estab -
\ shments , such alternatives for students were increasing . 
Prillaman , unable to rely on a compulsory meal program , 
i ais ed prices too high , he would jeopardize needed volum e 
\ 
~f student customers . As another consideration, higher 
might disconcert influential alumni who wanted 
preserve the cheap "student spec ial" as a valuable part 
of UNC's tradition . 31 
Prillaman could choose to reduce inventories or draw 
from the food service ' s cash reserves. But t o do so would 
give only a temporary reprieve , would mean a reversal of 
recent commitments to expansio n, and would be a sign to 
the public that the food service was in financial difficulty . 
Another way of combating rising expenditures would be to 
cut back on labor costs . Layoffs might upset workers , but 
to Prillaman , a more important consideration was the 
likelihood that students would protest any cutback in 
servic e . The well-being of the food service depended on 
student patronage . 
While Prillaman contended with the food service's 
special problems , Chancellor Sitterson was busy reorganizing 
31George Prillaman interview , 6 September 1979; 
9aniel Pollitt interview , 4 September 1979 .- Each suggested 
that administrators were under pressure from alumni , as 
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the university's entire business operatio n. Evaluati ons 
by outside management experts showed that UNC ' s growth 
merited not only a change in the size of its administra-
tive staff , but also a change in kind--in effect , said 
Sitterson , "a whole new approach . " In May 1968 , after 
two years of searching , Sitterson appointed a "hard - headed 
businessman1132 to the newly-created position of vice 
chanci=llor for business and finance . That man was 
Joseph c. Eagles , Jr ., a tobacco warehouse owner and 
former state senator from the eastern part of the state . 
The fol lowing September , Eagles asked his friend Abi e 
Branch to rejoin the business staff and gave him a mandate 
to investigate "all phases of dining halls operati ons . 1133 
Eagles and Branch had administrative responsibil-
ities which extended beyond the dining hall operation ; 
nonetheless , thej seem to hav e given much of their attention 
to the food service . Like George Prillaman , they viewed 
the food service primarily as a business in financial 
trouble . Operating reports showed that L e noir Hall served 
32rn his interview , 10 December 1 97 4 , Sitterson 
noted the difficulty he had h ad in fi nd ing a businessman 
of proven abilities who could afford financially to take 
the relatively low-paying university job . Correspondence 
in thP. Chancellors ' Records , Business file , UNG Archives, 
indicates that Sitterson also had some diff i culty in 
getting the state to fund the position; see l etter from 
Governor Dan K. Moore , 10 April 1968 , about Sitterson ' s 
r e quest to transfer $27 , 000 in university salary funds 
so that Eagles could be hired . 
33James A. Branch to George W. Pril l aman , 
9 S~ptemb~r 1968 , Businoss Rec ords , UNG Archiv~s . L~tter 
r~fars to discussion b'?tween Branch and Eagles . 
30 
nearly 435 , 000 fewer paying customers in fiscal 1967 than 
in 1966 , and 230 , 000 fewer in 1968 than in 1967 . On 1 July 
1968 , the ledger for Chase Cafeteria disclosed a deficit of 
ov er $100 , 000 . The Pine Room also was operating at a lcss . 34 
Eagles , Branch , and Prillaman agreed generally that the 
se rvices of the separate campus cafeterias needed to be 
consolidated and that the facilities needed to be made 
more attractiv e . With Branch as the go-between , Eagles 
kept informed and in turn advised Prillaman about the 
effic acy of renovating Lenoir Hall and instituting 
mandatory meal programs for students . 35 
Occasionally Eagles and Branch acted independently 
of Prillaman 's counsel . According to Prillaman , Eagles 
could have , but did not , capitalize on his l egislative 
connections in Raleigh to get special help from the state 
budget office . 36 One thing that Eagles did do was to 
authorize Branch to explore the possibility of leasing 
t he university food service to a private contractor for 
34operating Reports for Lenoir Dining Hall , as of 
30 June 1967 and as of 30 June 1968 , Business Records , 
UNC .Archives . 
35correspondence during the fall of 1968 betwee n 
Eagles , Branch , and Prillaman , Business Records , UNC .Archives . 
36George Prillaman intprview , 6 September 1979 . 
Eagles had served on the .Advisory Budget Commission during 
his five terms as state senator . The R~~igh_li~!'.L§-~g 
Q£&~~Y~A' 31 Dec~mb er 1958 , described him as Governor 
Luther Hodges's "leg-man" in the General .Assembly . When he 
assumed his post at UNC in 1968 , the gh~rlQ11~_QQ&~~Y~~ ' 
3 0 Apr i 1 1 9 6 8 , c a 11 P. d him a "mo n ~ y - r a i s er , p a r ex c e 11 enc e , " 
and said that th e univ<>rsity had giv"!n him the "unpublicized 
t a sk of promoting a nd defending UNC in the State House . " 
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following school year . By the end of December 1968, 
~nch--inspired by the arrangements which other state-
ported universities had already work~d out , and enticed 
• the prospect of freeing the university from managerial 
for a failing business--had asked at least 
companies to submit preliminary proposals 
taking over future management of the UNC food services . 37 
, !he_£Q.ill~l~m..en1~~y_g~Qhl~m~_Qf 
l!:e.~Qnn~l-.an£_finsn~ 
In dealing with · the food service, Eagles and Branch 
primarily concerned about its financial stability, 
but neither they nor other UNC administrators were ignorant 
of the brewing dissatisfaction among the campus's non-
:, academic workers • . As far back as October 1967, Chancellor 
Sitterson had appointed a University Grievance Committee, 
with his assistant Claiborne Jones as its chairman , and 
charged it with devising coherent and uniform appeal 
procedures for non-academic employees. On 1 March 1968 , 
the chancellor ' s office announc ed those grievance 
procedures to all university employees . 
On 1 April 1968 , "to encourage clear understanding 
and to reduce fears or false impressions of unfair 
treatment ," the chancellor amended and expanded t he 
university 's personnel policies . Sitterson advised 
37Joseph C. Eag l es , Jr . , to James A. Branch , 
16 October 1968 , with copies to Claiborne Jones and . 
George Pri llaman, suggests exploring the possibility 
of leasing ; also correspondence between Branch and 
officials from Servomation , ARA Slater , and SAGA 








department supervisors to keep "wel l-in formed" of policies 
and to "communicate freely" with their empl oye es about 
gri evances ; he announc ed a "decentralizat i on agreement" 
with t he State Personnel Department , whereby t he univers i ty 
would have "significantly increased responsi bili ty" for 
ar r angeme nt s with its own personnel ; he set up a University 
Personnel Counci l (with Claiborne J on es as chairman, and later , 
Joseph Eagles as a member) to coordinate policies betwe~n 
the chancellor's office and th e universi ty and statP. 
perso nn e l offices ; and he appointed a standing university 
Commi ttee on Non-Academic Employee Appeals t o serve as 
the appellate court for employees seeking procedural remedy 
for their grievances . 38 -Such announcements seemed to have 
come none too soo n. An April strike in nearby Durham by 
Duke University's non-academic workers aroused widespread 
student suppo rt there , and for UNG administrators made the 
potential f or campus disruption in Chapel Hill all the 
more apparent . 39 
George Prillaman may have been pleased that the 
administratio n was att empting to clarify appeal procedures 
for employees , but he was also concerned that univ ersity and 
state controls on treatment of work e rs tended to limit his 
manag er ial flexibi li ty . Federal and state standards for 
38J . Carlyle Sitt erson memo , 1 Apri l 1968 , 
Chancel lor s ' Recor ds , file on Non - Academic Workers , 
Ad-Hoc Committee on Gri evanc es , UNG Archives . 
pay , and benefits might be suitable for 
r kers , but to Prillaman , regulations were of littl9 use 
.1~hout appropriations . Still , the welter of rules was , 
· n spite of the constraints , so confusing that it gave 
... 
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~anagement an opportunity to exploit regulatory ambiguities 
I 
Certainly George Prillaman had a financial 
to do just that. For instanc e , sinc e some s alary 
increase s were contingent upon the availability of funds 
(all salaries , including his own , came from receipts) , 
Prillaman exercised discretion in granting merit raises 
to his workers. In the absence of close supervisfon by 
state job - classification specialists , particularly after 
the university's decentralization agreements with the state , 
Prillaman could be expected to keep employees on as low 
a salary grade as possible . And s i nce split shifts were 
not prohibited by the state , what Prillaman called th e 
"inherent nature 11 40 of food service work--with labor 
n eeds peaking at meal times -- created an economic incentivP 
for their continuance . 
~lso , since the State Personnel Act protected 
permanent full - time employees , Pri l laman could avoid some 
state controls by keeping workers classified as temporary 
or part-time help . In Ju l y 1968 , Prillaman admitted to 
""'Vi ce -Chancellor Eagles that " carrying employees on 
------
40George W. Prillaman to Joseph C. Eagles, Jrs ., 
~ July 1968 , Business Records , UNC Archives . 
.. 
payroll beyond the normal p eriod is not a good 
Pril lam an went on to explain why the policy 
be continued nonetheless : "The labor market •. •• 
tightest we have ever encountered • • • • We are 
chronic drinkers, unr eliables and 
It did not take long to ~valuate 
workers , Prillaman said , but 
'.dismissing them for others of a like kind" was a 
I 41 
1• fr u st r at in g pro c e s s and no sol u ti on to the prob 1 em . " ,. . 
·Prillaman' s solution was to keep "unreliables" on 
~ temporary payroll as long as he employed them. 
By Octob er 1968 , all levels of the UNG administra-
~ion were aware of the foodworkers' grievances . Even 
Chancellor Sitterson knew of the workers' memo to their 
"Employers" ; he authorized his staff to discuss the 
suggestions in that memo . To Joseph Eagles , James A. 
Branch , Claiborne Jones , and Fred Haskell , many of the 
employees ' proposals must have seemed reasonable. Some , 
in fact , were already university policy--compliance with 
the Fair Labor Standards Act , prompt delivery of telephone 
messages , use of courtesy title , and notice of two weeks 
before laying off full-time workers . 
How Prillaman defended his management policies is 
34 
unclear. He probably guarded his prerogatives by declaring 
41 Ibid . 
his superiors that he treated workers with the respect 
they deserved and as fairly as financial circumstances 
, would allow. Pr esumably ~ Prillaman said that he could not 
give merit raises unl ess funds were available; that he 
could not fire a supervisor just to make way . for a woman 
like Mary Smith who "couldn't write her name 11 ; 42 that he 
could not avoid layoffs entirely; that he could not avoid 
having workers occasional l y perform extra duties ; and that 
he was within state guidelines in granting leave , holiday, 
and overtime benefits . 
Exactly what instruction Prillaman got from his 
superiors is lik ewise diffculty to determine . Apparently 
Branch, Eagles , and Haskell did encourag e Prillaman to 
abandon split shifts, give some weekends off , stop keep-
35 
ing workers overly long in temporary status , and have group 
meetings with emp l oyees to discuss grievances . 43 At the 
same time , the administrators knew the financial constraints 
under which Prillaman operated , and they probably suspected 
that the employees ' list of suggestions r ep resent ed an 
42Geo rge Prillaman interview, 6 September 1 979 ; 
Elizabeth Brooks attributed Prillaman with the same 
quotation , interview 18 September 1979 . 
43 Fred Haskell to Joseph Eagles , 5 November 1968 , 
a detailed review of the foodworkers ' suggestions . Other 
Busi ness Records reports show that there was a conscious 
effo rt by late 1968 to reduce split shifts a nd give some 
week ends off . Also see memo from Prillaman to food 
service emp l oyees , 19 , 22 November 1968 , inviting them to 
meet ings, UNC Archives ; in later interviews , Pine Room 














1 statement of the actual dissatisfaction among workers . 
~ 
sum , although they questioned some of his polici e s , the 
did not push Prillaman to alter drastically 
' conduct of everyday food service aff airso 
Thus within the UNG administration , trad~tional 
uationships were maintained , although under incr e asing 
Chancellor Sitterson early in his tenure had 
that the campus 's business operation was not 
responding effectively to n e w circumstanc e s o f 
iversity growth and economic necessity . As a consequence , 
high administrative officials had tri ed for 
to establish channels of communication and 
which were more appropriate to the times . Their 
.approach was based on the premise that under tighter 
organization the university would be both more efficient 
financially and more responsive to its workers . Towards 
the end of 1968 , the r eorganization process had started 
but was not yet well enough fixed to be easily evaluated . 
By then it was evident to administrators (and to 
foodworkers , albeit from a different perspective) that the 
food service was in trouble . Branch , Eagles , Haskell , Jones , 
and Sitterson gave varying degrees of thei r attention to 
the problem and its solution. They must have realized 
t hat the food service difficulty had many related aspects 
and that separate solutions to financial instability and 
Personn e l discontont were imp o ssible . If , f or in s tance , 
administrators urg~d George Pri ll aman to put stringent 
37 
on food service expenses--nearly 50 percent of 
costs--they were at the same time 
ncouraging , however unintentionally , more unrest among 
Thus in a sense the administrators were forced 
' y the situation to operate at cross-purposes with 
hemselves. 
In spite of the confusion , the administrators seem 
have tried , at least sporadically , to be respectful of 
the workers ' needs and to animate the Lenoir Hall 
~anagement staff to be sensitive to those needs . The 
~orkers ' charges of administrative negligence may have 
been justified even though the written correspondence 
among administrators gives no evidence of the intentional 
malice alleged by some workers . Nevertheless , neither 
the food service ' s chances for solvency nor the employees ' 
working conditions would much improve unless substantial 
policy changes were madeo Administrators considered the 
foodworkers ' needs but they were mainly preoccupied with 
the food ~~Yi£~~ n eed for financial stability . To the 
most outspoken of the workers , if the uni v ersity wanted 
a first - class food service , then the administration had 
better give workers its primary consideration . 
CHAPTER III 
THE STUDENTS 
UNC's dining hall operation existed of course to 
serve students . Hence manag ement made d ecisions based to 
a larg e Pxten t on its perception of student demands--
demands which in turn affected the working conditions 
of cafPtPria employePSo For example , before Prillaman 
saved money by cutting back on thP. dining halls ' opPrating 
hours, ho had to consider what Jamps A. Branch called the 
"far reaching implicati ons insofar as student rP.·lations 
arp concerned . 111 In October 1 968 , the weather b Pcame an 
additional consideration . A sevP.re drought impelled 
Prillaman to suspend dishwashing operations in Lonoir Hall. 
With the introduction of disposable paper plates and 
plastic utensils , students did much of the after - mP.al 
cleanup themselveso ~s a rPsult , the work of some cafe-
teria employees became expendable . On 11 Octob 0 r , 
Pril laman laid off ten L enoir Hall employees . 
For the first time , workers appealed publicly to 
students for help. The Dail..y_I..a.!:_Ho.!tl_ , UNC ' s student 
lJamos A. Branch to George W. Prillaman , 
9 Septomber 1968 , Businoss and Financ~ Division Records , 
UNC Archivos. Branch admonishes Prillaman not to discuss 
publicly plans for the cutback . 
, I 
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newspaper, said that an unidentified worker had written to 
the paper , urging that students refus e to clean up after 
eating , thereby to dramatize the need for rehiring the ten 
employees . On 16 Octob er , Prillaman admitted an "Prror in 
judgment" and offered to rehire the suspended workers . An 
18 Octob er ed itorial in the I~~-tl~~l applauded Prillaman ' s 
response to public pressure and emphasizPd the university's 
2 dual responsibility to its students and its workers . 
Yet in spite of student concern for the cafeteria 
workers laid off during the drought, few students seemed 
troubleq by--i f they were aware of--the full range of 
foodworker grievances against management . ~ 12 Octob er 
I.ar_li.e..el editorial , which suggested that rnanagemPnt refund 
to students the savings Aarned by the enlistment of cost-
free student help , made no suggestion of monetary restitu-
tion to workerso 3 Later in October, when management set 
up two "all-you-can-eat" self-service rooms in Lenoir Hall, 
students .let their appetit es talk for them ; there was no 
indication that students worried about the declining need 
for food serverso 
Student protests nevertheless continuPd to focus 
on the food· service . During the previous summer , Prillaman 
2~aily_I.a~-1i~~' 12, 17 , 18 October 1968 . LatPr, 
workers laid off were reimbursed from the chancellor's 
discretionary fund , authorized by Claiborn<> Jones; see 
note , 12 December 1968, BusinPss Records , UNC Archives. 















and Thomas A . Shetley , manager of the UNC Student Stores, 
had arranged to have the dining halls supply campus snack 
bars with sandwicheso4 Prillaman hoped that the agreem ent , 
besides providing an additional work opportunity for 
foodworkers , would boost dining hall revenues . But UNC 
students did not lik e the n e w arrangement; they thought that 
the snack bar sandwiches were unappetizing and too e~pen sivp . 
Shetley explained that high prices were the rpsult of the 
university ' s October commitment to raise · the minimum wageo 
Enough students were still dissatisfied , however, to induce 
UNC ' s student legislature to recommend , as protest , a 
boycott of Lenoir Hall breakfasts . 5 
Under pressure, Prillaman agreed to reduce the 
price of the sandwiches he supplied to the snack bars , but 
no sooner had that issue quieted than another student 
complai nt surfaced--this one about discourteous snack bar 
employee s . In r esponse , Shetley conceded that the 
university had hired some inept workers, but he maintained 
that state personnel restrictions mitigat ed against the 
employment of higher-qualified people and against 
conscient ious work by current employees . As Jo A. Branch 
4 Arrangpments between Prillaman and Shetlpy werP 
made with concurrence of James Ao Branch; final agreement 
sig nPd by all threP , 19 September 1968 , Business RQcords, 
UNC Archives . 
5Q..ail.Y-1.£I.-1:i~l , 24 October 1968 and 2 , 3 
Novembe r 1968 . 
would claim later , "the system did not encourage dedicated 
6 
work.,.rs . " 
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Throughout this period of growing public discontent , 
hall workers were caught in the middle . Campus 
grumbling about soggy sandwiches and surly service hurt 
the employees ' pride but left them little chance to 
respond . For example , foodworkers knew , Mary Smith said 
later , that the sandwiches were not very tasty by the time 
students bought them , but employees had no control over 
what was essentially a problem of distribution and storage . 
With regard to the charges of worker rudP.n.,.ss , Mary Smith 
pointed out how much easier it was to be respectful when 
one also receivP.d respect.7 At the time , management and 
not Mary Smith r espo nd ed to the student complaints with 
the explanation that employee wages had driven up 
customer prices while the employee wage structurP had 
driven down worker motivation . Both students and workers 
had grievances against managment, but for the timP being 
their interests did not coincide. Students may have 
intended to help the workPrs during the drought, but at 
other times students contributed to the frustration that 
was spreading among the foodworkers . 
6James A. Branch , summary of intorview by D' Ann 
Campbell , 2 October 1974 , SOHPC ; see also Q~i1Y-1:s~-tl:!~l , 
17 November 1968. 
7Mary Smith intervi ~w , 18 September 1979. 
lil~ck_§1YS~D1§_~ng_fQQ.Q~Q~k~L§~ 
~-.§.Q.a.£i~1-~~1-Qf_~lli.B...§ 
On 11 Dpcember 1968 , the voice of the workers 
suddenly SPemed to change, and with it , the pattern of 
protest against the management of thP university food 
service. On that day tho UNC Black Student MovPment (BSM) 
presented Chancellor Sitterson with a list of twenty -thr ee 
demands . The black students were "stomping down , " they 
said , because of their disdain for the "token , symbolic" 
efforts the UNC administration had made toward providing 
equal educational opportunity for all North Carolinians. 
The BSM demanded the immediate recruitment to UNC of more 
black students (the state was 24-percent black; thP 
university at Chapp! Hill, less than 2 percent) , and it 
demanded revision of the curriculum and implementation 
of social policies more responsive to the n eeds of black 
students already on the campus. 
The BSM letter to the chancellor spoke not just 
of student needs; it included those of the expanded 
community. Referring specifically to treatment of non-
academic workP.rs on campus , the black students accused 
the univprsity of "the most violent form of oppression 
and the denial of human dignity . " The BSM orderPd the 
admini strati on to "acknowl P.dg e its shortcomings" and to 
begin meeting immediatPly with employees and BSM mpmbers 















l eviati ng " in to l erable working conditions . 118 The BSM 
to takP their case to the public and the 
tone of their letter assured them of a 
statewide audience . The cafeteria workers , for their part , 
Aow had as a vocal ally a group of about one hundred UNC 
students . 
Th e alliance between black students and foodworkers 
which emerged in December 1968 was neither sudden nor 
accidentalo Preston Dobbins , a twenty-two year old senior 
and principal spokPsman for the BSM , said later that as far 
back as the spring of 1968 , one of the specific goals of 
the BSM 
was to try to establish some kind of ties with 
the surrounding black community •••• We werP. 
just a few black students on a white campus 
and we wanted to not be isolatPd and not to 
forget our roots •• o The closest thing we 
had for contact with an aspect of thP. black 
community was the cafeteria workers right here 
on the campuso9 
Foodworker Elizabeth Brooks , refl ect ing on the problems 
thP. employees had had in pr esenting their griP.vances to 
the administration , confirmed the origin of the tie between 
black students and foodworkers : "We con fidPd in Pri:>ston. 
8BSM demands listed in letter signpd by Juan 
Cofield to Chancellor Sitterson , Chancellors ' Records , 
filP on Black Student Movement , UNC Ar~hives . Also sPe 
.Q~ i 1 y_l.g_t:_tLe.e.l , 1 2 D e c em b ., r 1 9 6 8 ; fh.a12..e1-J!i 11 _!Y!!.!!lli , 
15 December 1968 . 
9PrPston E . Dobbins , interview by JacquPlyn Hall , 
4 Decernbi:>r 1974, SOHPC . 
,. 
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We kind of seeked him out from the others • he just 
seemed to be just a person that was l ooking out for things 
like this . 1110 
Dobbins had indeed long been looking out for things 
like the foodworkers ' problP.ms. Even before he graduated 
from a Chicago high school in 1964 , ho was coordinating 
"activist - oriented • o • free-wheeling • and intense" 
programs in his own Woodlawn communityo AftPr attending 
Chicago City Collegp as a "kind of passing idea , " and 
getting elected student body presidPnt whilo there, Dobbins 
c am e to N or th C a r o 1 i n a for a " ch an g e , " h av i n g b e en 
recruited by Michael Lawler to work in a Youth Educational 
Services (YES) project . .After sppnding the summer of 1966 
in Fayetteville , Dobbins began to lik e thP statp--"it was 
warm •• o there were a lot of trees and people were 
friendly"--so he decided to stay , coordinating for the 
next year a statewide YES follow-up program . It was , 
said Dobbins , 
a very valuabl e experienceo •• ~ I became aware of 
••• how diffprent groups relate to each other , 
based on power positions •••• I also lparned a 
lot about • • • the kinds of hasslps that would 
com P. up , the kinds of frustrations that people feel. 
Eventually, "as a result of just trying to do things and 
then feeling that I was getting nowher e , " Dobbins too 
b~came frustratPd . In th e summer of 1967 , still liking 
lOEli zabeth Brooks intervi ew, 22 October 1974 . 
Carolina but with "absolutely no interest in any 
' ;~l n d o f po 1 i ti c a 1 th i n g , " Dobb i n s P n r o 11 Pd at UN C i n 
Hill . 11 
During the fall , in spite of "really fe eling s or t 
contented , 11 Dobbins dPcided casually to attend a moe ting 
the campus Ghapter of the NAACP . What hP. said h e dis-
covered was a 11 bullshit group . . . r e a 11 y anti qu e • • • 
I felt this fire start to stir in me again •• • I said 
t o myself, 'Oh no ' • • • I had sworn to my spl f that I 
wouldn ' t get involved . " But Dobbins did anyway , as he 
explained: 
I don ' t even remember really making a conscious 
decision •• , • l remP.mber onP week just ••• 
talking to peop l e that I kn e w, saying that every -
body ought to get togP.thP.r and g-0 to the next 
NAACP mP.eting • • Gin~ since every black 
student was automatically a rn ombor ••• we 
would votP the abolition of tho group and then 
start another ono. So that ' s what I did . 
Dobbins admitted that voting the NAACP out of 
existence 11 was a suddP.n thing to happen 11 and 11 causod 
some antagonism 11 among the core of about a hal f - dozen 
NAACP faithful . 1 2 The campus NAACP latP.r reconstitutod 
itself and there was confusion for a time , at l oast to 
outsiders , about which organization black students 
belongod to , the NAACP or the exclusively-black insurgpnt 
gr oup calling themselves the Black Student MovP.ment • . 





BSM membP.r Wallaco R. Peppers recalled that the "universi ty 
wanted numb e rs ~bout membershiPJ; we coul dn ' t eve r find 
them . 1113 Preston Dobbins claimPd that by 1968 , thP. 
majority of blacks on campus were "pragmatically" loyal 
to the BSM , and all WP. r e r espo nding to "things in t h e air 
• • o ther e was a l ot going on around the country in tp rm s 
of black student political activism • . . gn Chapel Hil~j 
there was some unr P.st but no dirPction . 111 4 
In February 1968 , the slaying of three blacks by 
law-enforcement offic P. rs in Orang eburg, South Caro lina , 
offerP. d an opportunity for local blacks to givP dirP.ction 
to their feeling of unrP.Sto In ChapPl Hill on 16 February , 
' after a night of protests in nearby Durham and other 
southP.rn cities, about sixty BSM mpmb ers march P.d from the 
UNC campus to thP downtown p o st office . ThPr P they burned 
an eff igy of thP. South Carolina gov ornor , r e ad Claud o 
McK ay's poem "If We Must Dio ," promised that it "was not 
thP. P.nd of our activitiPs ," and marched back to campus . 15 
In the npxt months , "a lot of things solidifiod with thP 
group ," r emembered Preston Dobbins . 16 BSM members began 
to involve themselves in local community projocts . Th ey 
13
wallace Poppors , int orvi ew by William (Jo 0 ) 
Knight , 28 Octobor 1 968 , SOHPC. 
14Pr oston Dobbins intorViPw, 4 Dec ember 1974. 
15ChsQ£l_tlill_~~~kly , 1 8 February 1 968 . 
1 6prPst o n Dobbins int orv i ew , 4 Decembor 19680 
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s~t up a tutorial program for Chapel Hill youth , hPaded 
by Jack McLean , a sophomoro from Fayettovillo . Black 
students helpPd rogister local voters--th~ir interest 
at least partially attributablP. to thP prpsonce of 
Reginald A. Hawkins , a black dontist from Charlotte , in 
the North Carolina Democratic gubprnatorial primary. 
Hawkins ' s son Roggio was a momber of the UNG Black 
Student MovemPnt . 
According to PrPston Dobbins , th o assassination of 
Martin LuthP.r King , Jr., on 4 April markod the "end of an 
ora of peacPfu l non-violont rPaction . " DPclaring thPmSPlvos 
. 17 
"mad as hell" and "ready to moPt violence with violPnc e ," 
about thirty-fivo BSM members marched through downtown 
Chapel Hill on Friday the fifth. After buying sevoral 
ConfederatP flags , thPy burnPd the flags in front of the 
Kappa Alpha fraternity housP . Reports of a gun poked at 
marchPrs from a Delta Kappa Epsilon fraternity house 
window stirred thP blacks to angry threats of rPprisal , 
but therP was no violence. On Sunday after a memorial 
servico , the BSM was eXpPCtPd to l e ad a group that would 
include ChancPllor Sittprson and UNG President William C. 
Friday in a biracial proc ession through downtown . But 
at thP. last mompnt Dobbins refusPd , saying that hP was 
not interestod in l oading anything that was "ninPty 
percont white." 18 
17QsilY_I~~-tl~~l, 6 April 1968 . 
18Q~i1Y_I~~-tl~~l, 9 April 1968 . 
48 
On Monday, as ~Na thousand peoplP attended a 
mP.morial service on campus , the BSM movPd to capitalizo 
on the rP.lationship they had established with the local 
black community . Abjuring authorization from campus 
administrators and saying that thP university had not 
gone far enough toward showing proper respect for the 
slain Dr . King , the BSM askod all UNC black PmployPes not 
to work the next dayo On 9 April, about 90 percont of 
the university's black workers walked off their jobs . 
All dining halls but on° had to bP. closed . Campus officials 
' 
charged that thP. BSM had pressurPd employePS into th P work 
boycott , and Chapel Hill's polico chief , William Do Blake, 
reported that at !Past fifty throatening calls had bpen 
' madP. to downtown merchants and thP.ir black omployoos . 
Preston Dobbins in turn accused the university of intimi-
dating its wo rk ers and hailed the succoss of the boycott : 
"Black workPrs will rP.alize after today tho tromondous 
power we have if we act as a community . We can cripplo 
this University and the Univ ersity off i cials realize it . 1119 
In Durham that same week , fou r- fifths of tho Duke 
University students wore boycotting clas ses and maintaining 
a vigil in support of a str ik e by university dining hall 
employees . Joining with tho Durham Black Solidarity 
CommitteP , tho DukP students black and white were demanding 
19Quotation from Q~ilY_I££_ti~~1 , 10 April 1968 ; 
also s 0 e fh~2~1-1:!ill_~~~~1Y , 7 , 10 April 1968 . 
49 
a $1 . 60 minimum wage and collective bargaining rights for 
the workers . In Chapel Hill, however , by Wednesday , 
10 April , UNC students were in class and black university 
workers were back on their jobs . 
Th e UNC Black Student Movement command ed morP. 
attention later in the spr ing . They hecklod and shook 
an axe handle at formor Georgia governor Lestor Maddox 
when he spoke at UNC in latP .Apri l. With the campus 
chapter of the YMCA , the BSM sponsored a teach -in on race 
and poverty . In Septembpr the BSM was one of several 
groups count pr ing the univorsity ' s official oripntation 
activities with an unofficial "Disori ontati on . " Later 
in the fal~ th 0 y sponsored a black symposium, but WP.re 
disappointed wh on expected guest spoakPr Eldridge 
Cleaver failPd to show up . 
The main PVent, hoWPVPr, was the campus appearance 
on 21 Novembpr , at the BSM's invitation , of Stokoly 
CarmichaPl . Speaking to sixty-seven hundred peoplP in 
UNC's Carmichael Auditorium , Carmichael PXplainod to thP 
black stud ents sitting close by and to thP rpst of tho 
95 - percent white audi pnc e that white liberal s did not hPlp 
blacks rP.dress grievances , but rather interfered with thP 
necossary confr ontation bptwoen black "revolutionary 
violence " and consPrvativo white socioty's "institution-
. 20 
alizod violence . " 
--------
20~h~2~l_tlill_~~~kly , 24 Nov 0 mb 0 r 1968; Q~ilY_Is~ 
tl~~l , 22 NovembPr 19 68 . 
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The previous February, a federal court had ruled 
unconstitutionally vague a 1963 North Carolina statute- -
amended in a 1965 special session because it threatened 
l 
UNC's accreditation--prohibiting known communist sympa-
·thizers from speaking on state coll ege campus es . 21 The 
need for a new state "speaker-ban" law had been an issue 
the election just completed on 3 November . 
Recently-elected Democratic Governor Robert W. Scott 
survived a tough campaign against eastern North 
'Carolina Congressman James Gardner, a champion of George 
)allace and an advocate of resistance to school desegre-
gation as enforced by the Department of Health, Education , 
and Welfare . Although Gardner attributed his defeat to 
Scott's receiving the "Negro" vote, "few blacks were 
.' enthusiastic about Scott ' s candidacy . 1122 Many liberals , 
thought that Scott had run on a law-and-order 
that was especially appealing to militant 
segregationi sts . In his campaign, Scott had skirted 
commitment on the speaker ban , but shortly after his 
election and just as Stokely Carmichael appeared in 
21 Qh~R~l_tlil.l_~ggkl.y , 18, 21 February 1968 . 
22Earl Black , "North Carolina Governors and Racial 
Segregation , " in E,Q1i1i£.§_.snsL!:Q1i£Y_in_NQ!.1h_~.2ro1in.a , 
edited by Thad L . Beyle and Merle Black (New York : MSS 
Informat ion Corporation, 1975) , p . 75; Q~ilY_Iar_liggJ:., 
8 November 1968 . 
Ch a p e 1 H i 11 , S co t t p i ck e d a s hi s " chi e f 1 e g i s 1 at i v e 
23 
arm-twister" the f°ormer state senator , Th omas J . White . 
White was a member of th e UNC Board of Trust ees from 
eastern North Carolina and in 1963 had been a principal 
·', sponsor of the original speaker-ban law . 
White was thus r epresentativ e of the many people 
in the state who held UNC in high esteem yet worried about 
campus activism . The university in Chapel Hill had been 
a particu larly effective force in the state's history, 
but its "influence had not always been welcome , " according 
to Carlyle Sitterson in a later assessment . It was not 
surprising , said Sitterson , that as a public institution 
; dependent upon the po l itical process for its support , 
UNC had earned both 11 admiration and resentment by the 
st ate community ." 24 
Although the mood of the crowd at Stokely 
Carmichael's speech was reported to have been "not frenzy 
or any real tension , 1125 his appearance seemed to draw out 
more resentment than admiration from the people of the 
state . Newspapers reported afterwards that an increasing 
· number of state legislators were hopeful that the General 
Assembly soon to convene could rewrite a constitutionally 
23Announcement of White as liaison , gh~2£1_tlil1 
~g~k!.y, 4 December 1 968 ; descriptive quotation from 
~1£igh_~£~~-_gng_QQ~£~Y£~ , 7 March 1 969 . 
24carlyle Sitterso n interview , 10 December 1974. 
25gh~Q£l_tlill_~~~k1Y , 24 November 1968 . 
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cceptable version of the so-called "gag law . " Many 
nfluential po l iticians and editors felt that the Chapel 
campus should never have allowed Carmichael to appear . 
thosP who doubted the efficacy of renewing the speaker-
ban law were appalled by what they called Carmichael's 
flagrant v i olation , with impunity , of a 1941 state statute 
prohibiting use of a public building to advocate the 
overthrow of government . 
People more sympathetic to the university ' s 
predicament were not so concerned about the details of 
Carmichael's l eg al transgressions or the administration ' s 
prohibit or prosecute , but still they fretted 
responsible action could be taken to deal with 
the "contemptuous character (line!] ••• contemptible gospel" 
. 26 
of a person like Carmichael . Not until December did 
William Friday speak out on behalf of the Consolidated 
University ' s four-campus system . President Friday deplored 
1 the substance of Carmichael's remarks but he doubted the 
1
effectiveness of legal prior restraint on campus speakers . 
support of outgoing Governor Dan Moore , Friday 
the right of college students in Chapel Hill and 
elsewhere to hear Carmichael speak. 27 President Friday's 
statement , however , did not ameliorate the discontent . 
BSM had presented Chancellor Sitterson with 
26Ro land Giduz , Qhs£~1-tlill_~~~k1y , 15 December 1968 . 
27Qh~£~1_tlill_~g~k1Y , 22 December 1968 . 
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list of twenty-three demands, allegations that held the 
administration responsible for prejudiced action against 
including campus non-academic workers . 
As the year 1969 approached , then , the UNC adminis -
recognized the existence of problems in the food 
service, pressures from campus black students , and counter-
pressures from statewide public opinion . There also were 
the many concerns of everyday academic and business life , 
compounded further by the unrest of white students and 
members. Like the blacks , many whites had been 
seeking to define their roles as active participants in 
social reform; the BSM demands gave those whites a special 
opportunity to act on their dissatisfaction with the 
quo . 
Certainly by the fall of 1968 , many UNC white 
students were already conscious , as the blacks were , of 
"things in the air . " They too knew something about the 
1960s civil-rights campaig n s in the South , even though 
by 1968 , as junior Buck Goldstei n said , they had missed 
the chance to participate in the "moral crusade of the 
. t . ,,28 s1 -ins . Still , students had seen at least on 
· television and in newspapers the unrest in urban areas 
throughout the country . Many whites who had considered 
28Burton B. (Buck) Goldstein, Jr ., interview by 
Robert son , 1 7 Apr i l 1 9 7 4 , SO HP C • 
advocates of civil rights were made uneasy in 
he later sixties by the call for "black power . " But 
hatever ins ecurities such advocates began to feel about 
their own activist rol es , most would still have agreed 
Kerner Commission's assessment that white racism 
a principal cause of black revolt . Although 
to be asking less than before for white 
many whites , driven by a sense of justice 
perhaps by a need to assuage their own guilt about 
past , continued to support black - led movements . 
At UNC , some white students had participated in 
NAACP, and though discouraged from membership in the 
some forty whites had marched in the blacks ' Februa~y 
protest against the "Orangeburg Massacre . " Shocked 
by the April assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr ., 
54 
many whites attended the memorial services and later that 
·month cooperated with blacks in organizing a campus teach-in 
on racism and poverty, featuri ng such speakers as Carl 
'Oglesby , organizer for Students for Democratic Society (SDS) , 
. and Sandy Sel l ers , from the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC) . In April , some UNC white students had 
participated in the Duke University student vigil to uphold 
the right of foodworkers there to strike . In May , the 
QAilY_I~~-He~l called on the UNC Faculty Council to set 
up an ombudsman for black-employee grievances . 29 By fall , 
29Editorial, ~~ilY_I~~-li~~l, 8 May 1968 . 
need to get in touch with your racism," as Buck 
30 
oldstein called it , clearly had moti~ated some white 
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. 5 tudents to support the right of UNC blacks to seek redress 
their special grievances . 
The autumn air of 1968 had in it more than strictly 
issues . Student concern about race relations mixed 
with growing disaffection with the war in Southeast Asia . 
Young people across the nation felt threatened by the 
selective service system and were suspicious of university 
complicity with American defense industries . To many 
college students , campus administrators were the enemy 
incarnate , a bureaucratic authority which oppressed 
minorities , the poor, and students. In April at Columbia 
University , students fought the school administration as 
if it were merely the local agency by which American 
capitalism enforced racism , inequality, and economic 
exploitation. The following summer, any lingering optimism 
that the system could reform itself seemed shattered by 
the nightmares of Robert Kennedy ' s assassination in Los 
Angeles and the riots in Chicago during the Democratic 
Convention . By the fall of 1968 , student revol~ was in 
the air; few college campuses in the country were not 
troubled by the question , "Could it happen here?" 
The South , a battleground for racial and class 
conflict in the past, was again caught in the unrest 
30Buck Goldstein interview , 17 April 1974 . 
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· reading through the country . Public officials saw reason 
be uneasy and UNC administrators were no exception. 
the previous spring, they had heard students condemn 
and rail against suspected university collusion with 
effort . Students criticized the campus presence 
programs; they staged "guerilla skits" against the 
In March , a group sat-in in Gardner Hall to protest 
mission of a Dow Chemical representa-
tive; fifteen arrests were made after UNC officials called 
police .
31 
In his September 1968 orientation 
address , Chancellor Sitterson acknowledged that "man learns 
from a conflict of opinion and value , " but h,e urged students 
32 "responsibl e" in their "exercise of freedom . " In 
of the apprehensio n about possible open conflict at 
UNC, Dean of Student Affairs C. 0 . Cathey optimistically 
expected the university to avert disruption because its 
administrators were "happy to listen" to students. 33 
Not all students were convinced of the administra-
beneficence . The Q~i1Y_I~~-Heg1 charged that the 
administration was ignoring the more fundamental question 
' of whether the university intended to go beyon d verbal 
actual inclusion of students in the process 
-----------
31 Q.ai1Y_I..9!_tl~~l , 19 March 1968; ~h_g2gl_tiill_!Yggkly , March 1968 . 
32Q~ilY_I..ar_tiggl , 17 September 1968 . 
33
Editorial , "Will It Happen Here , " Q,gi.!.y_I..9!_ti,ggJ.. , September 1968 . 
f deciding policies which affected student lifeo 34 Even 
body president , Kenneth Co Day , a senior from 
Burlington who , as another student lead er described him , 
a radical , " warned that the university was not 
the needs of its students . 35 If all concern ed 
did not agree on how to accomplish their goals , 
agree that curfew and visitation rules should 
~ e more lenient and that course curricul a should be more 
1appropriate to student interests . 
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Activist students could seek reform through several 
organ i zatio n s , most of wh i ch were pol i tical l ife by 
, UNC student government recognition . Student government 
had a legit i mate tradition and its leaders , such 
Day , h ad easy access to offices of high administra -
· tors , including the UNC chancellor and president . The 
student judic i ary oversaw enforceme nt of rules for students 
student leg i slature had the power by 1968 to 
apportion about $250 , 000 i n stu den t f unds for campus 
activities. On e of stude nt governme nt ' s offshoots , the 
Experimental College under the guidance of Buck Goldstein , 
offered students a range of unoffic i al alternative -
curriculum choices . Despite such programs , students who 
were most impatient for campus reform were convinced that 
---------
34Ibid . 
35~~i1Y-1:~~-tlg~1 , 17 September 1968 . Quotation 
abo u t Day from Charles N. Jeffress , intervi e w by Kathy 
Robe rtson , 17 April 1974 , SOHPC . 
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student government was too unwieldy and conservative 
an effective agent for change . 
To some UNC students , the Southern Students Organiz-
Committee (SSOC) s eemed a better alternative . George 
Vlasits, a twenty-six year old former UNC student from 
ful l -time SSOC organizer , paid ten dollars 
a week . Based in a SSOC field office in Durham , he fre-
quently was on the UNC campus . He already had received 
public attention for having refused induction into the 
armed services a nd for bei n g one of the fifteen protesters 
·arrested at the Dow Chemical sit-in at UNC . In September 
1968, with the avowed intention of spurring "debate on 
~ important issues , 11 36 Vlasits helped organize a campus 
' 
' chapter of SSOC . Sam .Austel l , a junior from Greenville, 
South Carolina , was said to be the organization's chief 
, officer , but to Scott Bradley , a member from Darien, 
' Connecticut , the elect i on of officers and a statement of 
purpose were do n e merely to meet the criteria for unive r-
sity recognition . In return , SSOC received authorization 
;· to use campus facilities for meetings ; it got no university 
funds . Bradley remembered that "SSQC itself was a real 
sort of amorphous thing • •• it wasn ' t that people were 
particularly concerned about membership ••• it was an 
organizational tool . 1137 
36Q~ilY_I~~-tlg~l, 17 September 1968 . 
37 scott Brad ley, interview by author , 30 October 
1974 , SOHPC . 
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As such , SSOC had the support of the Q~i1Y_I£K_tl~~1 
Wayne Hurder, a senior from Champaign , Illinois, 
it a 11 good vehicle for effecting change . 11 
formed in 1964 from the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) as an adjunct for predomi-
nantly-white college campuses , SSOC at UNC encountered 
skeptics fearful of its being too radical . To those who 
alleged that SSOC and the New University Conference (NUC)--
its parallel structure among graduate students and young 
faculty--were mere fro n ts for SDS , Hurder answered that 
:SSOC was "better than SDS 11 because it had a less-exclusive 
leadership and was oriented more specifically to the needs 
southern studentso 38 
During the fall of 1968 , SSOC members lent their 
organizational support to several causes . In race relatio n s , 
SSOC, along with the BSM and the campus YMCA--long an 
· advocate of racial equality and harmony- - helped coordinate 
a boycott of Durham ' s Northgate Shopping Center , a boycott 
by t~e Durham Black Solidarity Committee to 
local business and government into providing better 
services for black citizens . The war i n Vietnam dro v e SSOC 
"' to denou n ce the United States's i.nyolvement and to 
support resistance to the draft . In November , eleven UNC 
students , including Bradley , Austell , and Andy Rose , local 






were arrested for distributing literature at the Fort 
military reservation . 39 
On ·the electoral front , SSOC passed out leaflets 
Durham campaign visit by American Party presidential 
candidate George Wallace. On 3 November , election night , 
ssoc expressed its disapproval of all candidates by 
sponsoring a "non-electlon" party in downtown Chapel Hill . 
As votes were being counted that would make Richard Nixon 
the country ' s president and Robert Scott the state ' s 
governor, SSOC ' s party spilled from the sidewalk into 
Franklin Street . Larry Kessler , a UNG history instructor 
' active in NUC , was arrested for obstructing traffic . When 
his friends moved to free him , five more arrests were made , 
including George Vlasits and a BSM member, Eric Clay . 40 
On campus, allying on occasion with leaders from 
Student Government, the YMCA , and National Student 
Association , SSOC took the initiative in pressing the UNC 
administration for more student rights. When SSOC circu-
lated a petition calling for more lib eral visiting 
privileges between campus men and women , nearly four 
thousand students signed it . SSOC submitted the petition 
to Dean Cathey , and then in the next weeks , led several 
hundred students in each of two marches ·(said to be the 
---------39 
2si!Y_I~~-lig&! , 19 November 1968 . 
402£i!Y_Is~_li&~! , 6 , 8 November 1968; ~hsQ~l_liill 
~~~k!y , 6 , 20 November 1968 . 
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since protests against th e 1965 s p e aker ban) from 
Chancellor Sitterson ' s residence. Such 
student feeling stimulated neg otiations 
ich by December had the administration authorizing a 
form of open-house visitation . 41 
Campus activists continu ed to put pr essure on th e 
even in situations wher e the university 
ould be held only indirectly accountable . Students were 
by what they saw as over - reaction and rough-handling 
Chapel Hill police at the election night street 
They were angered by the Episcopal Church's 
eassignment of William R. Coats, a campus chaplain active 
ith students in anti-war , open-housing, and racial-equality 
SSO C, NUC , and U.AWMF ext ended the range of their 
by jointly publishing the Pr.Q..t.~sn-1Ls!.di~h; a first run 
thousand copies quickly sold out . In early December , 
black students were still infuriated by Carolina Union 
director Howard Henry ' s handling of Stokely Carmichael ' s 
appearance (they said that Henry would not allow them to 
raise funds by charging admission) and by what they called 
'Dean Cathey's pigeonholing of a $64 , 000 Carolina Talent 
~earch proposal to HEW which would have aided in the 
recruitment of minority students--items for which they held 
the ca~pus administration directly responsible . 
41 Q~ilY_I~K_tlg~l , 4 , 18 , 29 October 1968 , and 
2, 14, 19 Nov emb e r 1968 . 
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In spite of the difficulties, however, one could 
that the administration was both listening to and 
' volving students in decision making . Besides changes 
visitation policy , SSOC and NUC had secured from the 
pledge to discontinue having campus 
attend their meetings . Many students 
plauded administrative support of the right of professors 
0 speak against the war . Many were encouraged by the 
ancellor ' s advocacy of a relaxation in the state ' s 
penalties--a stand, along with visitation rights, 
Sitterson had received the public censure of 
state politicians, including gubernatorial 
Jam~s Gardnero 42 The administration , in sum , 
be steer ing down a middle road between radical-
and conservative - political pressures, responding 
but surrendering to neith er • . If such a policy 
lack decisive ne ss , it could nevertheless be 
dustified if it prevented revolt from either side . 
Meanwhile , the UNG cafeteria workers continued 
the university its meals . Like other groups on 
campus , the foodworkers had personal needs that required 
' urgent administrative attention . Unlike the other groups , 
·the workers remained almost invisible , their voices 
unheard among university dinner conversations 
----------
42Gardner ' s criticism of the chancellor came only 




00 cerning other issu es - -that is , un ti l 11 December , when 
Student Movement dramatically spoke out in their 
I~n2iQn_2g21~in~g~ 
b£mini21~~1iQn_in_£_~Qg~g~g 
Preston Dobbins claimed that he attempted to meet 
Chancellor Sitterson a few days aiter presentation of 
th e BSM demands, but that he was allowed to talk only with 
Jones and Dean Cathey . Dobbins reported that 
a gap in the office door he had seen Sitterson 
a newspaper . A South Building secretary gave a 
version of the confrontation : "That ringleader 
:• •• just came slouching in here real cocky -l ike and says 
43 
.to Dr . Jones , 'Hey , are you Jones? ' " Howeve:r it 
happened , communication between administrators and black 
students was strained . Officially , Chancellor Sitterson 
replied only by promising in a letter to Dobbins and 
BSM co-chairman Juan Cofield that he would answer their 
44 demands in detail before the end of January 1969 . The 
black students were frustrated by the administration ' s 
to act . 
Coincidental with the delivery of the BSM demands 
administration came the public release of a report 
43Both accounts in Qh£2~l_tlill_~ggkly , 
December 1968 . 
44J . Carlyle Sitterson to Juan Cofield and Preston 
Dobbins , 16 December 1968 , Chancellors' Records , BSM file , 
UNC Archives. 
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bY a Faculty Council committee chaired by J . Dickson 
Phillips , dean of the UNC Law School . Formed the previous 
group had studied policies for integrating 
students into the university community . Having 
observed the number of black students increase only to 
a trickle in the thirteen years since court-ordered 
integration , the Phillips committee urged the university 
to adopt a policy of higher risk in the admission of 
minority students who did not meet normal admission 
standards. The committee also recommended the appointment 
of an ombudsman "to act in respect to special racial 
grievances involving Negro students and other members of 
the University community . 1145 The Phillips report was 
, welcomed general l y by supporters of more affirmative 
integration policies but some , r emark ing that the faculty 
committee had overlooked the need to recruit black 
professors to UNC , criticized the report as just another 
glaring sign of the white community's blindness to black 
needs . 46 
I n any case , as people anxious l y awaited the 
chancellor ' s reply to the BSM , tensions were heightened 
by publicity of troubles on other college canpuses in 
64 
45Minutes of Faculty Counc il meeting , 6 December 
1968, Chancellors ' Records, file on Faculty Affairs ; see 
al so ~.a12tl_tlill_ V/P...e_tly, 18 December 1968 ; cf. report by 
Long committee , 12 June 1979 , for reiteration of many of 
the Phillips committee recommendations (notes , Chap . I , p . 8) . 




the country , particularly at Brandeis and at San Francisco 
In North Carolina and at UNC , many people deplored 
the B SM ' s qu e st for "r ever s e di s c r i min at ion for p u r el y 
1 .. 47 co or reasons . Such people advised Chancellor Sitterson 
firm agains t "this sort of foolishness 1148 from the 
"lunatic fringe . 1149 One letter-writer asserted that high 
admissions standards were the "only chance" the campus had 
to avoid becoming a "totally negro university . 1150 Another 
was unsympathetic to the "African Niggers who want 
the School ;" he suggested that Sitterson "tell them 
people in hell want ice water . 1151 
Not everyone was aghast at the BSM demands . George 
urged whites not to question the content of the 
black demands but rather to focus on the common struggle 
by creating additional demands . The Q~i1Y-1s~-li~l was 
more temperate , preferring to use the term "necessities" 
instead of "demands," but it supported the black students 
and pointed out that their claims on behalf of university 
non-academic workers was "fully justified . 1152 Even the 
---------
47Editorial , fh~2gl_liill_We~~ly, 15 December 1968. 
48Hugh Morton to Chancellor Sitterson , 12 December 
1968 , Chancellors ' Records , BSM file , UNC Archives . 
49 Dean James C. Ingram to Chancellor Sitterson , 
16 December 1968, Chancellors ' Records . 
50J . D. Medlin to William C. Friday , 17 December 
1968 , Chancellors ' Records . 
5lc . Mitchell, Sr ., to Chancellor Sitterson , 13 
December 1968 , Chancellors ' Records. 
52Editorial , Q~ily_I~~-li~gl , 12 December 1968 . 
' . •' 
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loc al chapter of the Associa tion of American University 
(AAUP) held an open forum and passed a resolution 
supporting "in general" the BSM demands.53 
In early January, Chancellor Sitterson , speaking 
television news conference , gave only a hint of his 
perspec tive on the issue . He sai d that the univ ersity had 
been concerned for some time that rising costs and high 
admission standards threatened to take UNC beyond the mean s 
of a "large percentage" of North Carolinians . Sitterson 
did not outline specific administrative measures to deal 
with the problem of costs and standards , but he did invite 
the faculty to join with the administration in considering 
university policy towards the "culturally deprived . 11 54 
The chancellor may have welcomed assistance in 
formula ting new policy , but it was the UNC administration 
which had to accept the burden of accountability imposed 
by the state . The administration, more than faculty or 
students , had to fight the threat of the Chapel Hill 
campus ' s diminished influence at the state level . In times 
past , according to state Senator Ralph H. Scott , the 
"legislature was made up of UNC graduates and they never 
thought of having a governor that wasn ' t a graduate of 
--------
53
oaniel Pollitt to Chancellor Sitterson, 23 January 
1969, about the AAUP's e ndorsement of the BSM on 14 January , 
Chancellors' Records ; also see Q~ily_.I_g~_tl£gl , 16 January 
1969. 
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Chap e l Hill . 11 55 Now , across the state, even people normally 
to the university, whether because they wavered in 
allegiance or because they were less confident of 
influence, seemed more reluctant than before to speak 
out on behalf of programs for the Chapel Hill campus . The 
Consolidated University in 1969 was expanding to its fifth 
and sixth state campuses , making the Chapel Hill campus 
relatively less predominant . The incoming governor , Robert 
Scott, was the first since his father twenty years before 
not to have studied at the Chapel Hill campus. One could 
expect, especially because of the publicity given to 
campus activists , that the campus's proposals for biennial 
appropriations would get unusually close scrutiny from the 
, new state legisla~ure convening in Raleigh . 
~s Sitterson prepared an answer that would be 
addressed as much to the state and to other college admin-
istrators as to UNC black students , he had the sympathy 
of the fh~£gl_tlill_~ggk1~· The paper , recognizing that 
the UNC administration was "bound by constitutional and 
policy limitations and some very hard realities , " said that 
the chancellor would be politically vulnerable however 
he turned : 
55Ralph H. Scott interview by Jacquelyn Hall and 
Bi ll Finger , 22 April 1974, Politics Project , Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina Library , 
Chapel Hi 11 • 
If the Chanc e llor so much as appears to b e retreating 
slightly before the BSM, he will be calling down wrath 
upon himself and the Unive rs i ty as sure as the Legis-
lature sits in Raleigh . If he turns the demands down 
out of hand ••• the Chancellor will be challenging 
the BSM to make its next move . 56 
68 
would be unfortunate , add e d a later editorial , adverting 
Sitterson as a civil-rights advocate with proven 
" if black students fail to r ecog niz e that 
in Ch an c e 11 o r Si t t er son th e y h ave a v a 1 u ab 1 e f r i end • 11 5 7 
Drafts of Chancel l or Sitterson ' s reply to the BSM 
circulated to deans and department chairmen for review 
and suggestions . The carefu l ly - worded final text h ad the 
. 
full conc urrence of UNC President Wi l liam Friday . The 
chancellor's official reply , nineteen pages long , was 
released publicly on 24 January . If it were possible to 
find high gr ound i n the middle of the sea , Sitterson ' s 
aimed for it . 
Pledging first that the univ.ersity needed a "better 
future" than would be poss i ble if it coun tenanced "unique 
treatme nt" of any color , the chancel l or went on to a 
point-by-point respon s e to the BSM demands . Some demands , 
he agreed , represe n ted val id university needs ; h e announced 
. the formation of faculty - student committees to study the 
possibility of an Afro-Amer ican cur r iculum and the 
56Editorial , gh~Q~l_tlill_~~~kly , 15 December 1968 . 
57 Editorial , gh~Q~l-liill-~~~kly , 29 January 1969 . 
69 
~ovement in the campus status of minorities (and he soon 
1d appoint James Ao Garriss, a black undergraduate , as 
istant director of univers~ty admissions) . Other BSM 
ands , however, Sitterson dismissed outright; neither 
n Cathey nor Howard Henry would be fired . Still other 
to act upon, said Sitterson, and 
hers were simply beyond the reach of the university's 
jurisdictiono 58 
Across the state , editors generally praised 
for setting a "proper tone" for discussion; they 
he had gone "as far as he could go in an 
. t• 1159 posi ion . One major daily did point out, 
Sitterson could have cited legislative 
providing special treatment for the enhance-
black education. 60 On campus , the Qaily_Ia~-tl~~l 
complimentary . Charging the administration with 
~ 0 dangerous complacency , 11 61 it said that Sitterson had 
(failed in a special opportunity to exhibit the "new 
~ttitudes , new understanding , new will" appropriate to the 
times . 62 Co ntrasting Sitterson with former UNC president 
58rext of response, Chancellors ' Records , BSM file, 
Archives; also in Q~ilY_I~~-tl~~l, 4 February 1969 . 
59ghaK1211~_QQ2~~Y~K ' as reprinted in Q~ilY_I~K-li~gl, 
5 February 1969. 
60§K~~ll3QQKQ_Q£ily_N~~2 ' as reprinted in Qai1Y-I£K 
tl~~l, 5 Februa=y 1969 . 
61 Editorial, Q~ilY_I~~-tl~gl , 5 February 1969 . 
62Editorial , !2..ailY_I£~_tlgg1 , 4 February 1969 . 
Chase, who dared teach evolution in the 1920s , 
Frank Porter Graham, a UNG president and U. S . 
denounce North Carolina ' s Jim Crow laws 
~ the 1940s , the I£K_tiggl rebuked the chancellor for 
ho osing not to use the prestige of his office "but rather 
hide behind the limits . "63 
The BSM took the attitude that if Sitterson were 
ally , they needed no enemies . They said that they had 
~nterpreted Sitterson ' s delay to mean that he was setting 
in motion programs to implement their desires . They 
his 1 etter as a 11 f1 at rejection" of their 
demands. 64 They were especially incensed by Sitterson's 
70 
that non-academic working conditions were continually 
improved . According to Sitterson, "vigorous efforts 
for several years" had brought the UNG employee pay scale 
above the federal minimum; he also noted the existence of 
· a well-developed university grievance procedur e and the 
continual recruitment and training of minority workers 
promotion . 65 
To the contrary , the BSM point~d out that Sitterson 
ignored their request for administration officials to 
meet directly with workers and black students. He had not 
.mentioned the lis t of grievances sent to him by the 
--------
63 Ibid . 
64~h~2gl_liill_~ggkly , 26 January 1969 . 









odworke=s th e previous October . He had not mentioned--
r to their mind , investigated--either the problem of job 
or the possibility that some workers actually 
than regulations required . And if 
were a training program for promotion , why were no 
workers aware of it? If there existed a grievance 
were those responsible for hearing complaints--
rom Prillaman to Sitterson--apparently so unwilling to 
rocess those grievances~ 66 
In January , much campus and state agitation focused 
chancellor's official response to the BSM . Less 
vi s ible during that time were the foodworkers ' activities . 
} 
}aced with conditions they saw as steadily worsening, 
~ 
the employees, especially in the Pine Room, developed a 
more aggressive style of protest . Elizabeth Brooks ' s 
. experience seems to have been a touchstone of that new 
She recalled that even after the BSM had spoken 
in the workers ' behalf, and long after the foodworkers 
first talked to administrators about pay shortages , 
own ninetieth work day came and went without a promotion . 
weeks later , she was still a temporary employee . 
Dissatisfied and exasperated by the delay and by the 
noncommittal exp lanations of supervisor Ottis White , she 
talk with Prillaman directly . Her fellow workers , 
----------
72 
remembered , "were very upset ••• they were all afraid 
were begging me not go up and bother him , because they 
would fire me . " But saying that she did 
if she were fired , Elizabeth Brooks went anyway 
with Prillaman . He assured her that she would 
soon receive permanent status . Not satisfied , she told 
that if her work were satisfactory , then she 
should be promoted immediatelyJ she would not continue 
working as a temporary employee . When Elizabeth Brooks 
to work in the Pine Room, she was on the 
67 payroll . 
Some years l ater , Elizabeth Brooks said that 
Prillaman had not known much about her except that she 
had a " big mouth . " She interpreted her success as 
evidence that Pri llaman wanted to keep her quiet . She 
remembered that her fellow workers f ir st reacted w,ith 
jealousy to her encounter with Prillaman . They started 
11 wh i s per in g to on e an o the r and s a yin g ' It ' s not f air • • 
She don't work n o harder than we do .'" No:r had she been 
there as long as some of those still classified as 
tempo:ra:ry . But instead of being reticent about her 
accomplishment , Elizabeth Brooks took the opportunity 
t o exhort the others . "I told them that what they were 
saying to each other wa sn't going to help • • •• They 
--------
67Elizabeth Brooks interviews , 22 October 1974 
and 13 September 1979 . 
to ••• let Prillaman know their feelings the 
as I had . 1168 
73 
The effect on other foodworkers of Elizabeth Brooks ' s 
was magnified by their association with UNG black 
Episodes are difficult to pinpoint chronologically, 
but foodworkers were meeting with black students before the 
BSM's December demands . In the subsequent six weeks before 
Sitterson ' s reply , they met even more frequently . Elizabeth 
Brooks charact erized the meetings as informal , happening 
individual workers on supper break might grab a sand-
and then sit at a dining room table and talk with 
black students . After a succession of such impromptu 
gatherings , · grievances began to be more commonly known 
and more careful l y recorded . At some point , Preston 
suggested and arranged for more - formal me e tings 
between workers and students, away from the job . How many 
were held , where , and how many foodworkers 
attended cannot be certified . But , say both the food -
workers and Preston Dobbins , such meetings di d take place . 69 
Preston Dobbins remembered that complaints which 
, had seemed bad enough wh en voiced by individuals , "sounded 
J 
texrible" when foodworkers expressed them in a group setting . 
Dobbins later was to minimize his own role in organizing 
68Ibid . 
69Elizabeth Brooks interview , 22 October 1974; 
Elizabeth Brooks and Mary Smith interview, 18 September 1979 : 
Preston Dobbins , intervi ew by oral -his tory class , 5 December 
19 7 4 , SO HP C o 
00 dworkers against what they saw as systematic 
"I didn ' t have to do anything," he said; 
with the BSM merely provided a forum for 
foodworkers which "focused rather than scattered" 
. 70 
already recognized. But it seems 
Dobbins did play a major role; he "could talk 
really make you aware of some of the things 
you had been overlooking," said Elizabeth Brooks . 71 
BSM - -principally Jack McLean, Eric Clay , and Reggie 
addition to Dobbins- - acted as a catalyst , 
uraging worker protest and accelerating its pace . 72 
Elizabeth Brooks ' s personal persistence gave the 
ernal organizing effort an example of success. Mary 
an important figure since , at I.east in 
e Pine Room , management and workers each relied on her 
the other . At first she was reluctant to 
sessions with black students , but concern 
r her co - workers (among whom was her sister Esther 
effries as well as her cousin Elizabeth Brooks) gradually 
74 
ed her to commit herself more openly to the group ' s cause . 
though conditions in the Pine Room may have been no worse 
Hall upstairs or elsewhere on campus , the 
70Preston Dobbins interview , 5 December 1974 . 
71 
Elizabeth Brooks interview, 22 October 1974 . 
72Dobbins interview , 5 December 1974; Elizabeth 
and Mary Smith interview , 18 September 1979 . 
'I 
I 
combination of what Preston Dobbins called an 
·ator" (Elizabeth Brooks) and a "strong follow-
personality" (Mary Smith) 73 caused organizing 
to be concentrated in the Pine Room . 
Meeting with the BSM seems , not surprisingly , to 
the workers more acutely aware than before that 
involved together in a racial conflict . The 
of racial justice was probably discussed 
in meetings of black workers and students , 
BSM involvement in the weeks before the 
not seem to have altered the character of 
grievances , which were basically unchanged 
Throughout , consciousness of race seems 
been more important to the workers than conscious-
themselves as part of a larger labor movement . 
odworkers were aware of problems experienced by other 
on-academic workers on campus, but their vision was 
their own everyday needs . Moreover , 
the foodworkers did not seek the counsel of outside labor 
There are indications , however , that behind 
the scenes some UNG faculty members and black students had 
discussed the use of outside organizing help . 
Back in the summer of 1968 , Preston Dobbins, Joyce 
(a black UNG graduate student) , and two UNG facu l ty 
75 
members (Ted Cloak and Roger Wells) met with Peter Brandon , 
----------




union oEficial who was active with non-academic 
at Duke University . Because they knew that 
collective ba~gaining and union contracts were prohibited 
for state employees , the group decided to ask Howard 
fuller , training directo~ of the Foundation for Community 
Development , to choose a " prober" to reconnoiter the UNC 
situation and id entify "indigenous leaders" to head 
camp u s o r g an i z i n g e f f o r t s i n th e f a 11 • Th e gr o up al so 
made arrangements , through Fuller , to support those efforts 
financially o7 4 Later reports said that Otis Lyte, a black 
amateur organizer , was on the UNC campus in the fall of 
1968.75 Whether Lyte was the official 11 prober 11 and how 
effect ive he was in his organizing efforts can only be 
determined through inference . Foodworkers do not remember 
having received his counsel nor that of Brandon prior to 
the February walkout . 76 
During January 1969 , meanwhi l e , popular suspicion 
of the food service ' s financial troubles was fueled by 
the univers i ty ' s ann ouncemen t that it wou l d delay construe -
tion of a long - promi sed snack bar in the new student union . 
J . A. Branch co n firmed public l y that outside firms had 
7 4Memorandum from group of nine faculty members to 
"Faculty concerned with plight of non-academic employees , " 
31 July 1968 , in Chancellors ' Records , file on Strike : Non-
Academic Workers . 
75g~~~n~£Q~Q_2~i1Y-~~~~ ' 16 March 1969 . 
76Elizabeth Brooks interview, 14 November 1974 ; 
Mary Smith and Elizabeth Brooks interview , 18 September 1979; 
Mary Smith , Verlie Moore , Elsie Davis, and Oveata Compton 











been asked to determine why students were not patronizing 
bl . f . 1. . 77 availa e campus eating aci ities . Known privately 
among administrators but not admitted generally , teams 
from both SAGA and ARA Slater commercial firms had visited 
the campus , studied the food service , and wer e preparing 
contract proposals to take over dining hall operations 
78 in June . 
While some university officials concentrated on 
the economic predicament , personnel director Fred Haskell 
and George Coffer , university special services officer , 
attended to the personnel problem . 79 Coffer attempted to 
pacify what he took to be the "isolated nucleus" of 
dissatisfied foodworkers . On 10 January , Coffer wrot e 
to the state personnel department that relations with 
dining hall employees had improved and that "overall 
morale appears to be quite satisfactory . " 80 Meanwhile , 
Prillaman moved to reduce substantially the number of 
workers on sp l it shifts , but he was primarily occupied 
with finances rather than with employee comp l aints . 
77 
7 7~silY_1£~-tl~~1 , 8 February 1969 . 
7 8 See correspondence between Branch and representa-
tives of the firms, Business and Finance Division Records , 
file on Food Servic es . 
79
rn a summary of h er intervi ew with Claiborne s . 
Jones , 28 November 1974 , D' Ann Campbell reported that higher-
level administrators had intentionally l eft Haskell and 
Pri llaman to so lve the employee grievances . 
80George L . Coffer to Sam W. Badgett, with copies to 
Branch , Eagl es , a nd Jones , 10 January 1969 , Business Records . 
According to some foodworkers , Coffer and Prillaman offered 
raises to individual troublemakers . 
end of the month , he set up a central commissary in 
Hall and proposed laying off thirty-seven employees 
from Chase Cafeteria , a move made necessary, he remarked , 
by the "high-rising costs of 1abor . 118 1 
In spite of the growing group consciousness , Pine 
78 
Room workers continued the tactics they had tried previously, 
and with much the same unsatisfactory results . Mary Smith 
said that the workers compiled a new list of grievances , 
including questions about the supposed January first pay 
raises , and asked her to represent them to Prillaman . 
Pr i 11 am an , she s a i d , to 1 d h er th at he di d n ' t 11 h av e time 
to look at this mess , " to which she replied , "Then we ' ll 
leave it with you in case you find time ." Prillaman also 
82 
turned down her request to meet with employees as a group . 
Workers recalled that he gave no reason for his refusal , 
but one can surmise that Prillaman realized that such a 
meeting would place him in a situation which would be both 
uncomfo rtable to him personally and compromising to him as 
director . Prillaman might also have felt that the food-
workers were being unduly influenced by black students whom 
he regarded as interlopers in manager-worker relations . He 
may have believed that a general meeting would give a few 
soreheaded employees a stronger forum than their petty 
81 Q.gi1~-I.g~-tl~~l , 5 February 1969; also George W. 
Prillaman to James A. Branch , 28 January 1969 , Business 
Reco rds . 
82Ma~y Smith interview , 10 April 1974; Elizabeth 
Brooks and Mary Smith interview , 18 September 1979. 
ievances and small following deserved , or that it would 
interpreted as an implicit admission of bad working 
In addition , he may have felt that collective 
proscribed by law anyway , was an ineffective 
of correcting individual complaints . 
Whether , as George Coffer suggested , his efforts 
those of Branch , Haskell , and Prillaman actually 
mollified the majority of the dining hall employees is 
( 
79 
difficult to know . .According to El izabeth Brooks , satisfac-
1tion among the workers may have been apparent but it was 
She remembered , for instance , one time when 
Prillaman came downstairs to the Pine Room crew and "bawled 
He .gave an ultimatum , she said , that included 
thinly-veiled threats about job security if employees kept 
meeting with black students . Prillaman ' s "throwing his 
weight around • • • shook up the majority" of the work er s , 
said Elizabeth Brooks , and left many of them too intimi-
t t . . . t. . t. 83 o con inue organizing ac ivi ies . 
With the encouragement of black students , however, 
a core of about a half-dozen workers remained determined . 
The principal ch al 1 enger s were Mary Smith , Elizabeth Brooks , 
Esther Jeffries , Elsie Davis , and Sarah Parker from the 
Room ' s second shift , and Verlie Moore and .Arny Lyons 
f:rom the first shift . According to Elizabeth Brooks , the 
other individuals in the dining hall told her more-tightly 
--------
83Elizabeth Brooks interview , 13 September 1979 . 
organized g1·oup that "I 1 m not going to say nothing, but I 
be with y 1 all . " Said Elizabeth Brooks about her wary 
co-workers , " We knew they agreed with us . 1184 
Having gained the campus's notice with the 
presentation of their December demands, BSM members were 
even more the center of attention in the weeks following 
80 
Chancel l or Sitterson 1 s January reply . Although many whites 
were gratified by what th ey saw as Sitterson ' s statesman-
like firmness , 85 enough others were vocal about their 
disappointment to give the appearance of added white 
sympathy for the BSM ' s cause . The BSM meanwhile evaluated 
cautiously how best to use the new support . To some extent , 
black students chose to withdraw from public scrutiny , 
keeping to themselves while letting their partisans carry 
on the debate. 
"We'd like white support but we ' ll do our own thing 
regard l ess ," Preston Dobbins a<:fvised a noon rally of four 
86 hundred people in Memorial Hall on 7 February . Then he 
stood watching as George Vlasits, sociology professor 
Richard Roman , and other representatives of SSOC , NUC, and 
the Graduate Student Association led a march downtown . 
84Ibid .; also Mary Smith interview, 18 September 1979 . 
85Numerous letters of encouragement to Chancellor 
Sitterson , in Chancellors ' Records , BSM file . 
86ch~2gl_liill_~ggkly , 9 February 1969. 
81 
Chanting "Vfork, study , get ahead , kill! , " the demonstration, 
which was irrit ating but not disruptive to downtown 
businesses , concluded back on campus with one hundred 
supporters of the BSM staging a peaceful ten - minute 
occupation of South Building , where UNG administrators 
had their offices . 87 
Students also crashed the regular monthly meeting 
of the university Faculty Council on Friday the seventh . 
Though some faculty members worried about setting a danger -
ous precedent, students were allowed to stay as long as they 
did not partic ip ate in debate . During deliberations chaired 
by Chancellor Sitterson, the council passed a resolution 
which admonished demonstrators and assured the administra-
88 tion of faculty support for a "free and open campus . " 
Fifty-six UNG faculty members , mostly in the soclal sciences , 
were not satisfied with the stand of the Faculty Council; 
they sent a separate letter to the chancellor, calling on 
him to recognize the "validity and importance" of the BSM 
demands. The document , written by sociology professors 
Charles Goldsmid and Robert Stauffer , asked Sitterson to 
redouble· efforts to accommodate minority needs rather than 
to exaggerate the university ' s past endeavors . The petition 
included a plea to increase wages and promotional 
87Rslgigh_Ng~~-sng_Q£~gKygA , 8 February 1969; 
12.sily_I..s..r._tl~Ql, 8 February 1 969. 
88Minutes of Faculty Council meeting , 7 February 
19 69 , show approval of resolution by c. Carroll Hollis as 
substitute for one offered previously by George E. 
Nicholson and thought to be too provocative , Chancellors ' 
Records , file on Faculty Affairs . 
82 
for campus non - academic workers . 89 
Whi l e the BSM took stock , announcing briefly that 
Afro - Am er i c an mi 1 i t i a h ad b e en o r g an i z e d to t a k e " act i on s 
back up our demands , 1190 white allies of the BSM found 
~hemselves chal l e nged by the newly-created Hayakawa Society . 
Named for the president of troubled San Francisco State 
University who had taken a hard line against striking 
students , faculty , and workers , the society claimed to 
the first of its kind in the country and representative 
of the "moderate majority" who were interested in "peaceful 
and constructive change . " President Grainger Barrett and 
other society leaders succeeded on Monday , 10 February , 
in meeting with Chancellor Sitterson and Dean Cathey . 
Urging like SSOC that students be involved in the university 
decision - making process , Barrett counseled the administra-
tion nonetheless to be chary of surrendering to radical 
and black - separ atis t demands . 91 
SSOC quickly repudiated the society ' s position and 
charged that Barrett and others were taking unfair advantage 
of thei r access to the st at e press , si n ce Maurice Stocks , 
a founder of the society , worked part-time in the univer-
sity News Bureau . Whi l e SSOC and the Hayakawa Society 
s._ ______ _ 
89B._algigh_~g~~-sn£_Q£~~yg~ , 11 February 1969; 
~hs2g1-tlill_~ggkly , 12 February 19 69 . 
9o~ily_I~~-tlggl, 9 February 1969 . 
9 1 ~~~hsm_MQI..ning_tl~~~l£, 12 February 1969 . 
83 
bled over who better represented "the people , " a UNC 
nalism School survey showed that although few on campus 
e members of radical groups , nearly half UNC's students 
the university was a better place because of 
ivity by campus radicals . 92 
If a forma l poll had been taken in Raleigh , however , 
no state official would have been sympathetic with 
positionso From the state ' s executive office came 
equest by the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) for 
·otographs of the 7 February demonstrators in Chapel Hill . 
gisl a tors in R al e i gh were described as sti 11 "hopping mad" 
er Stokely Carmichael's appearance. 93 Worried that one 
mpus al~eady was the plaything of radical pressure groups 
d that other campu ses might become so , Representative 
• F. Mohn of On s low County made r eady to introduc e a 
for General ~ssembly consideration . 
overnor Robert Scott and the ~dvisory Budget Commission 
' 
had refrained from expressing open criticism of the Chape l 
Hill campus , but they both recommended sharp cuts in 
~pprop riati o ns for the expansion of the UNC Medical School . 
In a move to increase state revenue , Scott in February had 
advocated , among other levies, North Caroli na' s first tax 
~ 
on tobacco --a proposal which was to eastern l egislators , 
92 
12.gilY_Is~_Hegl, 13 February 1969 . 












said one observer, "as wise as advocating polygamy . 1194 
Chapel Hill loyali sts feared that reductions in campus 
appropriatio ns would become part of the political trade -
off as Scott tried to secure passage of his revenue plan. 
Not all the jousting between politici an s , adminis-
trators , and students was confined to Chapel Hill and 
Raleigh . On 5 February, students at predominantly-black 
North Carolina A & T University in Greensboro occupied 
an administrative building until given a promise that 
their demands would be met . 95 The following week, on 1 3 
February , over fifty blacks occupied offices in Duke 
University 's Allen Building . Faced with a one-hour 
84 
ultimatum and the imminent threat of being forcibly evicted 
by nearly one hundred and fifty Durham policemen and state 
highway patrolmen, the blacks evacuated the building at 
nightfall . They were joined outside by nearly two 
thousand allies, and then were hemmed in by law- enforcement 
officers . Bottles and rocks and tear gas were hurled in 
an ensuing "free-swinging melee." More than twenty persons 
required hospitalization . 96 
The shock of the news from Durham was felt throughout 
the state . Governor Scott complimented Duke President 
~ouglas Knight ' s decision to ask for help from law-
94Jack Childs , E_gleigh_N~~~-~nsLQQ~g~ygI, 13 
February 1969 . 
95~Kggn~QQIQ-~~ilY_Ng~~ ' 6 February 1969 . 




forcement officers; he " has set the tone for our actions 
potentially similar situations on other campuses , 11 said 
At the campus in Chapel Hill , such a tone was 
some activist students worried about . For 
e second consecutive Friday , SSOC organized a noon rally 
n the YMCA courtyardo George Vlasits , who had been at 
before , told the crowd that as long as 
insisted on using institutional procedures 
0 change institutional procedures, then reform attempts 
would fail . BSM member Juan Cofield reinforced Vlasits's 
noting that UNG administrators had established 
' 
recent committees on minority affairs without first con-
sulting the BSM . The mood of the rally was angry but Adolph 
leader of the Young Socialist Alliance , vowed 
to ask Chancellor Sitterson " nicely one last time" to 
implement the BSM demands . 98 Subsequently , about one 
hundred persons jammed the hall in South Building . 
Conversation between the group and Dean of Men James o .. 
Cansler was , however , nei ther nice nor particularly 
constructive . 
During the weekend , it was l earned that Duke 
Univers ity , in the aftermath of occupation and confrontation 
'"' there , had consented to implement most of its black students' 
demands . Administrators there pledged to estab lish an Afro -
---------
97Rsleigh_N~~~-~ng_Qh~gKY§K , 15 February 1969 . 
98Q£ilY_I~K_li§§l , 15 February 1969 . 
er~can curriculum by fall (said to be the first at a 
redominantly-white southern university) . They also 
greed to set up a separate dorm for blacks , and to 
ecruit and provide academic assistance for more black 
Duke President Knight called the agreement a 
. 99 
understanding with students." Others, noting 
the pressures leading up to the agr:eement , called it an 
administrative capitulation and, depending on the point of 
86 
yiew , were either encouraged or dismayed about the prospect 
response by administrators elsewhere . In 
BSM supporters said that black demands at UNC 
been less extreme than those at Duke; the implication 
that at UNC , black needs could be accommodated at least 
easily . Such a conclusion , however, ignored differences 
administrative flexibility between privately-endowed 
and publicly - supported UNC . 
Aware of growing frustration on the UNC campus and 
on avoiding what one Duke official had called 
"d bl . t• "lOO Ch 11 s·tt d amna e communica ion , ance or i erson agree 
on Mo n d a y , 1 7 F e b r u a r y , to a j o i n t S SO C - B SM r e qu e s t to 
convene within ten days an open meeting of the chancellor , 
President Friday , several deans , SSOC , the BSM , non-academic 
and others . Mickey Lewis , a BSM member , told the 
of two hundred waiting outside South Building that 
99Grg~n~QQ~Q-12£i1Y-~g~~ ' 23 February 1969 . 
lOOibid . 
87 
tterson was a "coo l dude . . • • We ' re going to have to 
hard to get anything from him . 11101 
The fo l lowing day , Sitterson met with six BSM 
and discovered that they were not content with 
rrangements made on Monday . The blacks presented Sitterson 
ith three new demands : they asked him to stop using whi t e 
ediators to deal with black problems , to recognize the BSM 
as the official university organization representing black 
interests , and to accede to the BSM ' s right to place demands 
the university . If their latest requests were not met 
the end of that week , Reggie Hawkins promised that there 
be a change from "reform to revolutionary tactics . 11102 
On Wednesday , blacks provided further demonstration 
their distrust of both institutional procedures and 
cooperation with whites . Reggie Hawkins and other blacks 
· dropped out of t h e National Student Association , and all 
three blacks on the committee studying the status of 
resigned from further participation . Some white 
leaders on c ampus , though stung by the BSM moves , nonethe -
less tried to throw their we i ght behind the black initiativeso 
Pres i dent o f the stud e n t bo dy , Ken Day , joined student 
legisl ator Ri chie Leonard and T~r_li~e l editor Wayne 
Hurder i n urging Sitterson henceforth to eschew normal 
student go v ernment channe l s and deal directl y with the 
-----
l O l~l..g_igh_Ne~~-~n~_Qbserve£ , 18 February 1969 . 
102D . !LSJ.!.!Y_I.s£_tl£.~1 , 1 9 F e b r u a r y 1 9 6 9 • 
'11 
concerning black demands . To back up their resolve, 
three white s offered to shift funds f rom student 
103 ; ~vernment programs to BSM ttµrograms of merit . 11 
The chancellor responded on Wednesday night to the 
88 
demands he received on Tuesday. In a statement released 
Sitterson recognized the BSM's legitimate 
~xistence and said that his January reply to their original 
demands should not have been construed as a rejection of 
I· 
~their valid needs , for which he had the "greatest 
respect . 11104 He promised to reconstitute the Committee 
"'on Minorities after consultation with the BSM and stud ent 
· government . In tone Sitterson was conciliatory even though 
in content his statement did not capitulate . What the 
reaction would have been to his message alone, no one can 
say, because a simultaneous declaration by UNC President 
William Friday received overwhelming press coverage. As 
an executive officer of the state , President Friday 
reaffirmed his intention to do 11 what is re qui red" to enforce 
a 1965 statute prohibiting obstruction of public buildings. 105 
' Campus activists black and white interpreted the statements 
by Sitterson and Friday as a double dose of administrative 
obstinance . 
1032silY_I~~-tlg~l , 20 February 1969 . 
104 
2~i1Y_Is~_tlg~l, 21 February 1969. 
105
rbid.; E£1~ish_~~~~-£DQ_QQ~g~yg~, 20 February 
1969; Ch~Q~l_Hill_~~~tly, 23 February 1969 . 
"' 
89 
On Thursday , the long-quiescent local chapter of 
NAACP reappeared . Claiming fifty members , black 
5 tu dent K e 11 y .Al ex and e r , Jr • , an noun c e d th a t i t w o u 1 d b e 
improper for the administration and others to recognize 
the BSM as the so l e representative of black interests . The 
nevertheless endorsed BSM demands which would improv e 
education , 
.d d 106 avoi e • 
as long as "institutionalized segregation" 
Ten s i ons were high on Thursday night as 
s~c , the Hayakawa Society , and the BSM all held meetings . 
No one seemed sure what the next day might bring . 
I! 
CH.A.0 TER IV 
THE FOODV\ORKERS SIT DOWN 
On Friday morning , UNG held to an uneasy peace . 
the week of tension had at least opened the door 
to direct consultations between blacks and administrative 
officials , but disturbing portents remainedo At Memorial 
,Hospital in Chapel Hill, the "disaster committee" released 
· a memo randum to employees reviewing procedures for treatment 
of Mace and tear - gas victimso In Raleigh, the General 
Assembly had among its business the consideration of bills 
dealing with riots and campus disruption. 
~lso from the capital , Governor Robert Scott issu ed 
a thirteen-point memorandum to all state-university presi-
dent s . In it he recommended procedures for handling campus 
disturbances. His message was stilted and firm : campuses 
"-were not intended to be places of "refuge or asylum" for 
dissidents ; picketing and demonstrations were allowed 
only if they did not disrupt regular activitieso If campus 
\.--, 
trouble did erupt , ' then university officials must notify 
the governor ; if a crime were committed , university officials 
m~st ask law-enforcement personnel to arrest offenders; 
if pol ice saw a crime committed on campus, they could make 




if the gcvernor thought it necessary , he would send in the 
highway patTol or National Guard . 1 Although the R~l~igh 
' News and Observer would describe his dispatch as "unduly 
--~~-----~---
91 
abrasive , "2 Scott said that he meant to boost , not undercut, 
the authority of campus administrators . 
On the UNG campus , the most active allies of the 
BSM gathered for the third consecutive Friday for a noon 
rally in the courtyard outside the YMCA . This convocation 
was different from previous ones , however . This time the 
BSM did not participate . It met separately in Alumni 
Building , headquarters of the sociology department . There , 
shortly after noon, forty blacks emerged dressed in black . 
Chanting "We ' re gonna burn this ••• place down , " they 
marched across campus , passing as they went a rather non-
plused group of their white standbys . Arriving at Lenoir 
Hall, the blacks got their lunches and carried their trays 
upstairs to a private room . During the next four hours, 
the group sequestered themselves , di scussing --a s whites 
:reliably reported--"something . 113 
Meanwhile, most white observers did not notice that 
in the Pine Room downstairs , workers had been having a 
difficult week . First of all, they were upset because 
1Governor Robert Wo Scott to Chancellor Sitterson , 
"Guidel ines ••• relative to seizure of buildings and 
disturbances ••• , " 20 February 1969, Chancellors ' 
Records , file on Strike : Non-Academic Workers . 
2.R.al~igb_~~..§_~n.9.._0b§~Y~ editorial , 24 February 1969 . 





ris Stephens , an empl oyee from Durham, had recently been 
Prillaman said that she was laid off to make room 
~0 r a permanent employee being transferred from Chase , but 
workers felt th at she was another no n - t em po r ary "temporary" 
employee whom supervisors had taken advantage of . For one 
'thing , said workers , she was given insufficient notice of 
More important , Pine Room employees contended 
fired for refusing to lift heavy trays of 
•dishes onto a high conveyor belt . To Elizabeth Brooks , that 
was "no reason at all," and represented a threat to other 
"We kind of felt that if they were going to start 
firing the ladies because they refused to do this, then it 
eventually come around to just about • o • all of us . " 4 
Mary Smith remembered asking Prillaman that week 
the January wage increases which had been promised 
given to eligible workers . She recalled Prillaman 
telling her , "Mary, one has already come through and that 's 
••• five hundred dollars more a year, if you stop 
everything th at is going on now . " She replied th at she was 
not due such a raise , but she remembered his insisting, 
am worried today, Mary , . . . I think they will listen 
you . " She rejoined , "I don't see why you are worried, 
you have done your job right, you will not be 
wo r r i e d • " And a g a i n P r i 11 am an : "I am going to admit to 
you I have been wrong ••• but I have not treated you wrong . " 





spite of her special treatment , Mary Smith said she still 
it wronged because Prillaman never did give her or other 
a satisfactory explanation about the raises. 5 
Compounding matters on Friday , Elizabeth Brooks 
another confrontation with supervisor Ottis White . 
had arrived at work to discover that the woman who 
served the adjacent counter was absent . According to 
Elizabeth Brooks , the supervisor asked her to work the 
extra counter , which she did . Later , during an after -
supper lull , she asked the supervisor to get a part-time 
student worker to help clean the counter that evening . 
Again White asked her to do it . Without saying anything , 
Elizabeth Brooks " just didn ' t do it . 11 .As workers were 
about to leave , the supervisor cal l ed to her and , pointing 
his finger , said , 11 Next time I ' m not going to ask you , 
I'm going to tell you. 11 She answered by telling him that 
11 it wasn ' t slavery time anymore •••• Regardless of what 
he told me , I still had a choice . I could do it , or I 
didn't have to . 11 6 
L ate t h at evening , according to El i zabeth Brooks , 
wh en th e ex a s p er at e d n i g ht - sh i ft em pro y e e s go t o f f 
\W.ork, they 
5Mary Smith interview, 10 ~pril 1974 . 
6Elizabeth Brooks interview, 22 October 1974; 








went outside and kind of stood around in a little 
bunch and we said , "We got to do something about 
this . " So we found Preston Dobbins before we 
left . And we to l d him that o o o we wanted to 
strike . But we did not know just in what way 
to do it . 7 
Duri ng t heir earli er meetings with black students, the 
idea of a s it-do wn, a s a method of get ting administrative 
attent i on, seems to have been raised and then dismissed 
as , said Preston Dobbins , a "pass ing notion. 11 8 By 
available account s, the actual decision to strike was made 
on Friday, 21 February , by a small group of second-shift 
Pine Room workers and was l argely unpremeditated . 
Onc e notified, Preston Dobbins was ready with 
counsel . Elizabeth Brooks said that Dobbins told them 
that "If you ' re going to do it, and going to get results, 
you gotta do it in a normal way." Since the Pine Room 
would be closed for th e weekend until Sunday afternoon 
at four o ' clock , Dobbins advis ed the workers to come in 
Sunday and set up their counters as if it were a regular 
workday . Then, he told them , "Leave the rest to the 
black students. 119 
Dobbins asked the employees to come to campus 
somewhat earlier than usual on the twenty-third, so that 
\...... 
they could meet with black students in Manning Hall before 
going to work. Elizabeth Br~oks rememb e r ed that by the 
7Elizabeth Brooks int ervi ew, 22 Octobe r 1974 . 
8Preston Dobbins interview, 5 December 1974 . 
9Elizabeth Brooks interview, 22 October 1974. 
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the workers arrived on Sunday, the black students 
"had really got things planned out . 1110 Already the students 
had tak~n what BSM member Ashley Davis remembered as a 
"solemn vote 1111 of support for the emp l oyees ' action . As 
left Manning Hall to go next door to the Pine Room , 
students told them , "Don ' t back down . " 
So the foodworkers set up their counters . Everyone 
stood ready to start serving when supervisor Ottis White 
opened the doors and then , said Mary Smith, "the thing just 
teed off . We walked out from behind the counter and 
12 
everybody just sat down." 
-----
lOibid . 
11w. Ashley Davis, interview by Russell Rymer , 
12 April 1974, SOHPC . 
1 ~ary Smith interview, 10 ·April 1974. 
CH.APTER V 
WEEK ONE :-
ADVERSARIES FORTIFY POSITIONS 
The Pine Room workers u sual ly served over one 
thousand people in two hours. That Sunday , most of the 
students who first crowded into the cafeteria and banged 
on the counters were members of the BSM and SSOC . They 
expected no service , they got none; and neither did 
students who arrived fully expecting Sunday supper . George 
Prillaman had to decide what to do with the food already 
prepared (he reported "looting and theft" 1 by students) , 
but his main concern was resolving what he called a 
"misunderstanding" 2 with his workers. As members of the 
press , forewarned by the BSM of the foodworkers' intentions, 
' b~gan to take notes and photographs , Prillaman put in an 
urgent call to James ~ . Branch , who soon arrived at th e 
Pine Room . After first laying the ground rule that black 
students must stay away, the two administrators sat down 
with the workers for about thirty minutes . 
1R~l~i9.h_~~~.§_~ng_Qb s~1:.Y~~' 24 February 1969 . 
2Qy~h~m-~gn , 24 February 1969. 
'1ff1 
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The students stayed close enough to hear what was 
on but purposely avoided the impression that they 
occupying the Pine Room . Whan asked by a reporter if 
represented the revolutionary tactics promised the 
pr evious week, Preston Dobbins smiled and answered, "Of 
3 course not." While the students milled about , the employee 
group recounted their grievances for Prillaman and Branch 
added a significant new demand: that the minimum wage 
all foodworkers be raised twenty cents an hour, to $1 . 80 . 
administrators told the workers that their grievances 
would be readily considered if they returned to work, but 
warned the employees to expect neither pay nor quick results 
from the walkout. Employees and officials agreed to meet 
again the following afternoon. The meeting split up; the 
workers went with their supporters to Manning Hall, while 
Room supervisors and volunteers cleaned the dining hall . 
The black students and Pine Room employees, by 
asking directly on Sunday afternoon and by phone later that 
'"' 
night, set about convincing other campus foodworkers to 
join them in taking "just a couple of days off . " The 
requests were accompanied more by intimidation than 
flattery , said some reports, but on Monday morning, nearly 
one hundred campus dining hall employees did not report to 
work . Only Lenoir Hall, with about a dozen regular employees, 
I' 
I 
plus supervisors an~ volunteers, remained open . Although 
members of the BSM and SSOC made some attempts to block 
the cafeteria . line, officials claimed that students , 
serving themselves and using disposable utensils , were 
able to eat there 11 al mo st as usu al . ,, 4 
In its regula~ly scheduled meeting that Monday , 
the UNC Board of Trustees worried about the foodworker 
walkout as another manifestation of student unrest . 
President William Friday, perhaps anticipating the board's 
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apprehension , had invited several leaders from UNC ' s student 
government to attend the meeting . In the students ' presence, 
Friday exho1·ted the board to sustain its "faith in the 
student generation . 11 Citing board chairman and Governor 
Robert W. Scott ' s 20 February memo (which had outlin ed 
procedures to use in case of campus disruption), President 
Friday went on to say that current administrative policies 
w.ere sufficient to deal with unrest . In a television 
news conference later that day , Governor Scott acknowledged 
\.--. 
that UNC students had the right of dissent but he advised 
dissatisfied ones to "go somewhere else . 115 
On Monday afternoon , food service workers attended 
the planned meeting with university administrators . This 
4~re~n~QQ~Q_Q~ily_N~~~' 25 February 1969 . 
5Ibid.; general accounts of events Sunday and 
Monday also from Q1!£.h~!!LM2~nin£_tl~~~lg, 24 , 25 February 1969, 
gh~Q~l-tlill-~~~kly, 26 February 1969, Q~ily_I~~-tl~~l , 25 






ime, personnel director Fred B. Haskell was with Prillaman 
nd Branch . After two hours of discussio n , Haskel~ 
announced that the university had met two of the workers ' 
em ands . First , some workers who had more than one year's 
~xperience would receive in their next paychecks a 
raise retroactive to 1 January . Complicated record-keeping 
pro cedures and a computer foul-up had caused the delay in 
payment , Haskel 1 said . Second, the uni ver si ty henceforth 
review the status of each full-time worker after his 
ninety days of employment to determine if he should 
receive a "permanent" classification . Haskell also reviewed 
university grievance p~ocedures and , noting that North 
Carolina law forbade collective bargaining with state 
employees , he invited workers to meet individually with 
George Coffer about remaining complaints . 6 
Employees were not content with the results of the 
meeting . They were aware that the announced raise 
affect all cafeteria workers, skeptical about the 
given for its delay , disappointed that the $1 . 80 
and other requests had not been met , upset that 
admini strators would discuss further grievances only with 
individual workers , and suspicious of the administration ' s 
sudden willingness to practice a policy of review for 
6 Fred B. Haskell , statement issued 24 February 1969 , 




~ermanent classification . Elizabeth Brooks stated that 
admini s trators had reneged on a promise. to bring worker 
paY records to the meeting and said that workers would 
refuse to meet as iridividuals with administrators . "We 
had gotten used to promises , " she said later . 7 In short , 
100 
the negotiating session had "not settled anything 
Both food service workers and management publicly 
. 
expressed a desire to end the walkout , but neither side 
was willing to offer further concessions . Each side felt 
that it had made its case and that the next move belonged 
to the other . Each side also admitted its anger . George 
Prillaman said that people whom he had never seen before 
threatened his life when he refused to produce the payroll 
records ; 9 Elizabeth Brooks said that workers had expected 
to "work everything out" during the Monday session .
10 
J 
Under the circumstances , neither side pushed to arrange 
' for future meetings . · It was the foodworkers ' last official 
1 meeting with George Prillaman . 
The workers and their closest allies did continue 
to get together , however, making preparations for a walkout 
that might last more than just a few days . During the 
7 . Elizabeth Brooks interview , 22 October 1974. 
8gL~~D§gQ~Q-~£ilY_N~~~ ' 25 February 1969 . 
9George Prillaman interview , 6 September 1979 . 




weekend , through what they believed to be normal university 
reservation procedures , the BSM had acquired permission to 
use Manning Hall~ the former headquarters--now vacant while 
undergoing renovation--of UNC ' s law schoo1.ll On Tuesday , 
25 February , food service workers arranged (together with 
the BSM, SSOC, and the campus YMCA) to prepare food at 
their homes and at Chapel Hill's Community Church and to 
serve the food in Manning Hall to boycotters of Lenoir 
Hall's services next door. State statute prohibited price 
competition with the university's food service , but it 
did allow organizers to solicit contributions and exempted 
them (as it did church and civic groups) from state health 
regulations . The acquisition of Manning Hall was thus a 
crucial move . Not only was it a base of operations for 
strikers and their followers , it also gave them some 
:y.onomic leverage . Campus sympathizers could boycott 
the university ' s food service and contribute instead 
directly to foodworkers who were no longer making even 
the minimum university wage . 
By the middle of the week , strike supporters moved 
to organize in other ways . Attempting to counter the 
mixture of surprise and confusion with which most UNG 
greeted the Sunday walkout , the BSM and SSOC set up 
11 The administration questioned the validity of 
the permission given to the BSM . Officials did not deny , 
however , that a functionary in the reservation office 
("some unidentified girl , " according to Claiborne Jones , 
B~1~i.9.h_N~~~-~ng_Q£~~~Y~~ ' 11 March 1969) had granted 




picket lines outside Lenoir . They talked to Lenoir patrons 
and passed out handbills listing the grievances of the 
and advertising the alternative lunches and 
at Manning . Elsewhere on campus and in dorms , 
BSM and SSOC coordinated distribution of more leaflets 
and posters . They also went downtown to begin collecting 
donations for the workers . 
Reverend Bill Coats telephoned leaders of the 
North Carolina Teaosters Union and asked for their help 
in putting a stop to campus food deliveries . Coats was 
told that since foodworkers and most truck drivers were 
non-union , the best that should be expected was that 
individual truck drivers might honor the UNG walkout . 
Toward that end , Coats , along with several dozen students 
and several professors , set up picket lines at the loading 
area of Lenoir . For a couple of days they succeeded in 
.../ 
persuading some early-morning drivers to turn away . But 
Pril 1 aman , still in charge of day-to-day food service 
operations , was able to offset Coats ' s move by calling 
distributors and rescheduling deliveries to unannounced 
times , thus forcing Coats by the week ' s end to cance l the 
tactic as " mostly non-productive. 1112 Prillaman also hired 
student part-time help at the $1 . 60 minimum to keep the 
Lenoir food service operating . Boasting that close to 
ttnormal numbers" of students were eating in Lenoir in 
~pite of the boycott , PriJlaman said that with so few 
worker s to p a y , " I ' m a ct u a 11 y m a k i n g m 0 n e y • 11 l 3 
Ih~-~gmini~1~~1iQn~~-g~~ly_Rg~22g£1iyg 
Qn_~Q~kgx~~-~1yg~n1~~-~ng_ft££~ 
Although during the first days of the strike, 
negotiations were left primarily to Prillaman , Branch , 
and Haskell , one can assume that Jo seph Eagles, vice 
chancellor for business and finance , closely monitored 
the lower-level administrator s . Eagles himself issued 
a statement on Thursday , 27 February , which outlined in 
some detail university and state personnel policies 
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toward non-academic workers . His most publicized assertion 
was that full-time permanent workers already were making , 
if sick leave and vacation benefits were added in, more 
.Jhan the $1 . 80 minimum which employees had requ ested . 
Eagles reiterated Haskell ' s pledge to review the status 
of temporary workers after ninety days of employment 
(admitting that such review had not always been practiced 
in the past) , and he agreed that before seasonal layoffs , 
workers shou l d be given a notice of two weeks . To the 
demand that individual worker payroll records be opened 
for scrutiny , Eagles answered that the university was 






h bl . . t. 14 ohibit sue pu ic inspec ion . Eagles ' s announcem~nt 
> 
ft unanswered many questions about actual working 
the food service . Dissatisfied employees 
statement clarified nothing except that the 
had no intention of negotiating in good 
104 
The chancellor meanwhile issued no public statement 
indicate that he was concerned about the workers' 
His influence (and that of his superior , President 
William Friday ) in the determination of adm~nistrative 
policy during the first days of the foodworker strike and 
difficu l t to determine . One can assume that 
Chancellor Sitterson was reluctant , as chief execu tive 
officer on campus , to inject himse l f into a lower-level 
labor dispute , but he must have been kept informed through 
staff assistant Claiborne Jones and Vice- Chancellor Eagles 
transactions with the workers . However they reached 
decisions , the UNG administrators steadfastly refused to 
invite striking employees , as a group , to discuss further 
the reso l ution of grievances . 
On 25 February (by coincidence , only two days after 
the strike began), a U. S . district court overturned a North 
Carolina law which forbade the formation of unions by state 
employees . But the same decision , UNC administrators could 
14Joseph C. Eagles , Jr ., statement issued 27 February 
1969 , Chancellors' Records , file on Strike : Non-Academic 








legitimately declare , let stand the right of state agenci es 
to refuse to bargain collectively with state - employee 
. t' 1 5 associa ions . In effect , said law professor Daniel 
Pollitt , the court decision allowed unions to be formed 
but out lawed them from doing "what unions do . 1116 
was therefore "more a matter of economic 
power than state law," according to lawyer Adam Stein . 17 
With co nsiderab l e economic p ower at its disposal , the 
UNC administ ra tion was under no compulsion to negotiate 
with an informal aggregation of striking workers . 
In addition , the administration was unwilling to 
meet with workers because the employees wanted to be 
accompanied by members of the Black Student Movement . 
The foodworkers insisted that they were capable of 
representing themselves , but they wanted BSM members 
present to monitor the bargaining . Administrators feared 
.../ 
that assent to the workers' request would be tantamount 
to recognition of the BSM as an official spokesman for 
worke r interests. Cognizant of their own recent co ntr o-
versy with black students , administrators were not willing 
to give the BSM a new and potent forum . The reluctance of 
~igher -l evel administrators to initiate either more 
15Q~~~n~QQ~Q_Q~ilY_N~~~' 27 February 1969; Qy~h~m 
~gn, 26 February 1969 . 
16oaniel Pollitt interview, 4 September 1979 . 
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or a thorough investigation of grievances was 
the cautious way in which they had for 
what they saw as excessive demands by 
The administrat ion , then , was more concerned with 
disruption than with grievances. Mary Hamilton , administra-
tive assistant to Claiborne Jones, later described what 
seemed to be the prevailing opinion in South Building: 
that the foodworkers "were not the class of blacks who 
would ever" have walked off their jobs "without being 
prodded" by rebellious students . That view meant in 
theory that the administration could recognize the 
' legitimacy of foodworker grievances without having to 
recognize the strike itself as a legitimate tactic or 
having to recognize black students as worker representatives . 
If in fact , as Mary Hamilton averred , some administrators 
.../ 
doubted that workers even "knew they had grievances, until 
it was pointed out to them , 1118 then one can see how the 
administration viewed the strike as essentially a student 
uprising. 
~glimpse of Chance l lor Sitterson ' s perspective 
can be found in his 27 February reply to a Duke University 
history professo::- who had written him about the "sheer 
revolution" being advocated by Duke student radicals . 
a 18Mary Hamilton , interview by D' Ann Campbell , 
18 November 1974 , SOHPC . 
'If 
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agreed with that professor's characterization of 
events and commented that " ••• unfortunately , the 
traditions of American universities sometimes give them 
[the radical~ far more influence than either their 
numbers or the merits of their position would justify. 11 19 
Without saying so explicitly, Sitterson probably also 
agreed with an interpretation offered by Congressman L . H. 
Fountain , who wrote that tolerance was "one of America ' s 
greatest virtues , '' except in the face of agitators "drunk" 
with the thought of power; in such case , tolerance was a 
"terrifying weakness . "20 
Race seems to have further complic ated the labor 
and student i ssues . ~ccording to Mary Hamilton , some 
South Building administrators would like to have been 
"living before the War Between the States ." She 
_J,nterpreted their intransigen ce as historically consistent 
with the white South's "massive resistance" to demands 
by "upstart " blacks . 21 In any case , the strike presented 
UNC officials with a novel s ituation; they had to deal 
not ju st with workers and students, but with workers and 
students who saw themselves as part of a black movement . 
--------
19Chancellor Sitterson to William E. Scott , 27 
Feb•ruary 1969, Chancellors ' Records , file on BSM . 
20 Congressman L . H. Fountain to President William 
Friday a nd Chancellor Carlyle Sitterson , 25 February 1969, 
Chancellors ' Records , BSM file . 
21Mary Hamilton interview , 18 November 1974 . 
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In sum. th e administrat ion' s per c eption o f employe e 
gri evances s e ems to have been cloud ed at the level of 
food service management by the f e eling that the strike 
was an illegitimat e way for workers t o voice complaint and 
at a higher administrative level by the conviction that 
st udents had involved themselves illegitimately in issues 
of university superintend ence . 
!_§1gggn1_E~~&2~1iY~~ 
Th~_Qil~mm~_Qf_~QY~~nm~n1-~ng_Ig~1i£~ 
That first week , students all over campus bickered 
about whether the foodworkers had the right to walk out 
on ·their jobs . Members of the BSM and SSOC had been quick 
to support the strike; they were joined during the week by 
other student picketers . Many other students, however, 
continued to eat at Lenoir in spite of the boycott . 
Generalizations about the attitudes of over ten thousand 
J 
students can be only partially accurate , but inasmuch as 
the student government represented and guided student 
sentiment , a look at its actions is instructive . 
On Saturday , 22 February , anticipating the next 
day's walkout , seventy - five members of the Black Student 
Movement had signed a petition to student body president 
Kenneth Day . They said that they wer e withdrawing from 
participation in UNC's judiciary system on the grounds 
that blacks were not represented . (The court system had 







code . ) During the next week , UNG student leaders 
used to recognize a separat e judiciary for black students , 
did promise to give blacks representation in the 
court system . On Thursday night, 27 February, in 
statement more directly related to the strike, the 
udent legislature supported the boycott of Lenoir Hall 
d passed a resolution which, borrowing language from the 
upreme Court's ~LQ~n v. ]~~ implem entation order fourteen 
,_,ears before , urged the UNG administration to induce 
r i 11 am an and H a s k e 11 to " move w i th a 11 d e 1 i b er at e s p e e d " 
resolving the grievances of the foodworkers . 22 
The strike was an important labor issue , said the 
legislators. It was not a "left-wing confrontation" 
, instigated by radical whites and it was "not a BSM plot 
to pe:rpetrate a revolution," according to Richie Leonard , 
t 
speaker pro temporeo 23 The strike was provoked by 
...../ 
injustices committed by the university against black women 
workers , and indicated "just another way the univers ity 
was not treating people properly ," said another representa-
24 tive, Charles Jeffress. The legislative resolution thus 
chastised the administration for its negligence and appeared 
to urge widespread campus support for the foodworkers ' strike . 
22~i1Y_I£~-tl~~l, 28 February 1969. 
23Qy~h~m_MQ~ning_fi~.t.,glg , 1 March 1969. 




But the legislature's support of the strike , upon 
examination , was rather weak . In fact , rather than 
themselves as adversaries of the administration , 
the campus student leaders were wrestling that week with 
a situation analogous to the one in which the university 
administration found itself . The student legislature and 
the university administration were both faced with demands 
they could not ignore--demands for a separate judiciary 
by black students and demands for better treatment by 
university non - academic workers . Each found itself 
accused of perpetuating past institutional injustices 
toward black students and workers . But neither legislature 
nor administration was willing to give in to what it saw 
as peremptory demands challenging the traditional ways by 
which decisions were reached and policies implemented . 
What each could do , in its own way , with a plethora of 
J 
promises and perhaps the best of intentions, was "move 
with all deliberate speed" toward piecemeal eradication 
of injustice and gradual restructuring of administrative 
responsibility . 
~s the days passed , impatient observers saw the 
stand-off b~tween strikers and administrators as evidence 
that efforts at strike settlement were moving all-too-
deliberately . Some of the mediators pushing onto the 
scene thought that the administration ' s irresolution was 
11· 1.1 
'' I 11. 
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of a simple problem in communication . On 
fourteen faculty members s e nt a petition to South 
attesting to the merit of the foodworkers' 
"We feel certain that once the higher-level 
f authorities in the University have been made fully 
aware of the extent of the problem , they will act,'1 said 
the signers . 25 
In another attempt to k e ep the upper levels 
informed , YMC A secretary Jean Luker compiled a detailed 
foodworker complaints . On Friday , Anne E. Queen , 
director and also the chairman of the Chapel Hill 
Human Re l ations Commission, conveyed the li st to her 
long - time friend Carlyle Sitterson . Except for the 
demand for a $1 . 80 minimum wage , the grievances closely 
r esembled those of the previous October and were the same 
0_.9.-es that workers had itemized for Haskell , Branch , and 
Prillaman in the first days of the walkout (and Which had 
be en pub lished unofficially all week in n ewspapers , posters , 
and handbi ll s ). Nevertheless , to Anne Queen, Sitterso n 
s eemed to learn for the firs t time on Friday, 28 February , 
of the workers ' particular allegations against the food 
service management . She remembered that the chancellor 
was 11 deeply concerned . 11 He accepted her offer to arrange 
25ouLh~ill-~Q~nins_tl~~~ld , 27 February 1969. 
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meeting between workers and administrators to be held 
the following week . 26 
Th e chancellor then asked his assistant Claiborne 
to run a spot check on the workers ' records to 
if their charges were valid . Jones in turn 
assistant Mary Hamilton to look at the records . 
~ater, Jones told Hamilton to probe no further ; he had 
received verification directly from Prillaman that there 
irregularities. But by then, Hamilton remembered, 
already uncovered evidence of erasures and changes 
on worker pay r ecordso 27 Late Friday afternoon, Claiborne 
Jones acknowledged publicly that further investigation 
of food service payroll accounts would in fact be necessary . 
The administration cast off its nonchalance in 
other ways . James A. Branch admitted outright for the 
time that the food service had been in financial 
difficulty for some time . Branch said that snack-bar 
services in the new student uni on would be coQtracted to 
a private company , and added that he expected to receive 
bids immediately from contractors interested in operating 
the entire food . 28 service . Branch did not surmise how the 
26Anne E. Queen , interview by Lee Ha~ris , 12 June 
1974 , SOHPC ; Jean C. Luker , interview by author, 30 January 
1975 , SOHPC ; J . Carlyle Sitterson interview, 10 December 1974 . 
27Mary Hamilton interview, 18 November 1974 . 
28Qy~h~m_Sun , 28 February 1 969 ; gh~R~1-tlill_~~~ly , 
2 March 1969. 
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to l ease might influence th e university ' s response 
foodworkers ' demands . Instead , and in spite of a 
ew concessio n s , the first week ended with the administra-
it s original position that grievances 
worked out most easily if workers first returned 
jobs and then discussed their complaints with 
personnel officers in "private individual conference . 11 29 
Meanwhile , Prillaman maintained that the Lenoir 
was not hurting business . On Friday , 28 February , 
eligible workers finally did receive their long-awaited 
annual raise . In each payche ck envelope was e n closed a 
note from personnel director Fred Haskell, telling workers 
that their jobs would not be held open indefinit ely . As 
much of the campus ' s attention turned to the weeke nd ' s 
Janis Joplin concert , the Duke-Carolina basketball game , 
, _}nd an unusually heavy snowstorm , the fhs.12_gl Hill-1f~ekly 
suppo rted Pril l aman ' s contention that many work ers had 
grown tired of the str ike and ~ere anxious to return 
to work . 30 
29Fred B. Haskell , statement to food service 
employee s , 28 Februari 1969 , Business Records , file on 
Food Service s . 
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CHAPTER VI 
WEEK TWO: T.ACTI CS CHANGE 
On Monday the third of March , in spite of Haskell ' s 
~xhortations , Prillaman ' s expectations , and a ~~i!Y_I~~ 
in addition to the ninety-day review of 
temporary status the administration had arranged for 
to get two weekends off each month , fewer than 
a dozen workers returned to their jobs. 1 One hundred 
and thirty remained out , and many joined the picket lines 
outside Lenoir Hall. In the afternoon , both workers and 
Prillaman (still the u niversity ' s chief negotiator) 
announced that they were going to discuss their differences , 
J but the attempt to get together dissolved into charges and 
counter-charges. A formal meeting n ever took place . 
Monday marked a change in tactics by organizers 
of the Lenoir Hall boycott . Rather than just picketing 
outside and distributing leaflets and so li citing contribu-
tions inside, SSOC and BSM members moved slowly through 
the Lenoir serving lines. Protracting the process by 
taking only glasses of water and sitting one to a table , 
protesters did not intend to eat but were content , as SSOC 
---------
1~ily Tar ll~1 ' 4 March 1969 . 
·1· 
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member Scott Bradley was to say, "to make life a little 
uncomfortable" for those who did . 2 Business continued, 
but the tactics met hostile resistance from some non-
boycotting student s . Nearby , campus policemen took photo-
graphs , but besides asking for students to remain calm, 
they did not intervene. Most area newspapers on Tuesday 
noted the lack of widespread support for the strike and 
boycott. 
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The slowdown continued on Tuesday . .At suppertime, 
opposing sides became more stubborn . With a crowd gathering--
wanting entertainment, according to Bradley--the stall-in 
led to angry shouting and shoving . SSOC member Andy Rose 
was pushed, supposedly by a football player; Rose pushed 
back , and then was slightly injured when the footballer 
hit him . Later, ~l Smarr, a third-year law student , began 
pushing through the line with two women students and an 
ex -Marine friend. SSQC member Joel Polin grabbed Smarr; 
Smarr swung at Polin, and then someone from behind hit 
Polin in the head with a glass sugar shaker, opening a 
cut that required ten stitches . Meanwhile , someone poured 
ammonia on a radiator. As the fumes spread, there were 
scuffles over whether to open the windows . Campus security 
chief Arthur Beaumont stood by with a few campus policemen 
and a member of the State Bureau of Investigation who was 
posing as a student. The security force did not have 
· 
2scott Bradley interview, 30 October 1974. 
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ficient manpower to stop the scuffling , so by radio 
downtown to put the Chapel Hill police 
alert . 3 
Preston Dobbins meanwhile had become concerned that 
foodwo::::kers ' cause was about to "slip slowly down the 
Despairing that administrative complacency would 
~entually 11 starve us out , " Dobbins later recalled that 
~th the black students ' commitment to support the food-
come the responsibility to bring the issue 
where it couldn ' t be ignored any longer. 114 
wanted to change the level of confrontation , he said , 
doing something that would focus attention on Lenoir 
and would show without violence the strike ' s serious -
of purpos e . .After carefully considering different 
to dramatize the strike , Dobbins called a meeting 
of the BSM . He rem embered being forceful , not democratic , 
about his views . After discussion and some dissension , 
the BSM supported Dobbins's plan , but before implementing 
they decided to add to their numbers by recruiting 
help from the pool hall in downtown Chapel Hill . 
At 6 : 40 P.M . on Tuesday, just before closing time 
at the nor t h end of Lenoir Hall , a group of several dozen 
blacks gathered with their customary walking sticks . 
3Description of events from Arthur Beaumont interview, 
17 November 1974 ; Scott Bradley interview, 30 October 1974; 
and area newspaper accounts. 
4Preston Dobbins interview , 5 December 1974 . 
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Dobbins stood on a table and announced that people 
or come be with uso"5 (George Prillaman , 
0 was there, later said that Dobbins also threatened to 
people ' s throatso)6 Th en , with a request that SSOC 
mbers "move over so we know who you are , 117 the blacks 
south through the room, turning over all the tables. 
everyo ne e l se watched transfixed , and the campus 
ready to protect Prillaman and non-striking 
assault , the blacks moved back north , turning 
They kept going out the exit and returned 
the i r M an n i n g H a 11 h e ad qu a :rt er s • 
Within minutes, twenty Chapel Hill policemen 
responded to Chief Beaumont ' s call to town police chief 
William Blake . The police arrived as students and workers 
were cleaning the kitchen and straightening the tables 
and chairs in the dining hall . The policemen supervised 
the closing and locking of Lenoir, stood guard outside 
awhil e , and then went back to their regular duties 
downtown. 
A short time earlier , President Friday and Chancellor 
Sitterson had been in Rale igh, lobbying the legislative 
Joint ~ppropriations Committee for additional funds--
Friday on behalf of the Consolidated University , Sitterson 
--------
5rbid . 
6George Prillaman interview, 6 September 1979 . 
7~h~2~l-tlill_~ggkly , 5 March 1969. 
the Chapel Hill cam~uso Neither Sitterson nor Friday 
emergency approval of a raise for non-academic 
Chances were still good that Governor Scott 's 
dget proposal--which would give raises to all state 
rkers and increase the minimum rate to $1.80 an hour--
:uld be approved by the General Assembly and effective 
the first of July . 
On the night of the Lenoir Hall table turning, 
was addressing a North Carolina State 
yniversity Founders ' Day cer emonial in Raleigho Buoyed 
mail" he had received since his stern 
message to college presidents, the governor 
the ninety legislators and others in his audience 
he deplored the activity of those students who , 
"intestinal fortitude," were bent on disruption. 
Students instead should "light the lamp of knowledge," 
Scott said. 8 He and Chancellor Sitterson, who was 
attending a play that night with his wife , learned of 
the Lenoir Hall incident about the time of the eleven 
o ' clock evening news . 
~f1~~m£1h~--Q~s~ni~~1iQn_sn£_R~R~~~~n1s1iQn 
Earlier on Tuesday, BSM member Reggie Hawkins had 
called his father in Charlotte. The former gubernatorial 
candidate made the three-hour drive to Chapel Hill 
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by black attorney Julius Chambers and Adam 
ein, a partner of Chambers in the firm which had 
presented Charlotte policemen and firemen in the case 
isulting in the legalization of public - employee unions . 
Manning after the table turning on Tuesday 
ight, they encountered a "volatile situation" in which 
~ 
here was !?Orne confusion about "who speaks for whomo" 9 
~uring discussions that sometimes got out of order , the 
~roup debated several issueso First, the black students 
had administered what Ashley Davis later called their 
;•personal touch010 to Lenoir Hall without the prior 
approval of the foodworkerso Employees felt somewhat 
betrayed , and feared that their o~n cause might have been 
subverted . Convinced during discussions , however , that 
' the commitment of the black students was genuine, the 
foodworkers closed the rift between themselves and the 
Still , "we hope ther e won ' t be any more of that , 11 
stated Elizabeth Brooks in reference to the BSM's action . 11 
The foodworkers also discussed that night how to 
strengthen their own ranks. They had talked about the 
formation of a union in previous days but had not yet 
acted . Although encouraged to do so by the lawy ers , the 
foodworkers were distrustful of that advice; "at the time , 
9Adam Stein interview, 27 November 19740 
lOAshley Davis interview, 1 2 April 1974. 













didn ' t know them from anybody else," Elizabeth Brooks 
12 
aid later . In the end , however , the employees were 
onvinced of the need to organize more formally . They 
reated the UNC Non-Academic Employees Union and chose as 
fficers four Pine Room workers: Mary Smith was president; 
lizabeth Brooks , vice president; Sarah Pa:rkex, secretary; 
Amy Lyons , txeasuxex . The workers ' association then 
a priority on theix requests to the administxation, 
concluding that theix main needs were the $1 . 80 minimum 
wage , the appointment of a black supervisor , and the receipt 
of time-and-a-half for overtime work . Other issues , they 
could be resolved after they returned to work. 
Representation was another matter discussed by 
Manning Hall groupo The need for attorneys was an 
unfamiliar one to Elizabeth Brooks , who recalled that 
foodwor k er s "didn ' t know there was anything they could 
represent us for , because we didn ' t feel like we had done 
anything wrong . 111 3 Hence there was no formal agreement 
that Chambers and Stein would represent the foodworkers-~ 
an omission which would cause some confusion later on. 
Although the foodworkers did not connect their legal needs 
to those of the BSM , the black students realized that 














issued against them . So Chambers and Stein did agree 
' represent the black students should this be necessary . 
By Wednesday morning , BSM expectations of publicity 
fulfilled . Journalists around the state interpreted 
e table-turning episode as evidence of violent intentions 
y UNG black students . At least in the short run , more 
ttention was focused on the students than on the workers' 
ause which the students professed to be supporting . Still 
nanswered was the question whether that popular view of 
wo u 1 d p er s i st o 
Administrators at the highest level--President 
Chancellor Sitterson , Claiborne Jones , Joseph Eagles , 
on Wednesday morning in South Buildingo 
They were aware that the boycotters had hoped to force the 
closing of Lenoir Hallo The administrators did not wish 
to grant protesters that victory but they decided in the 
i nterest of calm on campus to keep Lenoir closed until 
noon on Thursdayo The reopening would come shortly before 
the meeting which Anne Queen was arranging for Thursday 
afternoon between administrators and workers . President 
and Chancellor Sitterson notified the governor ' s 
ff . f th . d . . 14 o ice o eir ecision . 
---------
1 4R~l~igh_~g~~-~ng_Q£~~~Y~~' 7 March 1969 ; Carlyle 
Sitterson interview, 10 December 1974; William c. Friday , 

















The administration ' s willingness t o discuss 
with a group of foodworkers indicated a quiet 
from management ' s earlier insistence on meeting 
ly with individual workers . The change may have 
presented an acknowledgement of the recent court decision 
hich recognized state employee unions; it may have shown 
hat high-level administrators felt that they wer e mo re 
0mpetent than lower - level management to deal with the 
orker group; it may have meant that administrative 
~nvestigations sin c e the previous week had led to new 
proposal s for settlement; or it may have simply been a 
r esponse to growi ng public pressure to act . The change 
in attitude did not mean , however , that the administration 
intended to (or could , under law) negotiate a contr act 
the foodwo rke r s ' union. Neither did the change mean 
the administration would meet with the employees as 
l ong as the meeting could be construed as recognition of 
the BSM as a legitimate bargaining agent for the foodworkers. 
This consideration was especially pertinent since the 
Tuesday night table - turning incident . 
~fter the administrators met , Claiborne Jones 
talked with a smail group of white student s who had 
requested to see him . Jones asked o n e of them , Richie 
Leona=d, to convey t h e administrators ' decision about 
closing Lenoir to a rally planned for that afternoon . 15 
-------
15Burton B. Goldste in, Jr ., and Joseph B. Shedd , 
"The food service employees ' strike ," a written summary 













i : OO P .M., over on~ thousand people--by far t h e larg e st 
of the strike--gather ed at the south end of Lenoir 
Leonard announced that Lenoir would remain closed 
the time being. The crowd cheered and then turned 
attention to other speakers : Mary Smith , Elizabeth 
Dobbins, professor Chick Goldsmid , and 
Fuller . 
Fuller ' s presence gave the rally added importance 
journalistso Since he had come to No=th Carolina in 
1965 from the Midwest , Fuller had become something of a 
celebre . While teaching in UNC ' s School of Social 
h e had been criticized by Governor Dan Moore , 
Congressman James Gardner, and other notable state figures 
for his political activiti es outside the classroom . 
Although President Friday and Chancellor Sitterson had 
defended Fuller, he resigned from UNC to devote 
hims elf full time to anti-poverty programs , which included 
in 1968 the organization of a statewide reaction to the 
"O rangeburg Massac:re" and the death of Ma:rtin Luther 
King, Jr.. More :recently , Fuller had formed the Malcolm X 
School of Liberatio n in Durham and had been in Allen 
Building with Duke blacks dur i ng their February occupatio n. 
At UNC ' s afte:rnoon rally on 5 March , Fuller fired 
a v erbal salvo at the attending white students , telling 
them th at th e y we :r e th e ti r e al n i g g er s on c amp u s , ti and th at 















port the workers' cause . 16 Fuller received applause for 
observations but some people took umbrage at remarks 
rally speakerso From somewhere in the crowd came a 
rrage of snowballs . If aimed at members of the BSM, they 
targets. Infuriated , the blacks tried but failed 
the perpetrators . At another point during the 
lly , a technician from the university's language lab 
ffectively quieted all speakers by cutting the microphone 
He then became the first person arrested during 
when BSM members chased him to Dey Hall , where 
e locked himself in a classroom until police came to 
and arrest him . 
Meanwhile , Governor Scott proved that he had been 
attention to events in Chapel Hill . ~t almost the 
same t i me a s th e UN C r a 1 1 y , S co t t w a s at E 1 o n Co 11 e g e about 
miles away , participating in a Founders ' Day celebra-
Upon receiving his honorary doctorate of law, Scott 
as he had in Raleigh the night before , by urging 
well-meaning students to " mar ch where there ' s poverty and 
i gnoran ce . " Then referring more pointedly to Chapel Hill , 
Scot t deplored student "acts of violence" and spoke of the 
"right of the majority to be served meals in an orderly 
manner ," adding that he had instructed UNC administrators to 
t ake "whatever steps necessary" to reopen Leno:.x Hall . 17 
---------
1 6 . 
Du.!:h.sil!LM..QI.n.ing_H eI..alsi , 6 Max ch 19 69 . 
1 7R~l~igh_N~~~-.an£_Qg~~~~I. , 6 Maxch 1969 . 
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Upset with the administrators ' hesitation , the 
ernor summoned President Friday and Chancellor Sitterso n 
' 
~aleigh to clarify his message that Lenoir Hall must be 
ened immediately , not at noon on Thursday . Friday and 
tterson urged consideration of the security advantages 
opening in the daylight rather than in the darkness , 
~they finally acceded to the governor ' s demand . The 
i nistrators and the governor's staff also discussed 
not the highway patrol wo~ld be needed . Neither 
Sitterson thought that the patrol was necessary 
order since there was "no physical danger," 
ccording to Sitterson , that would justify its presence • . 
of the governor's staff sharply disagreed . 
the two university officials l eft with the 
·impression that they had convinc ed the go v ernor that the 
patrol would not be needed . 18 
Back on campus that Wednesday , Chancellor Sitterson 
, prepared a sev e n o ' clock statemerit that would announce the 
next morni ng ' s opening of Lenoir Hall and the "direct 
discussions" to be held in the afternoon between administra-
tors and foodworkers . His st at ement reminded workers of 
agreements on the annual raise and the ninety-day review 
of job status ; it disclosed that an independent auditing 
18William Friday interview, 5 December 1974; 
Carlyle Sitterson interview , 10 December 1974; Carlyle 
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~taff from Jo seph Eagles ' s office was checking worker 
overtim e records and that classification specialists from 
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state personnel office were striving to match employee 
19 descriptions with "work actually doneo" 
But as Sitterson got ready to break his official 
in a way that would seem favorable to impatient 
strike supporters , Governor Scott made another entry in 
the administrative ledger . Scott ' s press secretary 
announced from Raleigh that in keeping with the memo of 
20 February , the governor had instructed four National 
Guard units to stand by in Durham and had sent five squads 
of riot-trained highway patrolmen to Chapel Hill (where 
they were stationed less than two miles from the UNC campus). 
Sitterson found the presence of the patrol "astonishing, 1120 
he said later . First , on the timing of Lenoir ' s reopening, 
then on the manner of enforcement , UNC administrators had 
had their convictions apparently ratified , then summarily--
and to them , embarrassingly--overruled by the governor . 
Unlike John T. Caldwell , the North Carolina State 
University chancellor who received a standing ovation on 
Wednesday when he told a convocation of six thousand 
students that he would tolerate no campus disruption , 
Chancellor Sitterson found his Wednesday night statement 
19
chancellor Sitterson statement , released 5 March 
1969 , Chancellors ' Records , file on Strike . 
20 Quotation from Carlyle Sitterson interview , 
19 September 1979 . 
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ignored . News of Lenoir Hall ' s reopening and the 
~Val of the highway patrol had turned campus attention 
y from the administration and focused it on the governor . 
UNC Graduate Student Assocation sent Scott a telegram 
ing him to "resist the use of military force" and urging 
~ inst e ad to p u sh for " i mm e di at e and sin c er e neg o ti at ions" 
. .,ween administrators and workers . 21 SSOC also met on 
After pledging at f irst to keep Lenoir 
decided that no advantage was to be 
~ined by direct confrontation with police . Nearly everyone 
anxious about what might happen the next day . 
The table-turning incident , coupled wi th the 
:governor's r espo nse, mobilized many UNC students and 
•f 
· ~aculty members who were heretofore inactive . Before 
; daybr e ak on Thursday , sev eral hu~dred people gathered 
". 
outside Le noir Hall to picket delivery trucks . One black 
d'emonstrator was slightly in jured· when hit by one of the 
Protesters made no attempt , however, to block 
entrances to the dining room. Fifty state patrolmen and 
twenty Chapel Hill policemen were there standing guard and 
handing out leaflets to passing patrons , reminding them of 
the 1965 statute which prohibited obstruction of public 








students , including football players who arrived en 
asse , were unimpressed by heckling picketers who said 
food was contaminated with "Scottococcus . 1122 
the day , after someone released stink bombs 
~nsid e , Prillaman requested that police keep out students 
r 
· pot intending to eat . Some demonstrators asserted that the 
patrol arbitrarily prevented men with long hair from 
entering the dining hall , but there were no special 
confrontations . 
On Thursday morning in the Morehead Planetarium 
faculty lounge , Chancellor Sitterson explained to univer-
• sity deans , department chairmen, and directors that he 
had disagreed with the governor with respect to the morning 
opening of Lenoir Hall . Sitterson said that the Chapel 
Hill police chief , not he, had asked the governor for the 
reinforcement of the highway patrol . Governor Scott had 
accommodated Chief Blake ' s request without further 
consultation with campus authorities . 
Si tterson admitted privately to the assembled group 
that "injustices had been pointed up" in the foodworkers' 
situation as early as the previous October , but he said 
that progress was being made to rectify the grievances 
of non-academic employees . Circumstances were complicat ed 
by the involvement of minority students . Sitterson 
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0 ncluded by advocating an "orderly , forceful , and rational 
our problems. 1123 Later on Thursday , 245 faculty 
graduate instructors signed a petition to 
Scott , saying that the presence of the patrol 
the "educational process " of the university . 24 
Meanwhi l e , Anne Queen , who feared that the patrol's 
resence jeopardized t h e planned meeting between workers 
admini strators , was still busy making arrang ements . 
quest i on of who would be allowed to participate remained 
.difficul t to answer . Queen and Claiborne Jones had decided 
wo u ld include only representatives from 
\ he high er - leve l administr ation (Jones and Eagles but not 
Prillaman), a member of the Human Re l ations Committee (Queen) , 
and workers . Bl ack students would be excluded . Late 
Thursday mo~ning , black students balked at the agreement . 
McL ean in particular , Anne Queen remembered, asked her 
r i ght she had to sit in on the meeting . Finally , after 
dis cuss i o n s about the "new necessities , " Queen convened 
' the meeting i n Howell Hal l between the delegations from 
· South Bu i l di ng and Man ning Hall . Honoring her "commitment 
to Jack , " Quee n and sever al BSM members then dep axt ed , 
leavi ng woxkers and administxators alone together . 25 
--.,_. ______ _ 
23Hand wr i tten outline of remar ks , 6 March 1969 , 
Ch anc ello r s ' Records , file on Strike; account also in 
R.s1gigh_Ng~~-~ng_Ob~g£yg£ , 7 March 1969 , by a reporte r who 
sneaked in . 
24Grggn~QQ£Q_Q~ilY_Ng~~ ' 7 March 1969 . 





The conference between the group of a few dozen 
and the two administrators lasted several hours . 
Claiborne Jones stated that the session--"mostly 
esigned for understanding each other" --had been "pleasant 
·, •• @nd] successful." Noting that discussions were to 
ontinue on the following Wednesday , Jones expressed his 
ope that the General Assembly would approve the l July 
salary increase which would boost the employees ' minimum 
to above $1.80. 26 
The workers ' evaluation of the meeting contrasted 
with that of the chancellor's assistant . Elizabeth 
administrators 
••• were just telling us how the university was 
run , and • o o how ••• they could not make a move 
until the legislature met ••• you know , a whole 
lot of the same things that we had heard ••.• 
They ••• made you feel real low and just like 
you really didn ' t know what you were talking about • 
.Administrators clearly intended to "take their own time 1127 
about insti tuting remedies . Why should workers go back to 
when they had won only more ' promises? Why should they 
six days for another me et ing , or until July for a 
Even in those instances when both sides recognized 
an injustice to workers , Elizabeth Brooks said that the 
' corrective measures proposed by the administration were 
not forthright . In fact , she said that except for an 
26Durhsm_MQ.Ining_He~sls , 7 March 19 69 . 
27Above quotations from Elizabeth Brooks interview, 
22 October 1974. 
stop addressing workers by their first names, 
he Thursday meeting with Jones and Eagles accomplished 
l•just about nothing . "28 
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While workers and administrators dickered , Apollo 9 
astronauts announced from outer space that they had 
successfully walked outside their orbiting capsule; the 
United States's preparation for a July moon landing was 
right on schedule. From Washington, Secretary of Defense 
Melvin Lai rd warn ed the North Vietnamese that bad faith 
in Paris bargaining sessions ran the risk of American 
retaliation in Southeast Asia. From Raleigh , 
state Senate minority leader Harry Bagnal and House 
minority leader Charl es Taylor warned Chan cellor Sitterso n 
that if he was not going to punish the ~tudents responsib;e 
for Tuesday night's table turning, "then the legislature 
will have to @o i tj. " 29 
Without notifying their Republican colleagues and 
without waiting for Sitterson 's reply , the two legislators 
released their l etter to the press . The effect of the 
widely-publicized note--with it s criticism of UNC administra-
tors , disruptive students , and implicitly , the legitimacy 
of the foodworkers' grievances- - was that the side show 
28Gt~~Il~QQAQ-~~ilY_N~~~ , 7 March 1 969 . 
29Harry Bagnal and Char l es Taylor to Chancellor 
Sitterson , 6 March 1969 , Chancellors ' Records, file on Strike; 
as reported by newspapers , the note also criticized Governor 
Scott . 
' political arm-wrestling threatened now to become the 
in attraction in a ne w drama, with politicians fighting 
r center - stage and with foodworkers shunted aside , 
legated to the role of almost invisible walk-ons from 
shadows offstage . 
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If foodworkers wanted a visible pla tform but could 
by themselves hold one, the UNC administration by 
contrast would have preferred from the first to remain 
but of sight , but could not avoid being thrust uncomfortably 
into the limelight . By temperament and experience , both 
Friday and Carlyle Sitterson seem to have felt 
ease and more effective when lobbying behind the 
Now there was nowhere to hide , especially for 
Sitterson , who was accountable for affairs on the Chapel 
Hill campus . 
For months, the chancellor had been defending 
positions against various demands. He had been accused 
by some of not going far enough toward reform; by others , 
of going too far . In February, from an enclave of 
university life formerly left to itself, came the open 
chall enge of the cafeteria workers , and with it, defiance 
from invigorated student activists . While trying to cope 
patiently with the situation , hoping to isolate misguided 
students , Sitterson's judgment had been disregarded by 
the governor . Sitterson may have been able to take some 
consolation from letters such as one he received stating 
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"we are standing behind you- - right or wrong , " 30 but 
to many observers , the governor ' s action had reduced the 
flexibility of academic authorities and cast them in "the 
o f wi t 1 es s f u d d y- dud di e s • " 31 
From Sitterson's perspective, considering his many 
constraints, decisive action was extremely difficult . UNC 
1 depended on public support to function; it was expected 
by its constituents to be an efficient , forward-looking 
business enterprise and to be an organization responsive 
to widely divergent political persuasions. As chancellor, 
Sitterson had to oversee those functions and at the same 
time consider what traditionally was the university's 
primary function : neither business nor politics, but 
academics . ~lready on Thursday morning in Morehead 
Building , Sitterson had turned to the academic realm for 
intellectual and moral support . How much political support 
the faculty could provide, ·however , was not yet certain . 
f~1QIDsIY_fQDD~£ii.Q..Il§_~~1~~n 
f..g£Yl.:tY-~n£_~£mini§1~s1i.Q..Il 
Traditionally, within a loose overall administrative 
network, academic departments in the university defended 
their prerogatives . UNC ' s central administration coordi-
nated interdepartmental necessities but usually acquiesc ed 
30George Watts Hill to Chancellor Sitterson , 6 March 
1969 , Chancellors ' Records , file on Strike . 
31 Editorial , §~ggn§QQIQ_Q~ilY-~~~~' 7 March 1969. 
decisions reached by senior departmental professors . The 
was "typical of a stable organization , " 
said sociology professor Henry A. Landsb erger, "set up in 
dif ferent fiefdoms over which there was relatively little 
sup ervision ." 32 
Between administrators and the most experienced 
members there was an attitude of understanding 
and mutual trust. A conservative administration reflected 
the temper of the faculty; many administrators, including 
came from the academic ranks . Administrators 
and faculty honored each other 's spheres of influence: 
faculty members , by concentrating on classroom teaching 
and research; administrators , by manipulating political 
and business arrang ements so that there was a minimum of 
interfer ence from outside the university in what was 
fundamentally an academic enterprise . Internal controversy, 
when it arose , usually found senior faculty members and 
administrators standi ng together , sometimes meting out 
discipline to or upholding the rights of an outspoken 
you ng instructor. Never particularly cohesive , the faculty 
came closest to involving itself as a group in public 
skirmishes when it perceived , as during the speaker - ban 
controversy , that shortsighted politicians were intruding 
upon the university's sacred academic ground . 
32Henry A. Landsberger, interview by St~ve Miller, 
3 December 1974, SOHPC. 
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Even into the late 1960s, when the issues of race 
war vibrated through the entire country , faculty involve -
broad political issues was modest . Most professors 
'ccepted the assumption that dissatisfaction with a particu-
problem did not carry with it an implied criticism of 
whole system . That disruption was an unacceptable 
ethod for effecting change was a collateral assumption . 
Thus in 1968, scattered UNG faculty support for black 
~ 
gubernatorial candidate Reginald Hawkins or anti-war 
presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy was within the 
bounds of an academic tradition that could be liberal in 
' its political ideas beyond the university while remaining 
instinctively conservative within . Faculty committees , 
such as the one headed by Dickson Phillips on the status 
of mi norities and the one headed by Eugen Merzbacher on 
the need for curriculum change , sometimes pressured the 
administration toward reform, but did so through acknowledged 
channels without conveying a need for emergency action . 
If the senior faculty members and administrators 
commonl y viewed the university , in the words of one observer , 
"as on e big family working together for the common good , 1133 
then within that family tradition , faculty and administrators 
tended to treat non - academic workers paternalistically , with 
a friendly appreciation and a firm expectation of courteous 
33Burton (Buck) Goldstein interview, 17 April 1974 . 
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servi ce. To most faculty members, the first ten days of 
the strike represented little more than a meal - time 
inconvenience . 
Some faculty members, according to political science 
professor ~lden E. Lind ' s assessment, considered the food -
workers as "spooks 1134 whose grievances were not to be taken 
seriously, but a group of well -r espected AAUP faculty 
members did recognize early that the foodworkers had 
problems. Those professors responded to the walkout by 
holding a series of lunch-time meetings to "exchange 
information" which they then passed directly to Chancellor 
Sitterson . Although the faculty group was important in 
keeping the administration better informed--Sitterson was 
always "very responsive , 11 35 according to j\AUP president 
Daniel Pollitt--their contributions did not result in 
forceful administrative action . 
Even these faculty . members who advocated a strike 
resolution satisfactory to the foodworkers wanted , said 
Henry L andsberger , to "remedy the wrongs without extreme 
measures . "36 For most faculty members who donated money 
to the foodworkers ' benefit fund, their efforts arose 
from other - than - radical motivations , since the faculty 
34Alden E. Lind , interview by Steve Miller , 8 October 
1974, SOHPC . 
35
oaniel Pollitt interview , 4 September 1979 . 
36Henry Landsberger interview, 3 December 1974 . 
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committee in charge of soliciting contributions intended 
to alleviate the hardships caused by the strike rather 
than to support the strike its elf . Sympathetic to food -
workers who may have been unwilling or afraid to cross 
picket lines, the faculty committee appealed to humanitarian , 
not partisan , motives . The overlay of conservative instinct 
with liberal idea was further illustrated by cardiologist 
Daniel T. Young who , though strongly sympathetic to the 
grievances of the foodworkers , admitted that h e was also 
spurred by self - interest: he wanted to prevent the employee 
strike from spreading to the hospital where it would disrupt 
services where he worked . 37 
There wer e , of course , exceptions among the generally 
undemonstrative faculty members . One group with a different 
tradition from the rest of the faculty was the New University 
Conference . Said to be the SSOC equivalent among graduate 
instructors and untenured faculty , the NUC vigorously 
supported the strike from its inception . Richard Roman , 
a socio l ogy instructor , was one notable example of this 
radical style of faculty protest . Roman was a "fiery 
speaker , 1138 said one of his colleagues; he was "willing to 
p u 11 do wn th e u n iv er s i t y , " 3 9 s a i d an o th er • Ex c e pt for th e 
37naniel T. Young , interview by Steve Miller , 
December 1974 , SOHPC . 0 
38tawrence D. Kessler , interview by Steve Miller , 
20 November 1974 , SOHPC . 
39 Henry Landsb erger interview, 3 December 1974. 
however , the faculty members felt that 
there was no thraat to what was called the 
of the university , 1140 they would let the 
·minis tration resolve the strike . During that time , 
e faculty and the administration general ly reinforced 
one another the position that labor and r acial unrest 
be treated circumspect l y , by a combination of 
iecemeal measures and temporizing rejoinders . 
1 38 
Although faculty members disapproved of the student 
~ehavior in L e noir Hal l on Tuesday night, they reacted 
~ore dramatically to Governor Scott ' s subsequent conduct . 
: Th e peremptory summons which Scott delivered to President 
and Chanc ellor Sitterson on Wednesday signaled a 
in the traditional ways of doing university business . 
Frederic N. Cl eav eland , chairman of the faculty and l ong-
time acquaintance of both Friday and Sitt erson, declared 
later that the "manner in whi ch the meeting was call ed and 
the governor's conduct during the meeti n g was t o tally • •• 
~nconsi st ent with th~ pr i or relationship" bet we en a chief 
executive and university officials . 41 Together with his 
order to send in the highway patrol , the governor ' s behavior had 
40 A phrase commonly used ; see Qyrh~ill-~Q~Iling_H e~~lg , 
21 February 1969 and ~hs~gl_liill_~~ekly , 26 February 1969 , 
for ex ample . 
41Frederic N. Cleaveland , inter vi ew by Bill Finger 


















an effect on campus , said Cleaveland , that was 
"traumatic . 11 42 The issue was no longer merely one in 
which student disrupters threatened the majority ' s right 
to be served meals . Many on campus now perceiv ed a greater 
menace to the majority ' s rights to academic freedom . 
Whereas prese1·vation of tradition had previously led 
conservative faculty members to defer the strike ' s 
r eso luti on to administrators , n ow defense of academic 
integrity became a reason for mor e faculty members to assert 
themselves. Ov er two hundred of them , for instance, 
signed the 6 March petition to Governor Scott , condemning 
his political and military interference with university life. 
Notwithstanding the faculty ' s overal l support of 
the administra t i on, th ere was a growing undercurrent of 
frustration caused by the inability of campus officials to 
:re so lve the strike. If Sitterson had moved earlier , 
recalled political science professor Lewis Lipsitz, then 
the university "might have avoided the intensity of the 
conflict . 11 43 Others , li ke Henry L andsberger , sensed the 
need for a strong administrative manager, one who could 
at least make a forceful symbolic act against the governor ' s 
intrusion and fo r the resolution of foodworker grievances . 44 
42Ibid . 
43Lewi s Lipsitz, intervi ew with Buck Goldstein by 
by oral history class, 17 October 1974, SOHPC . 
44Henry Landsb erger in terview , 3 December 1974 . 
140 
Instead (and despite the ongoing communication between the 
chancellor and some professors) , there were 11 important 
segments of th e faculty , " according to faculty chairman 
Fred Cleaveland t ~ho still did not know how or ev e n whether 
the administrat~o n was responding to the demands of the 
governor and the foodworkers . And the administration , 
said Cleaveland , did not know the extent to which "important 
members of the faculty ••• felt very strongly that . . . 
the needs of the food service workers needed somehow to 
be dealt with . 1145 
The Faculty Council normally provided a forum for 
discussion and a stimulus to communication between the 
chancellor and the faculty . The assembly of one hundred 
and twenty faculty representatives usually met once a month 
with the chancellor presiding. A regular meeting was 
scheduled for Friday , 7 March , but as convention time 
approached , the chancellor was out of town attending the 
conference basketball tournament in Charlotte. His assistant 
Claiborne Jones also was not available , so Fred Cleaveland , 
who was responsible for determining the agenda , decided to 
postpone the meeting. .Arrangements were made instead for 
the entire faculty to meet on the following Tuesday, 
11 March . Sitterson , upon the advice of Cleaveland and 
other respected faculty members , would then make his first 
public address since the strike had started . 
45 Frederic Cleaveland interview, 9 November 1974 . 
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The need for immediate faculty action seemed 
sufficiently great, howev e r , to prompt Alden Lind to 
a Friday meeting anyway. Two hundred and fifty 
including one hundred and forty full-time faculty 
\ 
' 1 members, answered Lind's call in Murphey Hall . Elizabeth 
Brooks , an invit ed guest along with Preston Dobbins, said 
that workers would appreciate the support of a general 
faculty strike . She also said that the workers, dissatis-
fied as they were with the previous day ' s meeting with 
Claiborne Jon es and Joseph Eagles, had added three new 
demands to their list: employees should not be charged 
for meals , cooks' salaries should be raised, and workers 
should be paid for time missed during the strike . Preston 
Dobbins then spoke; he chastised the faculty for their 
timid petitions. He reminded them not to "use your personal 
dislike of the BSM as a crutch, because you are not dealing 
with us . You are dealing with a hundred and fifty people 
out of work because of atrocious conditions on their jobs. 1146 
After cross-examining Dobbins and Elizabeth Brooks , 
most faculty members in attendance were sympathetic to the 
foodworkers ' cause but they had a difficult and lengthy 
time deciding on the proper tack to take . Dick Roman gave 
a speech that , according to Lou Lipsitz, attacked the 
faculty ' s integrity and left "people's hair standing up 
46rape recording of meeting, 7 March 1969, in 
possession of Elizab eth Brooks . 
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back of thei x necks . 11 47 '· Roman called fox an i mmediate 
e ach e r s ' stri ke . Unl ess suffic i ent numb e rs actual l y 
ar t ici p a ted , however , the tact i c would be "self - destruc t ive 
accoxdi ng to history instructor Larry Kessler . 48 
Lind agr eed t h at t h e few who were wi l ling to strike 
b e fir ed and t h e un i vex si ty soon returned to an 
o f " t e r r ad act y 1 s . " 4 9 .An t hr op o 1 o g y pro f e s so r 
Stev en Pol gar suggested t h at admi nistrativ e x eprisals might 
be avoid ed i f fac u lty members me x ely "reschedul ed" t heix 
class ap p ~intments , but the group on 7 March finall y d ecided 
def er ac t i on un t il afte r the ch ancellor had responded 
to th e full facul ty on the fo ll owing Tuesday . In the late 
after noon , by a vo t e of 70 - 9 , a dwindli ng assemb ly reso l ved 
that the f o odwo rke r gr i ev an ces shoul d receive " equitable 
solution s . "50 It h ardly repx esented a forcefu l or urge nt 
faculty mess age to the admi nist r at i on . 
The arrival o f the p atro l on campus shocked UNG 
stud ents , al t h ough l ess s t eeped in the tradition of academi c 
fr e edom, th ey we r e p e r hap s l ess app all ed t h an the fac ulty . 
Student activi s t s , wh o we r e no t p a r t i cul ar ly co ncern ed about 
47L ewis L i p s i tz i nt erview, 17 October 1974 . 
48Lawr en ce Kess l er int erv iew, 20 No v embex 1974 . 
49Ald en Lind inte r v i ew , 8 October 197 4 . 
50Ral~igh_N~~~-~ng_QQ~~~Y~~ ' 8 Mar ch 1969 ; 
Dur h..a!!LM..Q.~nins_tl,g~lig , 8 March 19 6 9 . 
the faculty was doing, set about arranging more of 
Scott Bradley called "disorganized organization . 1151 
picketed both Lenoir Hall and South Building . They 
called a meeting in Great Hall of the new student 
ten minutes after beginning, the five hundred 
attending were routed by a bomb threat . In the ensuing 
suggested reconvening in Lenoir and 
patrol . But another bomb threat there 
prompted students and police to trade accusations and 
forced the students finally to organize their picketing 
money - raising activities elsewhere . 
A group of student government leaders meanwhile 
pushing their efforts at mediation . Student body 
· president Kenneth Day and representatives Richie Leonard 
and John McDowell were sympathetic to the needs of the 
foodworkers . The mien of the government group , as well 
as their putative status as leaders, gave them an access 
to South Building which , though not denied to the more 
boisterous student groups , was abjured by them . Day, 
Leonard, and McDowell met with Claiborne Jones on Friday 
morning . Jones told them that the administration could 
move no faster to resolve worker grievances . Interference 
from the governor and the need for legislative approval of 
the $1 . 80 minimum wage imposed severe restraints . 
51scott Bradley interview, 30 October 1974 . 
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Aware that much of the power to deal with the 
mediate situation had shifted to the state's executive 
'fice, the group of student leaders went to Raleigh for 
Friday afternoon appointment with Governor Scott . On 
the students considered raising the issue of 
freedom with Scott , but they decided that he 
ould think freedom was threatened more by radical-student 
violence than by the action of the state patrol. Finding 
• 
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the governor as expected , dissatisfied with the UNC adminis-
• 
tration's respons e to student disruption , the group tried 
to convince Scott of the primary need to resolve the 
foodworker grievances . But they discovered that Governor 
Scott was leaving settlement of that issue to campus 
: authorities . 52 Organizing support for their cause was 
for both students and faculty members a confusing and 
frustrating undertaking . 
The administration persevered by degrees in its 
quiet investigation of the workers ' complaints . On Friday, 
Cl aiborne Jones released a statement that state classifica-
tion specialists would be on campus Monday to talk to both 
striking and non-striking employees . From the UNC accounting 
office came the announcement that their food service audit, 
incomplete so far , had found that between forty and fifty 
52 Account of student leaders from summary by 
Buck Goldstein and Joe Shedd . 
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were due overtime pay . The increase in the minimum 
age , the administration maintained, was stil l in the hands 
the General Assembly . 
Legislative--i.e . political--interference was 
nathema to campus educators; legislative support , however , 
of the university . In the case of the 
,$1.80 wage , campus administrators did not push for 
emergency state assistance to meet the workers' demand; 
could com e only through extraordi nary procedures . 
· Administrators hoped to appease workers by pointing out 
. t he prospect of eventual General Assembly approval of the 
$1. 80 minimum . That way , with relations between Chapel 
Hi ll an d Raleigh already strained , univer sity authorities 
would not have to trade in precious political chips trying 
to get state officials to meet the demand right away . 
Chancellor Sitterson had acknowl edged in his 
executive session with deans and department chairmen on 
Thursday morning that improprieties had been found in the 
operation of the food service . Sitterson could have 
pub l icly announced what he had conceded privately , but 
after the foodworkers rejected the administrative package 
of remedial measures on Thursday afternoon , Sitterson must 
have realized that an admission of injusti ce unsuppo=ted 
by tangible concessions would so~nd hollow to impatient 
partisans of the workers . He did not want to provoke a 
showdown with those demanding instant redress. Also , 
by admitting culpability, he might leave himself open to 
the charge of abetting what one newspaper called the 
11 group of anarchists o • • determined to destroy the 
universities . 1153 Sitterso n had felt state political 
lightning already, so he stayed low and went to the 
basketball tournament . 
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For the moment, the likelihood lessened of a showdown 
between the state and the students . Even hard-line 
legislators found themselves slightly embarrassed by the 
manner in which minority l eaders Bagnal and Taylor had 
criticized Sitterson's handling of the crisis . On Friday, 
the state senate backed off from a resolution calling 
for a tough stand against disruption on the grounds that 
the resolution might appear to be aimed specifically at 
Chapel Hill and thereby "aggravate a sensitive situation •. " 5 4 
Even Governor Scott evident! y thought a showdown unnecessary, 
at least for a while; he advised the five hundred National 
Guardsmen standing by in Durham that they could return home 
for the weekend . 
The weekend was comparatively calm around L enoir . 
On Sunday morning, the ~hsR~l-tlill~~~klY reminded readers 
of some amusing scenes from the previous week on campus : 
53Editorial, Qy~hsm_M~~ing_tl~~slQ, 8 March 1969. 
54o~~h..am_~yn , 7 March 19 69 . 
eporters charging to a pep rally for the basketball team , 
hinking it was a gathering of strike supporters; highway 
sometimes the target of the epithet 11 pigs , 11 
inking to each other and marching as students called the 
resolution someone offered to 11 reschedule 11 
salaries ; and a suggestion to form a John Wayne 
for apolitical violence.55 
Other evidence showed Sunday readers that UNC was 
alone among colleges struggling with student , racial , 
and employee problems . At Duke , blacks and administrators 
were still trying to work out a modus vivendi . At UNC at 
Charlotte and at North Carolina A ~ T University , black 
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students continued to protest unfair treatment . At colleges 
across the country--from San Francisco State to Wisconsin 
to Sarah Lawrence--administrators contended with their 
students' overt dissatisfaction with university policy 
toward non-acad~mic employees and local residents. 
CH.APTER VI I 
MORE DISPERSION OF ACQ)UNT.ABILITY 
Those who went downtown about noon on Sunday noticed 
that on both sides of Franklin Street , for two blocks, people 
stood in silent vigil. Organized by SSOC and student 
government leaders to call the town ' s attention to the 
foodworkers ' cause, the tactic was a familiar one, used 
heretofore by Chapel Hill protesters against the Vietnam 
war . Behind the scenes , however, there was little silence. 
, . 
. 
On Saturday , Alden Lind had called Fred Cleaveland and had 
..r-;: 
,I 
"never heard him so depressed and utterly without options. '1 '· 
., 
ii 
Cleaveland was worried about the administration ' s misappre-
hension of the extent to which older , established faculty 
members were concerned about the redress of employee 
grievances . To Lind , the administration was still treating 
workers as "non-humans"; he complained about Sitterson' s 
"inexplicable muteness" and the chancellor's "typical 
southern way" of managing the crisis : "if you sit on your 
haunches long enough , the problem will finally • dry up 
and blow away . " Both Lind and Cleaveland were disappointed 
---------
1 Alden Lind interview , 8 October 1974 . 
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with the meager results of the informal faculty meeting on 
Friday . Their commiseration turned into a call for action . 
Lind telephoned colleague Lou Lipsi tz and together they 
called another twenty professors to meet on Sunday , 9 March , 
at Lind's hom e . 
The Sunday afternoon gathering included respected 
faculty members from various departments and pol itical 
persuasions--"top-no tch people , " according to Lind. 2 The 
group organized itself to push reluctant administrators and 
faculty members into action beneficial to the foodworkers. 
The group ho~ed to exert at the same time a stabilizing 
influence on those in the universi~y community who advocated 
radical action . On Saturday; for instanc e , graduate teaching 
assistants at UNG had decided to go ahead with a rescheduling 
of class appointments . By Sunday , President Friday and 
Chancellor Sitterson had formally warned all teachers that 
failure to meet their assigned classes would , according to 
trustee policy since 1959 , be interpreted as a "neglect of 
duty and breach of contractual relationship" with the 
university . 3 On Sunday evening , individuals from Alden 
Lind's ad - hoc group met again , this time on campus with 
graduate students , whom they successfully dissuaded 
2Ibid . 
3William C. Friday and the chancellors of the four 
Consolidated University campuses , statement 9 March 1969 , 
reaffirming Board of Trustee policy set 25 May 1959, 
Cha nc el lors ' Records, file on Strike . Although not stated , 
the clear implication was that administrators considered 
a "rescheduling of classes" to be only a semantic 







from what Lind called the "meaningless gesture" of strikingo 4 
Law professor Dan Pollitt was one who debated that 
night with outspoken ~oodworker supporters who argued that 
visible and determined advocates among white academics were 
crucial to the cause of the non-academic employees . If 
workers were willing to risk losing their jobs, then whites 
should be willing to do the same , said radicals, who 
considered only secondarily the indications that their 
actions might in fact divert attention away from the 
employees and make conservatives even les s sympathetic to 
the foodworker cause . ~gitation was more important to 
them than concern about obscuring central issues or lo s ing 
the allegiance of the timid . 
Po lli tt ' s Sunday audience was skeptical when he 
pointed out that the foodworkers alr eady had Chambers and 
Stein as l egal representatives . To prove his point , 
Pollitt call ed Juliu s Chambers in Charlotte , at about 
10:00 P.M ., to ask if he had been working on the foodworker 
case. Chambers said ye.s , whereup on Pollitt advised him 
to give some public evidence to that effect . 5 Later that 
night, Chambers sent to Chancellor Sitterson a telegram 
declaring his intention to represent campus non-academic 
workers and asserting that the university was in violation 
4 Alden Lind interview, 8 October 1974 . 
5naniel Pollitt interview , 4 September 1979; 








of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1966 for not paying the 
statutory minimum for overtime work and was in violati on 
of the Thirteenth · and Fourteenth .Amendments and the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 for its disc~iminatory hiring 
practices . 6 Chambers officially notified the foodworkers 
by sending their president , Mary Smith , the same telegram . 7 
Elizabeth Brooks admitted later that the workers had been 
s l o w i n " g et ti n g b a ck " w i th th e l a wy er s s i n c e th e op en -
ended arrangements of Tuesday, 4 March . Preston Dobbins , 
however , had maintained contact with the attorneys throughout . 
Under Dobbins's continual pressure to secure legal help , 
especially to straighten out questions about overtime pay , 
the employees ' finally , as Elizabeth Brooks said , "sensed 
maybe he was right. 118 
Chancellor Sitterson, when he received the telegram 
from Chambers on Monday morning, discussed its contents 
with President Friday and Claiborne Jones , who also had got 
telegrams . On Monday afternoon , Friday and Sitterson 
notified Chambers that the university had referred the 
matter to North Carolina Attorney General Robert B. Morgan 
in Raleigh . 9 What the two administrators did not say was 
6Julius L . Chambers to J . Carlyle Sitterson , 
telegram receiv ed 10 : 30 A. M., 10 March 19 69 , Chancellors' 
Records, file on Strike . 
7Julius Chambers, telegram 10 Ma:ch 1969 , in 
possession of Mary Smith . 
8Elizabeth Brooks interview, 13 September 1979 . 
9Telegram from J . Carlyle Sitterson and William C. 
C , Friday to Julius Chambers , 3 : 35 P.M ., 10 Ma rch 1969 , 









that the univeristy was thereby taking on as counsel a 
man who was also chairman of the board of trustees of 
East Carolina University , a growing academic rival to 
UNC for pieces of the state ' s financial pie . 
On Monday morning , members of the BSM stepped up 
their activities; they toured Saunders and Murph ey Halls , 
interrupted classes in session , and told teachers and 
students that they should be out helping the f oodworkers . 
"To do n othing is to be nothing , " the BSM pointedly 
advised the campus over a l oudsp eaker they had set up 
in Manning Hal l. 10 That same morning , striking workers 
refused to meet with st ate personnel director Claude E. 
Caldwell and his job-classifcation team . Publicly , the 
workers asked why they should meet with Caldwell when 
the previous Octob er he had r ebuffed th em in Raleigh . 
Privately, according to Daniel Pq lli tt , the foodworkers 
gave a blunter reason for their refusal , saying simply 
that "they didn ' t trust those honkies . 1111 
Insid e South Building o n Monday morning , attorney 
Adam Stein met with the chancellor's assistant , Claiborne 
Jones . In Stein ' s subsequent report to the pu blic , he 
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said that Jones had agreed that the university had treated 
lOlli!Ih~m_§yn, 10 March 1969 . 






its workers "like niggers" and that George Prillaman was 
not fit to manage the food $ervice . Rather than negotiate , 
however , Jones had advised Stein to resolve substantive 
foodworker issues with the attorney general . The campus 
administration had bungled negotiations and abrogated 
responsib il ity for its employees , said Stein; nonetheless , 
he advised students , workers , and faculty to "give Morgan 
a chance . 1112 
Backer s of the foodworkers continued their picketing 
outside South Bui l d i ng on Monday . At a noon rally in 
nearby Polk Place , speeches were given , and obscenities 
were heard . In the afternoon , SSOC and BSM members 
prepared a "boycott bu l leti n " that called for another 
rally on Tuesday and accused state "po l iticos" of "playing 
their costly games with the i n ternal affairs of our 
university . 111 3 From Lenoir Hal l came a report that three 
thousand people were served wi thout incident . Perhaps 
this bit of upbeat news from the management indicated that 
students had tired of the " baloney-and - Truade 11 1 4 l unches 
and the chicken-and-french-fries suppers at Manning ; 
perhaps some were bothered by health department reports 
that the Manning Hal l food was "subject to all kinds of 
1 2gh~£gl_tlill_~~gkly , 12 March 1969 ; Q~~hsm_MQ~ninB 
He~~lg , 11 March 1969; Adam Stein interview , 27 November 1974 . 
13Du~hsm_§gn , 11 March 1969 . 
14Daniel Pollitt described the lunches in his 
interview , 4 September 1979 . 
food poisoning. 1115 If management's announcement meant that 
UNC student support for the boycott was waning , however , 
that inference would have been difficult to prove. 
Because skeptical strikers had refused on Monday 
to discuss their job classifications with Claude Caldwell, 
the state personnel officials moved on Tuesday, at the 
suggestion of a faculty member, from Gerrard Hall to 
Manni ng Hall . They hoped that strikers would be more 
amenable on their home turf. At first, however, as 
Caldwell waited in the Manning Hall basement, strikers 
stayed upstairs with the BSM . Later, several workers did 
relent and talk with the state job analysts , but the 
foodworkers remained upset with campus administrators. 
Elizabeth Brooks announc ed that she had rec eived from 
Claiborne Jo n es a summary of their 6 March negotiating 
session . Not only was his account inaccurate, it was 
also degrading, she said , pointing out that the adminis-
tration referred to employees only as "personnel," never 
as "people. 1116 
~-2~~a~a1~_§KQYQ_2f_NQn~h~~ggmi~-~2Kkg~~ 
t!Q1Q3_12.-1:~~giti2n 
While strikers grumbled and waited for the chancellor 
to speak publicly , a separate group of non-academi c employees 
15 R~lgigh_lig~~-~ng_Q£~gKYgK , 11 March 1969 , 
attributes quotation to H. Dobson , sanitation engineer 
for the district health department. 
16DuKh~m_§~n , 11 March 1969 . 
met to discuss with UNG personnel d~rector Fred Haskell 
demands which it had ear lier submitted to the administra-
tion. The organization was the UNC Workers ' Association , 
formed on 26 February and composed of janitors and maids 
who had continued to work during the cafet eria strike . 
Roscoe McCrimmon , president of the association , announced 
after a Monday negotiating meeting that administrators 
and workers had held "substantive talks . " McCrimmon 
further observed that the foodworkers might have been 
more effective had they joined with maintenance employees 
before deciding to strike . 17 
McCrimmon may have been correct in his analysis. 
Janitors and maids had grievances as real as those of the 
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foodworkers . Workers commonly complained of carrying heavy 
loads , having few weekends off , enjoying little chance of 
promotion , and being underpaid. Because many foodworkers 
also knew o t her campus workers , there existed a basis for 
widespread understanding of the problems each had in 
dealing with management . Black students on campus had been 
concerned about the grievances of maintenanc e workers and 
could have provided organizational support for both food-
workers and janitors . In addition , the nature of mainte-
nance jobs gave faculty members and white students the 
chance to know individual janitors well and to know their 
17 Du~h~ill-~Q~ning_tl~~~lg, 11 March 1969 ; Q~ilY_I~~ 
tl~gl , 11 March 1969 . 
' 
· 1 
grievances as thoroughly as those of the foodworkers . 
Potentially , then , the faculty and student body might 
have been as supportive of janitors and maids as they 
were of the foodworkers . 
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But janitors and maids were widely dispersed across 
the campus; they were not clustered in a central location 
as the foodworkers were in Lenoir. Also , the nature of 
individual maintenance work , in contrast to that of the 
foodworkers , did not depend on functioning as a group 
while on the job . Maintenance employees did not have to 
contend with management continually overseeing their work 
and thereby serving as a cause and focus for worker 
complaints. ~nd from inside the ranks of maintenance 
workers there did not emerge the same style of vigorous 
leadership as emerged from the food service women in the 
Pine Room. Important ingredients that led to the food 
workers coalescence as an activist gro u p thus were missing 
from other non-academic employee groups at UNC . Furthermore , 
as cond i tions in the caf~teria worsened prior to the strike , 
the immediate predicament absorbed ~he attention of food-
workers and black students; problems of coordinating their 
plans were difficult enough without having to organize other 
non-academic workers . Janitors and maids were therefore 
left out of the decision to strike , in part because they 
were not as well organized internally nor as inclined to 
activism as the foodworkers , and in P.art because they were 
given little opportunity to join the cause. 
157 
Other non - academic employees might nevertheless 
have joined in sympathy with the foodworkers ' walkout 
after it began . Indeed , said foodworker Elizabeth Brooks 
later, "we asked them to stxike . 1118 But the same elements 
that made job experiences different before the strike 
prevented close communication between maintenance workers 
and foodworke rs during the strike . Perhaps the dilatory 
administrative response to foodworkers showed janitors and 
maids the advantage of holding on even tighter to their jobs . 
Rather than being handicapped by the situation , however, 
maintenance employees found the times all the more 
propit ious for a redress of their particular grievances. 
Inspired by the foodworkers but separate from them , janitors 
and maids soo n formed their own organization and submitted 
a list of their needs to the administratio n. They discovered 
that the administration was remarkably wi lling to talk . 
Sin ce the janitors had not struck and had not 
enlisted the aid of radical students , the administration 
could use the janitors ' organization to demonstrate 
publicly how , in contrast , the food wor kers had overstepped 
the tradi t i onal boundaries of propr i ety . By balancing i ts 
intransi gence to foodworkers with concessions to janitors , 
the admi ni stration might impress upon foodworkers the 
efficacy of submitting grievances through proper channels 
.,}II 
18Eliz abeth Brooks interview , 13 September 1979. 
and at the same time reinfo=ce its image of benevolence--
meting out justice to its non-academic workers with the 
implicit admonition that as long as workers behaved 
properly , they would be treated fa irly. 
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Te nsion between striking and non-striking foodworkers 
was eve n more evident than that between cafeteria and 
maintenance emp l oyees . Foodworkers who remained on the 
job at Lenoir Hall did so against strong pressure by 
strikers . The non- strikers generally were elderly men and 
women with long expe~ience in the food service . Through 
the years , some seemed to hav e curried relatively more 
favor with management than the strikers ; they were therefore 
reluctant to risk their jobs by strik ing, especially 
co nsidering the pal try benefits the tactic so far had 
reaped . 
Although it is difficult to ~now accurately the 
motives of individual ~orkers , eve n some strikers were 
caught between a desire to strike and a desire to work in 
spite of the strike . Arthur Foushe e , a respected cook in 
Lenoir , understood the grievances but felt personally 
unaffected by them ; he wanted to work but would not cross 
the picket line to do so . Other workers stayed away 
because of direct intimida~ion. One of Lenoir Hall's other 
cooks , having promised strikers that he would not cross 
their picket line , came to work at 4 : 30 A.M. to avoid 
passing the five o ' clock picket ers . According to Elizabeth 
Brooks , UNC black students, after learning what the man 
had done , found him at his home and told him that they 
"wouldn ' t be responsible for what happened to him. 1119 
From then on, the cook did not work and was officially 
listed as a striker even though he did not participate in 
any strike activities . 
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Although a noticeable array of students and faculty 
were dispirited by the UNC administration ' s handling of 
the foodworker situation, the crisis educed so lid support 
for the administrat ion from one notable group of faculty 
members . On Monday, 10 March, the fo=mer dean of UNC ' s 
law school , Henry P . Brandis , Jr . , circulated a petition 
asserting that "to the extent that a labor dispute is 
involved , we believe that the University is moving in 
good faith to reach just solutions . " Brandis's statement 
went on to condemn the 11 small mi nori ti es of students and 
teachers urged • by individuals from outside," and it 
warned against the "real danger that they ~uch minorities] 
will goad the people of the state into destroying freedom 
of expression fo:: all of us." 
Fifteen members of the Institute of Government 
faculty and nineteen of the Law School faculty signed the 




General ~s semb ly by l egislators who were UNG truste e s . 
~ft er applause, the document was entered into the journal 
of e ach house by a unanimous vote . 2° Campus administrators 
must have been grateful for the dissemination statewide 
of such an outspok ~ n affirmation of what they felt was a 
s t e adfast position : a combination of good-faith negotiations 
with work ers, a non-conciliatory stand against radicals, and 
a wariness of political incursion from elements beyond the 
university community . 
On Tuesday afternoon , 11 March , Chancellor Sitterson 
finally did talk to the public . Two thousand people jammed 
into Memorial Hall , site of the scheduled General Faculty 
mee ting. Sitterson began by saying that once given the 
opportunity to speak to the community a~out the foodworker 
s ituation , he had "eagerly accepted." His "firm intention," 
he said , was that "every legitimate grievance be dealt with 
justly and promptly . " In reviewing his acquaintance with 
the problem , he recalled the October 1968 mamo from the 
workers of Lenoir Dining Hall . His staff had considered the 
employees' list of suggestions and in response had issued 
certain "authorizations and instructions" to th e food service 
management . As of 11 March, conceded the chancellor, thos e 
-·---------
20ourh~m Sun , 10 March 1969; R.sl..e.i.9..h_N~~ng 
Ob s e rver , 11 Mar ch 1 969 , r e fer s to the inclusi on of 
t he petiti o n in th ~ journal of the Gen eral As se mbly . 
October commandments had "not been carried out completely . " 
Citing the strike specifically , Sitterson said that 
h e had request ed p~rsonnel director Fr ed Haskell and 
auxiliary services director J . A. Branch to meet with the 
workers on 24 February . He noted that workers had subse-
qu e ntly refused those administrators ' invitation to discuss 
grievances individually. Sitterson claimed that he had 
learned of the specific grievances through the Chapel Hill 
Human Relations Commission on 28 February , but that 
"intensive efforts" to meet with workers were thwarted for 
a t ime by the BSM's interference. In the interim , he had 
asked auditors and state classification specialists to 
investigate the employees ' complaints . 
Sitterson then recapitulated the 6 March negotiating 
session between cafeteria workers and his representatives 
Claiborne Jones and Joseph Eagles. Retracing seventeen 
grievances , point by point , Sitterson acknowledged that 
''errors in calculation may have occurred" with respect to 
overtime pay due to workers. Sitterson said that workers had · 
asked for the first time on 6 March that the $1 . 80 minimum 
wage be applied only to permanent employees , not to all; 
state personnel officials might therefore be able to 
accommodate the demand by upgrading some of the workers' 
job classifications. In reference to the use of courtesy 
titles by supervisors , Sitterson restated university policy , 
noting that the university did not need "at any level , any 
I 
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person unable or unwilling to treat workers with courtesy , 
respect , and decency . " .About other aspects of the workers ' 
grievances , Sitterson's statements gave little new informa-
tion , except for his mention that "extensive changes" were 
anticipated in the management of the food service. 
The chancellor then plunged into what he regarded 
as the "larger question" of preserving th e "long and deep 
traditions" of the university. He spoke of "free inquiry, 
right of dissent , elevation of the intellect, and the 
enrichment of human spirit . " The "search for truth , " he 
said , required "study , reflection , and continuous dialogue." 
And "any group who resorts to fo:rce is not interested in 
truth but the imposition of its will." Sitterson called 
upon his audience to " tol e rate the imperfections of man," 
but noted that North Carolina law and UNG Board of Trustee 
by-law did not tolerate either interference with the use of 
public buildings or neglect of teaching duties . In referring 
to the use of tolerance and force , Sitterson did not mention 
the governor or the police . The fundamental issue was 
"orderly gove:rnance , " said Sitterson • .All groups--students, 
fa culty , administrators , and trustees--must regard themselves 
as "custodians" of the "precious public trust" which was the 
university in Chapel Hill , a "grea-: and v enerable institution . 11 21 
---------
21 Text of Chancellor Sitterson ' s remarks , 11 March 
1969, Chancellors' Records, file on Strike; see also 
newspaper accounts . 
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Sitterson then left the stage and auditorium without waiting 
for questions . 
After Sitterson departed , Mary Smith and Elizab eth 
Brook s spoke for the workers . They appreciated the 
conciliatory tone of the chancellor ' s remar ks since it 
was the first public admission that management was in some 
way responsible for the foodworkers ' problems , but the two 
women questio ned the administration's intention to move 
beyond talk . In light of the autho=ities ' past unwilling-
ness to negotiate , the employees doubted that just or 
prompt administrative action would follow. 22 
After the foodworkers spoke , the faculty set about 
acting , as best it could . In spite of confusion about 
voting procedure in such a large meeting (only one-fifth 
of those present were faculty members eligible to vote) , 
the faculty managed to pass two resolutions introduced by 
Daniel Pollitt on behalf of the AAUP . One resolved that 
the university should support the foodworkers ' association 
and barga:n with its chosen representative ; the other called 
upon the Faculty Council (as distinct from the General 
Faculty) to authorize a nine-member committee to investigate 
the needs of campus non-academic workers . Several of the 
faculty members present had int ended to , but finally did not , 
introduce resolutions to censure the conduct of George 
I I 
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Prillaman , Fred Haskell , and UNC news bureau chief Pete 
Ivey, an official whom they accused of distorting news 
releases to insinuate a tie between strike supporters 
d . t 23 an commun:i.s s . 
Even though the chancellor had hinted broadly that 
many of the foodworkers' complaints were indeed justified, 
attorney Adam Stein amplified the foodworkers' feeling 
that Sitterson ' s talk was anti-climactic and largely 
inconsequential . Returning from Raleigh where earli er in 
the day he had talked with deputy attorney general Harry 
McGalliard , Stein met with graduate students and instructors 
in Alumni Hall after the mass gathering in Memorial Hall . 
He noted that Sitterson had responded to many of the 
foodworker grievances merely by stating university policy. 
That approach , said Stein , avoided dealing with the funda-
mental need to make sure that such policy was just and that 
it was implemented forcefully and equitably rather than 
ignored . Furthermore , asked Stein , why expect an administra-
tion which "hasn ' t done anything" on its own in more than 
two weeks and which has turned negotiatio ns over to the 
state, now to fulfill a promise of prompt action? 
23Minutes of 11 March 1969 meeting of General 
Faculty, by Clifford Lyons , secretary of the faculty , 
10 July 1969, Chancellors ' Reco~ds , file on Strike; 








Stein added that Attorney General Morgan ' s office 
wa s investigating the univers~ty ' s violations of the Fa~r 
Labo r Standards Act regarding overtime pay , and he estimated 
that nearly $80 , 000 in back pay was due the foodworkers . 
Some of the attending instructors , because of their 
di s s a tisfaction with Sitterson's speech , revived the 
pr op o sal to reschedule class meetings , but Stein advised 
th em not to fo llo w through on the idea . The important 
thing, counseled Stein , was to give the attorney general 
a chance at remedy . In contrast to UNG administrators , 
Morgan was an "efficient operator" who might well think it 
"political ly wise to simply come in here and clean up 
24 
th e mess ." 
Observers might have quibbled : over what Stein meant 
by "mess -," but most of them would have agreed that sorting 
out the issues was still difficult . The Du~h~m_Sun 
wondered as late as 11 March , "which--i f any--of the 
complaints of the food - service employees have any validity . 1125 
By Thursday , the Qy~ham-~~I.ning_li~Lal~ was attempting to 
keep a clear perspective by defining the UNG strike as two 
separate issues : "the claims of the workers are one thing; 
the operation of the university is another . 11 26 That view 
wa s advocated by most faculty members and presumably by 
24Qyrh~m_MQining_li~I~1£ , 12 March 1969 . 
25Du~h~m-~yn , 11 March 1969. 
26QYih~m_MQining_li~Isl£ , 1 3 March 1969 . 
---· 
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administrators also; it acknowledged the validity of some 
of the work~rs 1 grievances while remaining adamant about 
preventing disruption of the normal educational process . 
State political authorities , however, remained essentially 
unconcerned with employee grievances whatever the validity; 
they concentrated instead on the issue of radical disruption . 
On Tuesday , legislators began moving a bill through the 
General Assembly which would stiffen penalties for sit-ins; 
on Wednesday , they introduced anti-riot legislation. 
M..Q~~~RR.r~h~n~iQn 
As in earlier ep isode s , l egis lators and others in 
the state r e acted not just to problems at UNC but to 
activities elsewhere as well . In Durham on Tuesday night, 
Howard Fuller organized a rally to support the decision by 
some black students to withdraw from Duke University and 
to enter the Malcolm X School of Liberation . When the 
downtown march got out of co ntrol and store windows were 
broken , forty - seven peop l e were arrested , including persons--
in a state car assigned to Howard Fuller's use--for fire-
bombing . the forest behind Duke President Douglas Knight ' s 
house . By Wednesday, 12 March , Durham was under a 7 : 00-5 : 00 
curfew; Governor Scott had ordered in the National Guard and 
had admitted that he had asked the board of the North 
Carolina Fund to cut off Fuller ' s funds. 
Tuesday' s events gave Wednesday an air of ominous 
uncertainty . At UNC , the plan for direct discussions 
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between workers and administrators had been obviated by 
each group's having taken on legal counsel . Instead, in 
Hill Hall , Chancellor Sitterson answered questions from a 
group of about seven hundred faculty members in an 
executive session . Although some of the questions were 
sharp and some of Sitterson's answers vague about particulars, 
the chancellor received "vigorous applause" when he 
concluded . Afterwards , Elizabeth Brooks was given a chance 
to respond to faculty questions. She gave details of the 
employees' complaints and said that the $1 . 80 minimum wage 
was the principal unresolved demand . 
Then among themselves , faculty members deliberated 
over a resolution calling for the ouster of George Prillaman 
"7 
and Pete Ivey . Dickson Phillips , dean of the Law School, 
said that since those officials had not had 
the chance to defend themselves , he could not share in 
his colleagues' pleasure at the "click of the guillotine." 
The faculty also discussed Henry Brandis's Monday petition . 
Freedom of expression , neglect of duty , use of force--all 
were issues ventilated during that debate . The faculty 
was , however , unable to act conclusively on the resolutions 
they considered , except to pledge continued contributions 
to the employee benefit fund . 27 
27Quotations from minutes of 12 March 1969 meeting 
of the General Faculty, 10 July 1969, Chancellors' Records; 
also see tarry Kessler interview, 20 November 1974; and 
newspaper reports. 
Meanwhile , campus tension was augmented by an 
ult i matum from the administration to the Black Student 
Moveme nto Pressure had been building on Chancellor 
Sitterson in recent days to quiet the loudspeaker system 
set up by black students in Manning Hall . The blare of 
music and announcements like "don ' t eat with the pigs in 
the pigpen1128 had especially distempered those faculty 
members whose offices and classrooms were nearby . Even 
foodworker supporters , such as Henry Landsberger , were 
upset at the black students ' "playing around the edges of 
d . t . th . . t 11 29 isrup 1ng e un1vers1 y . 
Wednesday afternoon , on orders from Chancellor 
Sitterson , Joseph Eagles told Allen s . Waters , university 
director of operations and e ng ineering , to ask the police 
to "take whatever action may be necessary" to silence the 
Manning Hall l~udspeaker . Waters , in the company of riot-
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equ ipp ed policemen , delivered the message to black students 
in Manningo Preston Dobbins b?lked at the order ; he wanted 
it in writing and personally from Chancello~ Sitterson . 
He n ever got either , but he finally complied with the 
command . 30 In one last verbal blast , with the loudspeaker 
aimed so that South Building administrators could hear , 
28Ashley Davis interview , 12 April 1974 . 
29Henry Landsberger interview, 3 December 1974 . 
30 Joseph C. Eagles , Jr ., to Allen S . Waters, 
1 2 March 19 69 , Chanc ellors' Reco:-ds , file on Strike J see 
als o notes on comm~ ni ca t ion from Waters , loc . cit •• 
'1,.•• 
Dobbins warned that just because the BSM was acquiescing 
onc e , "Don't think you have won a victory. 1131 
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If a victory had been won , the administration seemed 
in no mood to celebrate or push fo~ another . Those in 
Manning Hall--mainly foodworkers, BSM, and SSOC members--
continued to organize the serving of home-coo ked and church-
cooked meals . During the day , people gath ered at Manning 
from around campus to eat and hear news of recent strike 
dev elopments; their contributions, when added to faculty 
and downtown solicitations and then distributed by food-
workers themselves according to job experience and family 
need , raised about thirty-five dollars a week for each non-
working employee.32 At night , foodworker partisans stayed 
inside Manning to prevent a suspected lockout by autho r ities, 
but the occupiers allowed regular visits inside by campus 
police to check on conditions . 
Almost a week had passed since campus security chief 
Arthur Beaumont had promised that "some action" would be 
taken against the individuals responsible for the table 
turning at Lenoir . In spite of the presence of an SBI agent 
(at the request of the university) , fixing responsibility 
for the incident was "not so simple . " Rumors had spread 
3lQy~h~m_M2~ning_H e~l£ , 13 March 1969. 
32Exact amounts raised and distributed are difficult 
to confirm . Several strikers said that they got considerably 
more than $35 a week . Henry Landsberger spoke of some 
friction between faculty members and strike supporters 
about plans for distributing the money among workers . 
\ 
, ' 
the previous Friday that warrants were being drawn up 
downtown , 33 but still no arrests had been made . The noise 
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from the Manning Hall loudspeaker was now silenced . Murmuring 
from outsiders about an unsanitary "soul food service" had 
motivated occupiers to keep disorder inside to a minimum . 
Thus although the situation was tense on Wednesday, 1 2 March , 
there was also reason to believe Sitterson's assurance to 
the fac ulty in Hill Hall that officials did not plan to 
oust Manning Hall occupants from their lai r . 34 
33R~1gigh_Ng~.§_~ng_Q£~g~~~' 8 March 1969 J quotations 
from Gr~fill~QQ.l:Q_~~ilY_N~~~ ' 9 March 1969. 
34ChaQ~1-tli1l_~~~k1Y, 1 6 March 1969J summa=y by 
Buck Goldstein and Joe Shedd . 
CHAPTER VI I I 
T.A.l(ING STOCK 
For two and a half weeks , the foodworkers ' strike 
had engaged various groups on campus in an unprecedented 
conflict . They fought over a confusing array of issues. 
During encounters , the position taken by one group was often 
misapprehended by another. Communication was made more 
difficult because each group ' s internal make-up was not 
fixed and its stand not necessarily agreed upon by its own 
members . Even for cohesive groups , public statement was 
not always consistent with actio n or private thought . It 
is perhaps helpful, therefore , to step back from the narra-
tive and take a look at the motivations and strategies of 
the groups drawn into the events of the strike . 
Am_Q!lf1-1he W.QLkeli 
At the same time that Chancellor Sitterson spoke to 
the faqulty on Wednesday , 12 March , Mary Smith and 
Elizabeth Brooks emphasized to a public meeting in 
Memorial Hall their disappointment in Sitterson ' s 
Tuesday speech. Not satisfied with promises, the 
employees said that they were no considering bolstering 
their bargaining position by affiliating with a national 
labor union . The foodworkers already had discussed such 
a possibility informally and at different times with Pete 
Brandon , Otis Lyte , and Howard Fuller . According to one 
later re port , the strikers had, through Fuller , asked the 
.Ame r i c an F e d e r at i o n of S t at e , County , and Muni c i p al 
Employees (.AFSCME) to help them , ti both because they needed 
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a strike fund and union expert i se , and because they needed 
the presence of a union to make it clear this was a workers ' 
struggle , not a case of stud ent disruption . 11 1 
.AFSCME, h owever , turned down the request . The union 
had just launched an organizing drive in the South under 
Jim Pierce , AFSCM E' s south ern director since late 1968 . 
Besides the expense , AFSCME faced both the difficul ty of 
reconci ling UNC black students to the idea of a workers ' 
union and the difficulty of bargaining with a state-supported 
university which cou l d sti ll l egally d ec lin e a union 
contract . 2 The foodworkers ' announced co n sideration on 
Wednesday therefore seems to have been more an indication 
of their frustration than a serious expectation of 
affiliation with a broader organizing effo r t . 
The emp l oyees ' frustration ar ose from the difficulty 
they had in understanding why negotiations kept shifting 
to various administrative l eve l s . Foodworkers tended not 
to differentiate between such l evels . Workers recognized , 
- ·----
1 To r n qu i s t , ti 0 r g an i z i n g L ab o r i n N or th Car o l i n a , ti 
p . 63 . 
2rbid . 
of course , that Joseph Eagl es was a different person in a 
different position from George Prillaman, and they learned 
t hat th e governor acted differently from the chancellor , 
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but during the strike , workers generally thought of adminis-
trators as a single group of decision makers that could , 
if it wanted to , reso lv e worker grievances . In Mary Smith's 
view, "the whol e system , if they had worked together, 113 
could have quickly settled the employees' complaints. 
Striking workers thus regarded the administrativ e 
system as their adversary. In their view, management 
talked about proper channels for remedy but never helped 
employees to use such proc edures . Official irresponsibility 
had forced employees to walk off their jobs; calculated 
unresponsiveness then forced them to continue a strike 
they had never intended to pro l ong . For administrators 
to argue among themselves about who in the hierarchy was 
accountable for what was interpreted by workers simply as 
a tactic of evasion , as proof that authorities did not want 
to resolve employee grievances . In the workers' minds , 
all administrators had di scredited themselves- - from Prillaman 
through Haskell, Branch , Eagles, Jones, Sitterson , and Friday 
to the state personnel office and the state's electe d 
Politicians . No one administra tor had earned the respect 
of the workers , and none received special deference from 
them because of his position in the administrative structure. 
--------
3Mary Smith interview , 9 October 197 4 . 
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In many ways , the worker5' image of administrative 
authority was a reflection of the workers' perception of 
themselves . The gradual formation of Pine Room foodworkers 
into a unified group prior to the walkout had not been a 
quick or simple process. ~nd after the strike began , there 
surfaced new problems in group definition . Although the 
Pine Room employees expected to and did enlarge their 
numbers by recruiting from other cafeterias , the relation-
ship between strikers and those foodworkers who were more 
reluctant to risk their jobs was not always cordial and 
posed a problem in group identity . The uncoordinated tactics 
between striking foodworkers and non-striking maintenance 
workers presented another obstacle. Still another was the 
prospect of relinquishing important negotiating decisions 
to outsiders , whether attorneys or union officials. Faced 
with limits on expansion of their support, the strikers 
tried to make their relatively small following cohesive. 
Yet among strikers themselves there were difficulties . 
Decisions about how to enlist added support, who was to 
speak , to picket , to cook , or to solicit money were not 
always easily reached . On top of that , jealousies seem to 
have circulated among stiikers about the preemptive assumption 
of power by Mary Smith and Elizabeth Brooks . Foodworker 
Sarah Parker's son Freddie , himself a high school student 
and a part - time emp loye e in the Pine Room at the time of 
the strike , said that his mother somehow got "weaved out" 
il 
of a leadership position among the strikers,4 although 
Elizabeth Brooks recalled that her colleague voluntarily 
withdrew from active participation because of a "nervous" 
condition . 5 In spite of the texture of trouble in 
coordinating their own activities , however , the strikers 
"did a very good job of controlling internal dissension , " 
acknowledged Freddie Parker . 6 During the first two and 
one-half weeks of the strike , the foodworker voice that 
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spoke to the public was remarkably consistent and committed 
to its cause . 
Alth ough foodworkers largely determined for themselves 
the terms of the strike settlement , the Black Student 
Movement hel ped them make thbse decisions . Left to rely 
on local support for their cause , the foodworkers counted 
on the black students to provide a " structure and a limited 
kind of know- how . .,7 The BSM had some experience in applying 
organized pressure on authorities . Black students , more 
than workers at least , knew something about raising money , 
publicizing issues , who and where higher - level administra-
tors were , which faculty members were likely to be most 
------
4 Freddie L . Parker , interview by Beverly Jones , 
18 October 1974 , SOHPC . 
5E l izabeth Brooks interview, 18 September 1979 . 
6Freddie Parker interview , 18 October 1974 . 
7 wallace Peppers interview , 28 October 1974 . 
,! 
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generous with time and energy , and which white students 
would offer assistance . Th e BSM helped arrange the collection 
and distribution of donated money, and provided the transpor -
tation and baby-sitting services necessary for workers whose 
family l ives were completely altered during the weeks of 
the strike . 
The BSM offered the foodworkers more than just 
practical aid. The black students shared with the workers 
the "deeper bond" of race . 8 Although the employees ' 
grievances demanded only one specifically racial redress, 
the feeling that their plight was attributable to racial 
differences with management was strongly implied. The 
employees ' racial consciousness was tied incontrovertibly 
to their friendship with black students and contributed to 
their subsequent political alliance. To the BSM , the cause 
of the foodworkers was attractive because it presented race 
as an issue both ideal and real ; it was an opportunity to 
achieve something for themselves and their race which in 
the larger society was too complex · easily to attain . 
The racial bond between black students and food-
workers overcame differences between the two groups in class 
and style . Whatever the economic family backgrounds of the 
black students , once at UNC they could have considered 
themselves a black intellectual elite , but they consciously 
sought another identification . Association with th e 
------
SI bid . 
e~ployees io the UNC cafeteria services gave the black 
students a chance to transcend class distinction and , in 
Preston Dobbins's words , " to not be isolated and not to 
9 forget our roots . " The workers too were aware of class 
differences between the black students and themselves; 
they overlooked the distinction and capitalized instead 
on the organizational skills wrought from what Elizabeth 




Still, there remained differences in style underneath 
the image of uni fied black leadership . Freshman BSM member 
Ashley Davis later said that compar e d with black students , 
the foodwo r ke r s tended to be more " formalized" in their 
requests to administrators and more "optimistic" for a 
favorable response. 11 Th e BSM- - with their demands, walking 
canes , berets, amulets , and army coats--purposely cultivated 
an image that was "wild and erratic , 111 2 according to Preston 
Dobbins . During t h e strike , the workers feared that 
independent action by black stud ents , if not violent itself , 
would provoke violent reaction by authorities. The table-
turning inciden t , as an example , at first seemed to indispose 
foodworke r s almost as much as others on campus , and the fears 
9Preston Dobbins interview, 4 December 1974 . 
lOElizabeth Brooks interview , 13 September 1974 . 
llAshley Davis interview, 12 April 1974 . 
12Presto n Dobbins interview, 5 December 1974 . 
of the employees did not slacken with the presence of the 
state patrol. 
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Workers and black students recognized together , 
however , that the administration , even if it did not intend 
to knock heads physically , did intend , as Preston Dobbins 
said , to "tie us up with ambiguities. 11 13 Workers did not 
themse lves use intimidation but they perceived that it 
could be used as an effective weapon to dramatize their 
cause . Administrative officials claimed that they were 
sympathe tic to foodworker problems and opposed only to 
interference by an al liance of students and employe es ; the 
foodworkers maintained that the administration was even 
less compliant when faced by ~oodworkers alone . The 
workers thus encouraged the rowdy image of the UNG black 
students specifically because it complemented their own 
cautious style. But if black students meant to protect 
workers by threatening their common adversaries , part of 
the price - -which foodworkers did notice "once or twice," 
according to Elizabeth Brooksl4 __ was that the strategy 
obscured for administrators the distinctive needs of the 
employees . 
Preston Dobbins appreciated that university 
intransigence arose in part from its desire not to be 
"forc ed to do anything , " especially by black students. 
----·----
13rbid . 
14Elizabeth Brooks interview , 13 September 1 979 . 
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But, said Dobbins, "anybody that could think" would know 
that the foodworkers had valid grievances . Reason therefore 
had failed ; understandable complaints met with unreasonable 
administrative response . For Dobbi n s and the BSM , to do 
nothing was to capitulat e . For the group to act reasonably 
and predictably was to fail also. Therefore , for Dobbins , 
the BSM ' s irrational image was a " necessary tactic . " The 
table turning was a dramatic example of the tactic . It did 
no physical harm to people and did only minor damage to 
property. True , it galvanized much public disapproval of 
radical student behavior , but the publicity of the incident 
and the arrival of the state patrol at least forced the 
administration out of what Dobbins called its "waiting 
game." 15 
The public image of a BSM unified behind Preston 
Dobbins remained intact during the strike . Dobbins claimed 
that really he was not wild and erratic . Awareness of his 
public image sometimes caused him "to . chuck l e,'116 but 
his purpose stayed serious as he care f u l ly weighed alterna-
tives befo r e he acted . While acknowl edg i ng that white 
support was important , Dobbins was absorbed with insuring 
the commitment of black students to the foodworkers . BSM 
member Wallace Peppers remembered that when Dobbins asked 
- ------
15Preston Dobbins interview , 5 December 1974 . 
16rbid . 
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for cooperation , he "never promised a democracy." Nonethe-
less , BSM members apprehended that a central policy was 
needed and they looked to Dobbins for leadership . They 
recognized Dobbins ' s organizing experience and his ability 
to speak with authori ty within the BSM and also in public. 
To Peppers , Dobbins was "fiery , " but the BSM was not.17 
Peppers , an admitted fol lower , said that he became an active 
supporter of the strike because it gave dai ly routine an 
exciting new interest . He sensed the possibility of actually 
achieving a soc ial goal . And besides , he said , his friends 
were doing it . 
Maintaining organized support among the BSM was not 
an easy task for Dobbins , however . He said that some BSM 
members were disinclined to risk expulsion or arrest for 
their activities. Others -- a "strong contingent 11 lB - -advocated 
ever more radical action; many of those were opposed to 
sharing strike activities with whites at all . Although 
Dobbins portrayed himself as a mediator among BSM factions , 
Elizabeth Brooks recalled that Dobbins was one of those who 
Pushed to keep the strike an all - black affair . Dobbins , 
Jack McLean , Reggie Hawkins , and Eric Clay seem to have 
formed an informal' central committee during the strike . 
With Mary Smith and Elizabeth Brooks , that group usually 
decided about boycott activities and negotiating positions. 
------
17 Wallace Peppers interview , 28 October 1974. 
18Preston Dobbins interview , 5 December 1974 . 
11 
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The rest of the black students and foodworkers could then 
modify, but would usually ratify , those decisions . Elizabeth 
Brooks remembered , however , that arguments among black 
students were frequent , and that sometimes others overruled 
Dobbins . 19 
At times , the black students met and acted separately 
from the foodworkers . There always existed the chance that · 
their coal ition would not hold , that lack of coordination- -
a "human problem" not particular to "our group , " according 
to Freddie Parker 20 --would cause the BSM and foodworkers 
to repudiate each other ' s purposes and tactics . But through 
the first two and a half weeks of the strike , the black 
student s showed substantial respect for the needs and wish es 
of the emp l oy~es . Tog ether the group s held firm , never 
drastically altering their original demands and still 
expe cting answers from administrators who they supposed 
could also act decisively as a group . 
In looking back , Preston Dobbins confessed that 
black students may have been naive in presuming that the 
foodworker walkout would bring an outpouring of support 
from var iou s white groups at UNC . At the beginning , SSOC 
and NUC coordinated with the BSM the distribution of 
-----
l9Elizabeth Brooks interview, 13 September 1979 . 
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literature across campus . The three groups also o~ganized 
t he boycott of Lenoir . But their early efforts at picketing 
and proselytizing did not recruit enough other backing to 
mak e the boycott as effective as they had hoped . The stall -
in during the second week was begun cooperatively by BSM 
and SSOC ; the BSM's turning of the tables on 4 March was 
partly motivated by the need to tell doubters that white 
supporters (principally SSOC members) had the unequivocal 
approval of black students and foodworkers . 
When the state patrol arrived on 6 March , the new 
issue of campus freedom caused more students and faculty 
members to follow the lead of the radical campus activists , 
a cadre of which remained outspoken rabble - rousers for the 
foodworkers ' cause . 21 The members of the radical group 
were through regular meetings kept informed of the thoughts 
of the inner circle of black strike leadership . Like the 
blacks , the white student activists viewed administrative 
maneuvering as calculated evasion and saw no more reason 
to trust the UNC administration after Chancellor Sitterson's 
11 March speech than before . Despite Adam Stein ' s plea for 
Patience , the commodity was in short supply; negotiations 
With the attorney general seemed to mean only that the 
campus authorities were sacrificing the workers to the 
state obstructionists. 
-----
2lssoc was without one of its leaders during the 
strike . George Vlasits , convicted of assaulting a police 
Officer during the November 1 968 non - election party , had 
begu n serving a 30 - day active sentence o n 24 February 1969 . 
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From the perspective of SSOC sympathizers , action 
was more important than access to e ither administrators or 
foodworkers . Scott Bradley ' s personal theory was that 
"everything helps . 11 Toward that end , he said , "a l ot of 
-
people were doing a lot of different things . 1122 Th ey 
suppl i ed bodies and signs for the picket lines , helped 
with incidentals of the alternative food service in 
Manni ng, organized ral l ies , pub l ished the E~Q1~sn_R~£i~h, 
ran off leaflets at the YMCA mimeograph machine , and 
solicited monetary contr i butio n s through bake sal es and 
art shows ; some even shined shoes downtown . SSOC members 
were ge nerall y referred to as radicals , si n ce their avowed 
objective was a thorough overhauling of po li tical institu -
tions. But if they pl otted and hoped for the coming of 
revolution , their actions did not lead to violence except 
on 4 Marc h, wh en onl y their own members suffered injury . 
SSOC members were visible--and to administrators , defiant--
supporters of the . foodworkers ; they concentrated on 
organizing campus whites while being purposely deferential 
to the wishes "of blacks . 
An other group of whites , an informal collection of 
student government lead ers , had aims during the strike 
which were somewhat similar to those of SSOC. The members 
of the government group (who visited the governor on 7 March 
------








and who regularly called on South Building officials) were 
slower to become aware of but eventually as convinced 
of the validity of the foodworker demands as the more 
radical student groups . Th ey participated in many of the 
same strike activities as SSOC and BSM . Nonetheless , their 
style and po liti cal objectives gave them an image quite 
different from that of the refractory radicals . The 
government group was impatient with administrative 
malingering , but they did not openly f l out authority; they 
were , in fact , somewhat sympathetic with the "almost 
impossible job" that Chancellor Sitterson faced . Them-
selves representative of student authority as traditionally 
constituted , ' the group ' s political goal during the strike 
was, according to Buck Go l dstein , to achieve a settlement 
favorable to the foodworkers which at the same time "could 
be bought by the average student and the state at large . 1123 
Tactically, the government group decided that the 
administration would act forthrightly only if officials 
percei v ed the strike as essentially a localized labor 
dispute. To mix in issues of ra€ial justice , student power, 
and academic freedom would only make settlement too complex 
for administrators to consider . Therefore th e group 
attempted to satisfy admin i strators that the foodworker 
grievances were separate from other issues of student 
---·---
23Buck Goldstein interview, 17 October 1974. 
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concern . Anoth e r tack taken by the group was to persuade 
administrators that widespread UNC student support existed 
for meeting the demands of the employees . By convincing 
authorities that strike supporters comprised more than a 
small group of troublemakers , the government group hoped 
to lessen the chances of an administrative crackdown on 
the isolated BSM , SSOC , and foodworker camp. 
Anne Queen, who herself had built the bridgehead 
from foodworkers to administrators , admired the student 
group's mediation efforts as evidence of the "genuine 
involvement of the better students" on campus. 24 Part 
of what the group learned during the strike , however, was 
that good students or not , they had very little power over 
the terms of the strike settl ement. And making use of 
their access to the various opposing groups was not a 
simple task . 
First , the group felt as Richie Leonard said , that 
the strike was just another indication that the university 
mistreated everyone , including students . Thus the 
government group argued in a way against themselves when 
they tried to separate the foodworker issue from other 
student concerns . In addition , though they communicated 
with various groups , they were not comfortable with any. 
There was no overt hostility between them and other groups, 
----·- --
24 Ann e Queen interview, 12 June 1974 . 
but there was an underlying tension which may have arisen 
from the gover nment group's uncomfortableness with its 
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own public image and with the discrepancy between the 
imagined and actual power of its members . In the presence 
of administrators and politicians , the students' indignation 
with what the authorities had so far achieved was probably 
close to the surface; in the presence of radical whites 
and blacks , the student leaders felt frustrated with what 
strike activists had so far achieved . Unable to identify 
themselves with either side , the leaders were perceived by 
both officials and radicals to be adversaries as much as 
allies . The leaders consequently felt some embarrassment 
about their lack of a clear mandate and their insistence 
on the probity of debate . Wanting to take a stand , they 
stood between , able to particpate only indirectly . 
Still , the student group did what its members felt 
best equipped to do: build bridges between students and 
the state . By Wednesday , 12 March , after the ominous events 
in Durham the night before , the group trusted evidence of 
the governor ' s rising popularity and the legislature's 
hardening mood more than they trusted Sitterson's assurances 
that the strike would eventually be resolved and that 
Manning Hall would not be forcibly evacuated. With the 
YMCA as their institutional "life- support system"25 and 
---·-----
25auck Goldstein interview, 17 April 1974. 
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Anne Queen as their mentor , the group began careful prepara-
tions to go again to Raleigh on Thursday , this time to 
meet with legislators they thought might be swayed to their 
point of view by intelligent student conversation and , in 
some cases , according to Anne Queen , by student Melinda 
Lawrence's "lovely southern accent. 1126 
Thg_Fa£Yl!y~gg.12..§_I~Ying 
Through Wednesday , 12 March , the issue which the 
faculty came closest to agreeing on among themselves was 
the threat to academic freedom posed by the confrontation 
between the governor and the radical students and manifested 
by the presence of the state patrol. Faculty anxiety about 
"their" university was not translated , however , either 
directly or via campus administrators , into effective 
politi cal pressure on state authorities . To some campus 
observers , eviden ce of the faculty ' s political impotence 
may have come as a shock , but preservation of campus 
integrity meant that academicians historically did not 
need to su lly their hands enl i sting state political support 
for t h e institution. That the faculty , as of 6 March, had 
been unable to mobilize instantaneous political wallop 
should have been a surprise to no one . 
Moreover, the faculty's bargaining position beyond 
--------
26 Anne Queen interview , 12 June 1974. 
the university was weak because of a faulty piece of popular 
logic . To those elsewhere in the state , UNC faculty 
dissatisfaction with the governor ' s action seemed often 
to be interpreted as faculty sympathy for continued campus 
disruption . That was true , however , of only a small 
minority of teachers . Furthermor e , the faculty ' s position 
may have been weakened from th e inside by , ironically , just 
the opposite of the public ' s logic . Some faculty members 
must have fe l t at least privately reassured by the police 
presence exactly because it would maintain order and prevent 
further di sruption . Thus in spite of strong feelings , the 
faculty never moved harmoniously and forcefully beyond 
t heir 6 March petitiop against the governor ' s interfe renc e . 
Divisions also remained among the faculty regarding 
~ 
the i ssue of foodworker demands. By Wedne sday , 12 March , 
some signers of the Brandis petition still would have 
objected to the mann er by which the employee grievances 
had been presented , even if they had to acknowledge that 
the workers had some valid complaints about the operation 
of the food service. Other faculty members , certainly the 
NUC and a sizable number of graduate teaching assistants , 
had been consistently and vociferously support ive of the 
foodworke r demands, even to the point of going on strike 
themselves . In between ~he conservative and radical 
responses ~as a large reservoir of faculty sentiment roughly 
represented by members of Alden Lind ' s ad-hoc committ ee . 
189 
The ad - hoc group --like the radical facu l ty and 
white student supporters , motivated by a mix of 
altruism , guilt , and self - interest --wanted to push for 
speedier administrative resolution of foodworker grievances . 
The ad-hoc group , however , te nd ed to dissociat e itself from 
the radicals and resemb l e the co nservatives when it came to 
the means of registering dissent . The moderate group's 
most apparent contribut i ons to strike activities were the 
boycott of Lenoi r and the r aising of money for employees ; 
they had no intention of going on strike themselves . 
Interest ingl y , there seemed to be li ttle debate about 
whether the administration and t h e board of trustees should 
be ab le to limit freedom of faculty expression by threat 
of dismissal . The faculty conceded the administration 
that power in principle. Th e qu estion was whether sufficient 
numbers could be org aniz ed to make the practical application 
of that power impossible. 
Most of the ad-ho c group's attention was focused on 
worki ng behind the scene s . Their main tasks there were to 
keep the p e ac e between factions of the faculty , as Daniel 
Young remembered , 27 and "not noi s ily" to raise hell with 
admi ni strators , as Al de n Lind recall ed . 28 The faculty 
needed to remind those in South Building , said Lind , of 
-----·---
27Daniel Young int erv iew, Dec ember 1974 . 




their obligation to preserve the integrity of the university . 
The issue was one already being considered by the administra-
tors . What was distinctive , however , by the time of the 
12 March faculty meeting in Hi l l Hall , was the steady erosion 
of the ge neral facu l ty ' s wi l lingness to give tacit assent 
to the cou~se of action being followed by the campus 
administration . 
Ihe_hgmini~1.!.91.Ql:~ 
In the beginning , UNC administrators had no blueprint 
for responding to the unprecedented employee walkout . The 
top-leve l administrators therefore adopted an initial policy 
of wait - and - see . They fe l t that emp l oyee grievances could 
be differentiated from the run of student complaints which 
had ~arraged them for mo nths . Student needs had already 
been investigated and responded to ; substantively , there was 
nothi ng new in their demands. As for the food service, it 
too had al ready been investigated (although the focus prior 
to the strike was on solvency more than on employee complaints). 
At least at the chance l lor ' s level , settlement seemed best 
left to those cl oser and more fam i liar with the everyday 
food service operation . Policy makers thus deferred to 
lower - level management to coax employe e s back to work and 
thereby to eliminate what was seen as a convenient excuse 
for student protest against high - lev e l campus officials . 
The administration underestimat ed , however , both 
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the determination of the foodworkers to function as a group 
and the strength of the bond between foodworkers and black 
students. Unable to separate workers from students , 
authorities became even more convinced during the first 
week of the strike that the employees were only pawns in 
a game of disruption organized by radical students . In 
addition , administrators continued to underestimate the 
extent of employee grievances . Reluctant to bypass normal 
channels of supervision , administrators allowed traditional 
sources of information , particularly George Prillaman , to 
belittle the gravity of foodworker problems. Thus at the 
top level , officials were persuaded not only that the 
walkout was perpetrated by students but also that employee 
grievances were not serious enough to justify aggressive 
corrective measures . 
By the second week , the administration was beginning 
to moderate its insistence that emp l oyees use normal channels 
of i ndiv idu al grievance appeal. Anne Queen' s intervention , 
along with some in- house financial inquiry , revealed the 
inadequacy of the administration ' s own channels of communica -
tion . Subsequently , George Prillaman was , to use his own 
., 
word , "muzzled , 1129 and negotiatio~s were handled by higher -
level adminstrators like Joseph Eagles and Claiborne Jones . 
But by 6 March , administrative non - action had helped solidify 
the bond between foodworkers and students and had made them 
--------
29George Prillaman interview , 6 September 1979 . 
;. 
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more obstinate about demanding full settlement of their 
grievances . The administrators in turn , especially after 
the scuffling and table turning on 4 March , continued to 
see students as primarily responsible for the continuation 
of the strike . While the chancellor personally may have 
been more sympathetic than before to the needs of the 
foodworkers , his attention was focused on the issue of 
student disruption rather than on the details of employe e 
complaint s . By the time of the 6 March bargaining session , 
the refor e , the administration seems to have viewed the 
strike essentially from the some philosophical reference 
point as it had a~ the beginning, and with the same hope 
of eventually winning a war of attrition with the 
protesters . 
Also absorbing the chancellor's attention by 
6 March was the participation of another activist, Robert 
Scott. As governor and ex-officio chairman of the UNC 
Board of Trustees, Scot t had legitimat e power to mobilize 
the state patrol and National Guard and could claim the 
power to reopen Lenoir Hall . Governor Scott , Sitterson 
remembered later , complained that the chancellor had not 
. h . 30 h h 1 communicated adequately wit him . Actually t e c anne s 
of authority prescribed that Sitterson report to the 
Consolidated University president , William Friday , who 
in turn reported to the governor. Friday remembered, 
30carlyle Sitterson interview , 10 December 1974 . 
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however , that he was " not in frequent communication" with 
the governor during the strike31 -- the 5 March visit to the 
governor ' s office by the president and the chancellor being 
one salient exception . 
Between President Friday and Chancellor Sitterson 
there was more frequent communication and a higher degree 
of confidence than between either one and the governor . 
Responsible for three (soon to be five) other UNG campuses , 
Friday surely had been influential in the selection of the 
chancellor f or the Chapel Hill campus in the first place . 
During the strike , from his off - campus Chapel Hill office, 
Friday was "in constant conversation" with Sitterson , not 
as a supervisor to a subordinate but as a long-time adminis-
trative partner , trying to "bring all the strength I c-ould 
to the chancellor and his processes . " 
The governor ' s action on 5 and 6 March demoralized 
UNC's top administrators . President Friday , in a later 
assessme nt , stopped short of saying that the governor had 
actually undermined the academic integrity of the university. 
There was at the time of the strike , Friday remembered , 
"genuine public anxiety" that colleges generally wete 
abetting social disruption ; it was "politically viable to 
attack universities . " In North Carolina , "some thoughtful 
People .. • thought that the university was completely 
3lwilliam Friday interview , 5 December 1974 . 
out of hand . " Obviou s ly disagreeing with that conclusion , 
Friday explain ed th at educators and politicians operate in 
"two different worlds , " with divergent views of the 
university as an institution . Politicians , in responding 
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to public pressure , tend to take an immediate view, while 
educators concern themselves with the l ong - term perpetuation 
of the in st itu tion . At no time during the strike did a 
po li tician ' s perception of the public's feelings justify 
for either Friday or Sitt erson the governor ' s militant 
action . The president and the chancellor and most other 
UNC educators did not trust politicians to l ead the 
university; they feared that the governor ' s heavy hand 
might turn a delicate situation into an explosive one . 
. What ever his misgiv~ngs about the governor ' s action , 
William Friday resolved to keep the lines of communication 
open between the university and the state . As he recognized , 
part of what was at stake was UNC ' s economically competitive 
position with other state - supported colleges and regional 
univer sities . The economic question had political ramifica-
tions . UNC at Chapel Hill had always been regarded as the 
most dynami c c ampu s in the state ; activity there invited 
public exposure . The concomitant risk was that cumu lative 
negative feelings in the public at large (whether justified 
or just imagin ed) would eve ntually diminish support for the 
Chapel Hill campus . "People get t ired of worr ying about you , " 
said Friday , and "loyalties shift . " 
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Determined not to let that happen , Friday seems to 
have encouraged parties outside the university to see the 
virtue in the campus administration's patient handling of 
the strike . Inside the university , Friday gave Sitterson 
advice informally , more as a colleague than as a superior 
"military- oriented" officer . 3 2 Friday also kept his office 
ope n to various campus faculty members and students who 
sought his help during the strike . Said student Buck 
Goldstein , an audience with Friday always left one 
encouraged that the president ' s "heart was in the right 
33 place . " 
I n some internal university affairs , however , Friday 
recognized that a balance between reason and force was more 
effective than reason by itself . Citing what he lat e r 
called his own "great respect for the law, " Friday 
sternly reminded students on 19 February of the state law 
prohibiting seizure of public puildings. Howeve r sincere 
his support for the university ' s academic integrity, 
President Friday acquiesced in , ra~her than publicly 
denounced , the governor ' s legal ly - backed threat of force 
as exemp l ified by the state patrol . Friday also maiutained , 
when he threatened UNG teachers with dismissal on 19 March, 
. 
that one ' s freedom of expression was limited by one's duty, 
which in the teachers' case was defined by the UNG Board 
32Ibid ., includin·g· above quotations . 
33Buck Goldst ein int e rview , 17 April 1974 . 
of Trustees . 
The strike, as Friday said later , demanded a "new 
way of dealing with a new situation . " Throughout his 
activity during that time , President Friday avoided the 
appearance of undermining the chancellor ' s prerogative to 
act as the campus ' s chief executive officer . Friday said 
that he never got on the "front end" of negotiations with 
the workers , for instance . 34 Instead , the president seems 
to have guarded his independence from either state or 
campus authorities . He purposely never got on the front 
end of the turmoil either . As one long-time acquaintance 
said , Friday was "smart enough not to get to where he's 
to blame for anything . • • sort of like the fellow that 
says · ' let ' s you and him fight . 1 11 35 
£~y~_2n_th_g_ch~n£gll.Q~ 
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The point man on campus was Chancellor Carlyle 
Sitterson. Like President Friday at the Consolidated 
University l evel , Sitterson seems to have wanted to reserve 
for himself the power to supervise the campus's overall 
functioning . To deal specifically with the foodworker 
problem , Sitterson followed normal procedures in delegating 
responsibility to his staff assistant Claiborne Jones and to 
Vice - Chancellor Joseph Eagles , whose official purview 
-- - ---
3 4 ~i l l iam Friday inte~view , 5 December 1974 . 
35Ralph Scott interview , 22 April 1974 . 
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included the food services anyway. From an outside view , 
Sitterson , Jones , and Eagles functioned as a group; without 
records of their private conversations , one cannot know 
exactl y what advice Sitterson got or what instructiDn he 
gave in return. Some people on campus who kept informed 
about administrative deliberations suggest that Jones and 
Eagles took an unsympathetic view of employee and racial 
grievances , whereas Sitterson- - once informed through 
alternative channels-- tended to be more sympathetic . 36 
Sitterson recalled in a later account , however , no signifi -
cant differences between his advisors and himself . What 
he said about his relationship with President Friday would 
seem as applicable to his association with Jones and Eagles : 
"Generally speaking , if there is communication on a particu-
lar issue . ~he~ informed , we l l - meaning people will 
come to the same conclusion . u37 
During the strike , the foodworker situation was 
discussed i n a series of early-morning meetings in Vice-
Chancellor Eagles's office in South Building . Besides 
Claiborne Jones , auxiliary services director James Branch 
usually attended ; sometimes faculty members such as Fred 
Cleaveland were there ; sometimes security chief Arthur 
Beaumont , personnel director Fred Haskell , and members of 
-------
36oaniel Pollitt was one who suggested this; Mary 
Hamilton and George Prillaman were others . 
37carlyle Sitterson interview , 10 December 1974 . 
the student government also sat in . Often the chancellor 
stopped by those meetings and when he did not , he was kept 
informed by reports from Jones and Eagles. Such channels 
of communication were regarded as normal and largely 
informal ; what specific direction the meetings gave to 
university policy can only be inferred from subsequent 
administrative action . Although far - ranging in scope , the 
purpose of such meetings was pri mar i ly to focus on policy 
specific to non - academic workers . 
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The admi nistration ' s composite wait - and - see attitude 
at the beginning of the strike had resulted in only casual 
investigat i on of foodworker grievances. The pace of the 
probe began to acce l erate duri ng the second and third weeks , 
although many foodworke r par tisans thought that administrative 
remedies were intentionally haphazard and misdirected . 
How much faste r the administration could have acted cannot 
be eas i ly determi n e d since i n qu i ry d id not proceed of its 
own a c cord bu t rather as a response to pressu r es app l ied 
by interested strike p a rticipants . By 12 March , the 
· chancel l or had acknowledged the validity of many of the 
employee comp l aints . But , Si tterson protested , conclusive 
evidence to that effect came from time - consuming investiga-
tion , n ot from radical invective . The university , to the 
extent of its power , would correct proven abuses in due 
Process (due process so far had isolated but not fired 
George Pri l laman) . Some foodworker demands , particularly 
,• 
--- • 
the $1 . 80 minimum, however justified , still r emained 
beyond university power to implement. 
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What policy advice Chancellor Sitterson received 
about other issues concurrent with the foodworkers' demands 
is unclear . Certainly President Friday's counsel about 
student and state issues was readily available , but 
Sitterson seems to have shunned ·some formal channels at 
his disposal . He did not attend the Faculty Council 
meeting originally scheduled for 7 March (although he 
did , by 12 March, speak both to the public and the faculty). 
Sitterson does not seem to have relied formally on the 
chancellor's cabinet (normally a weekly gathering of 
administrative heads) nor on the faculty advisory committee 
(a prestigious group of elected faculty members whose 
convention. was at his discretion) , even though he did 
communicate frequently and informally with indivi duals from 
those groups. He did not talk directly with foodworkers , 
nor with what he termed 11 unapproachable 11 38 radical students . 
Thus in dealing with an extraordinary situation, Chancellor 
Sitterson relied on a co llection of both normal and special 
administrative procedures . 
After 6 March , in spite of their anger at the 
governor's intrusion , Sitterson and other UNC administrators 
did not respond by acting forcefully themselves . They were 
reluctant because even if they too wanted to punish radical 
--------
'· 
students for interfering with university governance , 
campus officials were not willing to take the risk that 
a violent confrontation between radicals and police might 
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also involve moderate students , faculty members , and female 
foodworkers . Moreover, if campus administrators wanted 
to defend their own supervisory prerogatives , they would 
need to differentiate their brand of l eadership from that 
demonstrated by the governor . If the administration joined 
with the state in acti.ng aggressively toward dissidents, 
even i~ such action ~orked (however success might be 
defined) , the governor would be the one receiving credit 
for the success; the administration's ability to act 
creditab ly on its own in other situations would not be 
strengthened . Faced with what it saw as a no-win predicament, 
the administration took its stand against state political 
interference by doing what appeared to many outsiders as 
nothing at al 1. 
Wh e n the chancellor went out of town on 7 March and 
then entrusted foodworker negotiations to Attorney General 
Robert Morgan , many campus observers became convinced that 
Sitterson was not doing his job . A prevailing image was 
that of a chancellor who had lost control of events and 
Was now subservient to the whims of the governor. Some 
Sitter so n of willful obstructionism ; .others saw 
him as simply inco~petent . Perhaps more accurate was an 
analysis by political science professor Lou Lipsitz, who 
---- -~ 
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viewed UNG administrative (and faculty) action as indicative 
of a pervasive "liberal failure" in the country , whereby 
"men of good will did not see that the terms of political 
discussion had changed and that their sense of timing no 
longer was sufficient to satisfy people. 11 39 Professors 
like Henry Landsberger and Alden Lind held similar views; 
they wished that Sitterson had seized the initiative to 
contro l the campus situation: he should have publicly 
recognized non- academic employee needs , admitted the limits 
of local redress , and challenged the state to provide 
assistance instead of soldiers . But by Wednesday , 12 March , 
Sitterson continued , according to student Buck Goldstein, 
40 to play the " southern ge ntleman . " 
~~1~~~gy_1.Q_2~~~~-1h~_uniyJU:si1y 
Although no overriding plan to resolve the crisis 
was apparent by the strike ' s third week , one can surmise 
that the administration may have intended to use passive 
resistance to its advantage . Principally, the administrators 
could point out to foodworkers that the governor ' s preemptive 
behavior was proof that external exigencies-- including state 
personnel regulations and General Assembly benevolence , or 
the lack of it - -had defeated the attempt by the university 
administration to redress the foodworker grievances . By 
--------
39tewis Lipsitz interview , 17 October 1974 . 
40Buck Goldstein interview , 17 April 1974 . 
extending the same line of ~easoning , the administration 
could claim that not only reso l ution of grievances , but 
also supervision of the foodworkers , was ultimately more 
the state ' s responsiblity than the administration's. In 
effect , the administration could claim (though they were 
more likely to admit this conclusion privately than 
publ i cly) that the foodworkers were more state than 
university employees . 
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Th e development of such an administrative attitude 
accelerated by the third week. By then , ca~pus officials 
realized that the laboriou s process of in - house investigation 
would not achieve a r eso l utio n satisfactory to the food -
workers . Th e administration also kn ew that many of the 
employee grievances had validity in the first place. 
Consequently, if the administrators cou ld shift t h e 
responsibility for negotiations to the state , they could 
assuage some guilt and avert some embarrassment arising 
from their own mismanagement of the campus food service . 
Once relatively free of its responsibility for non-
academic constituents , the campus administration could more 
easily sh ow public sympathy for the foodworkers ' plight , 
even to the point of becoming a mediator in talks between 
represe ntatives of the state and the foodworkers . If 
negotiations broke down , then the state , not the university , 
might bear the onus of fai l ure ; if negotiations were 
successful, the university not only would have foodworkers 
back at their jobs but would also have help from the state 
in assuming the financial burden of higher wages , which 
campus administrators could then say that they had 
advocated . 
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Th e strategy of disclaiming primary responsibility 
was also attractive because administrators could the n 
concentrate their energies on the preservation of the 
university ' s academic integrity. They could pacify faculty 
and students by encouraging the feeling that UNC was a 
special institution which could not be run like a military 
organization or a state highway department. Inju stices 
were more easily exposed and corrected through an open and 
dynamic (if occasionall y irritating) campus process . UNC 
was a liberal institution in the best sense , administrators 
could emphasize , where in the traditional exchange of ideas, 
reason was paramount but dissent was allowed because it 
gave proof that freedom of expression was alive and well. 
If on the one hand administrators intended to 
preserve university integrity by allying with disheartened 
academics against the governor's interposition , on the 
other hand they were ready to join with conservative state 
forces in pledging a hard line against internal disruption 
by campus radicals . In keeping with the 'latter intent, 
the UNC chancellor warned faculty instructors against 
rescheduling classes , ordered the BSM to shut down their 
Manning Hall l oudspeaker , and explained his position in 
talks to faculty and students . Even if he had been forced 
into the open , Sitterson's emergence indicated that he 
intended to assert himself as chief guardian of the 
university ' s overall academic function. If the governor , 
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the legislature , and student radicals would just be patient , 
and the negotiators diligent , perhaps through the continued 
"application of reason"- - what the ,gh~J2..gl_tlill_Y!_g_gklY called 
the "messy but wisest alternative 1141 -- the strike might 
eventually come to a peaceful conclusion satisfactory to all . 
Such would have been the best possible outcome of 
the administration ' s strategy . By relinquishing bargaining 
rights to the state, the administration might turn what 
appeared to be a retreat into a reassertion of power . By 
pitting campus radicals and state conservatives against 
each other , the administration might independently secure 
its position in the middle (or "mudd l e , " as some observers 
may have said) of the road to strike resolution . But by 
12 March , the hope for a particular scenario held no 
guarantee of its actual occurrence . In a strike that was 
as volat i le as ever , action by any of the participants 
might again trap and immobi l ize the administratio n. 
By asking the attorney general for help , the UNC 
administration involved itself in a worrisome new relation-




with the foodworkers' counsel , had the job of reconciling 
a complicated set of university , state , and federal labor 
regulations . Morgan was in the position of defending the 
policies of the Chapel Hill administration , but if he found 
that the allegations of attorneys Chambers and Stein were 
justified-- that UNG had indeed overstepped its authority 
in dealing with its workers -- then Morgan would be in a 
position to embarrass the university . The state could hold 
the university legally , as well as morally and financially, 
culpable for past transgressions and responsible for future 
corrective measures . Thus in arbitrating between worker 
and ~ubfic agen cy interests , Attorney General Morgan was 
as much an enforcer of state regulations as an attorney for 
the UNG administration . 
The university , therefore , besides having its 
standi ng in legal arbitration undermined by increasingly 
substantial evidence of its mistreatment of the foodworkers, 
had in addition , as client of the state , no guarantee that 
political considerations would not further erode its 
Position . After all , Robert Morgan and Governor Scott were 
Political 9ompatriots . Each had been recently elected with 
strong backing from interests in the eastern part of the 
state , each had direct loyalties to state universities 
other than Chapel Hill , and each was under pressure fro~ 
what attorney Adam Stei n called the "honchos in the state 
J. 
206 
that run things -- banks , boards , legislature 11 42-- to enforce 
vigorously laws against disruption on college campuses . 
In addition , according to law professor Daniel Pollitt ' s 
speculation , news commentators such as Jesse Helms , WRAL - TV 
executive vice president and a f r e quent critic of UNG 
43 
administrators , probably influenced the governor ' s staff 
and the attorney general ' s staff , at least one of whom 
was a l ready " ant i-l abor and anti - black . " Those people , 
said .Adam Ste i n , seemed "per fectly happy at turmoil which 
would disc r edit UNC . 11 44 
4~Adam Stein interview, 27 November 1974 . 
43o aniel Pollitt interview , 4 September 1979 . 









AG.AIN THE STIR OF EVENTS 
Early Thursday morning on 13 March , Governor Robert 
Scott ordered the highway patrol to clear Manning Hall and 
arrest the UNC students responsible for the Lenoir Hall 
table turning on 4 March . William Blake , the Chapel 
Hill police chief, remember ed talking with the governor 
over the phone at about 7:00 A.M . and trying to explai n 
why he had not already served the week - old arrest warrants . 
Said Blake , students would be "out there marching and we 
go pulling them out of line and we were liable to have 
a confrontation we couldn't stop . " Blake assured the 
governor that "we were going to take care of it," but the 
governor's only response , as Chief Blake recalled , was 
that "you ' ve just taken too much time . It ought to have 
been done before now . " 
Blake did not want to relinquish the warrants to 
the. highway patrol because he feared that they would try 
to effect the arrests and then leave an explosive situation 
for the local police to handle . .After convincing the 
governor to delay Manning's evacu ation until the afternoon, 
Blake resolved to go himself , alone and unarmed, to arrest 
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the seven students charged with disorderly conduct. "The 
reason I went by myself," recounted Blake , "was I felt like 
I wouldn ' t get any resistance . There 1 d be no glory in 
jumping on one policeman." 
.At ab o u t l : 0 0 P . M . , B l a k e l e ft hi s gun i n L e no i r 
Hall with George Prillaman and SBI officials , and went next 
door to Manning Hall. There , rumors of the closing and 
service of the warrants had preceded Blake; he remembered 
students inside shaking sticks , trying to intimidate him . 
There was no problem , he said , except that he saw none of 
the students whom he had come to arrest. Other students 
went out and found the ones he wanted . Peacefully , the 
students came to Blake; they asked if they could go to the 
police station on their own. Chief Blake granted the request 
because they "had complied and given up" without resistance. 1 
" The UNG administration had learned of the evacuation 
order about 8 : 30 that morning, when Governor Scott called 
Claiborne Jones and notified him that he was prepared to 
send in the National Guard to close Manning Hall . Jones 
told the governor that the university had plans to close 
the building as soon as state personnel director Claude 
Caldwell completed his interviews there with workers--
expected by Friday . Chancellor Sitterson learned of Jones's 
lwilliam D. Blake , interview by author , 9 October 
1974, includes above quotations , SOHPC J see also account 
in Buck Go ld stein and Joe Shedd summary. 
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conversation with the governor at 9:00 .A.M •• 2 Some years 
later, Sitterson recalled only that it had been time anyway, 
"p:ro forma ," for construction crews to resume renovation 
work at Manning . How the administration planned to remove 
Manning 's occupants is unclear. 3 To have planned a removal, 
forcible or not, conflicted with Sitterson ' s assurances to 
the faculty in Hill Hall the day before . In any case , the 
governor seems to have forced the issue early on Thursday, 
13 March , and the administration , p~rhaps privately thankful 
for the help but publicly disquieted at the timing , acquiesced 
in his command. 
After · hearing of the governor's plan , Chancellor 
Sitterson set in motion his own initiative. By memo , he 
instructed operations director Allen Waters to use "whatever 
methods you deem best" to vacate Manning Hall. Occupants 
should be given no more than thirty minutes notice. 
Should they refuse to leave , Sitterson directed Waters to 
"take such action as is required. 114 Having told the governor 
that the university had already planned to vacate Manning 
Hall , the administration through its chief executive officer 
seems to have handed a low-level operations officer the 
2c1aiborn e S . Jones , memorand a , 13 March 1969, 
Chancellors' Records , file on Strike , UNC Archives . 
3carlyle Sitterson interview , 19 September 1979; in 
his summary of a phone call to Chief Blake , Claiborne Jones 
mentions the service of the warrants but not any local plans 
for vacating Manning Hall (note #2 above) . 
4Chancellor Sitterson to Allen S . Waters , 13 March 
1969 , Chancellors' Records , file on Strike. 
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responsibility for deciding what methods of enforcement 
should be used . Top - level administrators must have hoped 
that the evacuation would go smoothly , but with the 
governor ' s intentions known and the intentions of the 
Manning Hall occupants not known , the potential for 
violence was high . The record reveals no administrative 
plans for preventing or responding to any kind of riot . 
I n the afternoon , shortly after Chief Blake served 
his warrants and while extra highway patrolmen began to 
mobilize nearby , students and foodworkers were still 
inside Manning Hall . El izabeth Brooks remembered being 
told by black students that workers need not leave; black 
students wanted to stay , she said , but they did not 
force workers to stay with them . Employees were 
decisive about wanting to leave , however , and so they did . 5 
Meanwhile , Reverend Bil l Coats advised white students to 
6 
abandon the building; they heeded his counsel , and left . 
The black students , with Howard Fuller , wrestled 
with their decision about whether to leave . Only two days 
before , Fuller had been accused of incit~ng disturbances 
in Durham ; a few weeks before that , he had urged Duke black 
. 
student~ not to give up Allen Building voluntarily . Preston 
Dobbins later remembered that in Manning , black students 
5Elizabeth Brooks interview, 13 September 1979 . 
6summary by Buck Goldstein and Joe Shedd; also 
g~~~QQ~Q_Q~ilY_li~~~' 14 March 1969, and R~l~igh_li~~~-..ang 





"thought of all kinds of schemes" but decided 
with Fuller that realistically there was "no chance of 
coming out on the winning end" if they stayed in the 
building . 7 "They had already made their case , 118 Fuller 
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would later recall about the black students . To have tried 
to hold Manning against armed evacuation procedures not 
only would have been self - destructive , it would have 
indicated that black students had interests different from 
those of the foodworkers . 
At 1:45 P.M ., about fifteen minutes after white 
students had filed out , black students also left Manning . 
A few minutes later, seventy - five highway patrolmen arrived 
in military formation . They were garbed in riot gear --
helmets and masks , with clubs and some shotguns . They began 
to herd students away from Manning. Some in the student 
crowd angrily taunted the police with shouts of "pigs , go 
home"; others were just confused and scared as police 
cordoned off a quadrangle outside Manning . The commotion 
grew when students emptied from nearby classroom buildings 
for the two o ' clock change of classes . Buck Goldstein said 
9 that "on - lookers suddenly were no longer on-l ookers"; the 
police made no distinctions among students. The BSM 
7Preston Dobbins interview, 5 December 1974 . 
8o wusu Sadaukai (Howard Fuller) interview by author 
and Joe Knight , 2 December 1974 , summary in SOHPC. 




strugg l ed to maintain a semblance of order by marshalling 
the crowd away from the police -- at least out of bottle and 
rock - throwing range . Several professors were also out 
front helping, on the theory, said Daniel Y 'o~ng , "that the 
troops would b e less likely to shoot old grey-headed 
professors than they would to shoot students . 11 10 
For several minutes the mass of students--estimated 
at between 1500 and 2000-- crowded into Polk Place , in the 
middle of the campus . Then fo ll owing the lead of some SSOC 
members , the throng surged toward n earby South Building , 
with the apparent intention of tearing "the whole god-damn 
thing down . 1111 Some faculty members known to be supporters 
of the foodworkers rushed ahead and hastily arranged a forum 
on the steps of Sou th Building which stalled the movement 
of the crowd . Gatheri ng attention to themselves , Dick 
Roman , Chick Goldsmid , Dan Pollitt , Lou Lipsitz, Chuck 
Wright , a nd Bill Coats urg ed the students to restrain 
themselves . The state shou l d settl e the strike rather than 
break it , Coats co nceded , but t he strike remained primarily 
a workers ' struggle . Should students make themselves the 
principal issue , there was the clear danger of provoking 
the police into a violent clash detrimental to all . 1 2 
lODaniel Young interview , Decemb er 1974 . 
lloani e l Pollitt interview , 4 September 1974. 
12N~th_Q~~Qlin~-~nYil , 15 March 1969; Qy~h~m 




Inside South Building , some student government 
leaders were talking with Chancellor Sitterson in a 
meeting unintentionally coincidental with the clearing 
of Manning Hall . The crowd outside made the students 
inside feel extremely uncomfortable. They found themselv~s, 
as Charles Jeffress reported , in a "very compromising 
situatio n . 1113 Even after the students lo ok leav e of the 
chancellor , he remained in his office and did not speak 
to the mass outside . Through faculty members Daniel Young 
and Carroll Hollis, however, he sent word that he would 
address the student body the next afternoon at 3 : 30. 
Expectations of violence were not realized that 
afternoon . If students meant to occupy South Building, 
they changed their minds . If some worried that they would 
. . 
be tear-gassed , knocked around , or shot by the highway 
patrol , they survived the day without physical scars . 
In actuality , after the speeches outside South Building , 
students began to consider practical matters , such as 
finding an altern ate site for the "liberation food service . " 
The possibility of another forced evacuation , compliance 
with health regul ations , the need for free expression-- all 
were issues during several hours of confusion and debate 
before the Baptist Student Union's offer to be the new 
14 
strike headquarters was accepted. 
13charles Jeffress interview , 17 April 1974. 
14 Anne Queen interview , 12 June 1974 ; also Buck 





The seven students arrested - -Preston Dobbins , 
Jack McLean , Ashley Davis , Thomas Jones , Jesse Nettles , 
Adolph Reed , and white student Cha~les Hafter- - divided 
themselves between the cars of Reginald Hawkins , Sr ., 
and law professor Michael Katz , and drove to the Chapel 
Hill police station , where each posted a $100 bond 
and was released . Back on campus , picketing at Lenoir 
Hall intensified , and at an 8 : 00 P .M. rally at the student 
union , Preston Dobbins castigated the governor for his 
action and vowed to "bring the university to its knees. 11 15 
The workers , having seen George Prillaman laugh at them 
as they left Manning Hall , were all the more determined. 
Emp l oyees had "never asked for troub l e , " said Elizabeth 
Brooks , adding that "after all the years we have worked 
for this state , it ' s hard to believe how far they will go 
before granting us a few s i mple demands . Why won't they 
1 6 pay us when they pay guar d s to stay o n campus? " 
Such qu estions were among the many that Adam Stein 
and partner James Ferguson discussed with Attorney General 
Morgan' s staff in an all - day series of meetings on Thursday . 
No news of progress in those negotiations reached Chapel 
Hill. What did come was an explanation from Governor Scott's 
15summary by Buck Goldstein and Joe Shedd . Black 
students later said that Hawkins happened to be in town 
because Sitterson had given him advance notice of the 
impending evacuation and arrests . 
16Q1Uh.am_M~Lning_He~sl£ , 14 March 1969; Elizabeth 
Brooks and Mary Smith interview , 18 September 1979 . 
office of his reasons for order ing Manning Hall cleared . 
Probably he agreed with what the Q~~ham_§yn that day had 
call ed the n eed to put an end to "pus sy- footing , to 
pampe ring, and to coddlin9" of disruptive students . 17 
But in tone and substance , Scott stuck to particulars , 
pointing out that students involved in the 4 March Lenoir 
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incident need ed to be arrested , that the messages broadcast 
from the Manning loudspeak er had been profane and disruptive , 
that the Manning food service had violated health regula -
tions , and that students in Manning had had in their 
possession firearms and other dangerous weapons. 
A li ttle after two o'clock that afternoon , Arthur 
Beaumont and Allen Waters , with police, SBI officers , 
and newsmen fo ll owing , had searched and locked Manning Hall . 
As they left , they tacked to an outside door a university 
statement that the building was closed for renovation . In 
the search of Manning , no firearms were found . Some years 
later , Preston Dobbins acknowledged that the BSM had in 
fact kept a gun in Manning (in spite of its being "foolish 
as hell " ) , 18 but on that March afternoon in 1969 , twenty 
faculty members , including Fred Cleaveland , Carroll Hollis , 
and Dan Pollitt , were impressed enough by the peaceful 
behavior of the BSM to sign a statement commending black 
17Q~h~m_§yn , 13 March 1969 . 
18Preston Dobbins interview , 5 December 1974 . 
. ' . 
. ) 
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students and foodworkers--along with the univ ,=s ity 
chancellor and president but not the governor- - for their 
collect iv e success in averting violence . 
On Friday , the state woke to news that in contrast 
to Chapel Hill, the previous day at North Carolina A & T 
University had not been peaceful. At that predominantly 
black school in Greensboro , students had boycotted the 
privately-run campus food service in support of striking 
employees . A demonstration by twenty-five hundred people 
ended in a confrontation with police; tear gas , gunfire, 
injuries , and eighteen arrests followed . At UNC on Friday, 
however , several hundred picketers focused their attention 
on South Building rather than on events in Greensboro . 
Also on Friday morning--after student body president 
Ken Day , at the insistence of others in his coterie , had 
made arrangements with President Friday the night before--
-
a small group of student government l eaders met in Raleigh 
with the executive committee of the UNC Board of Trustees. 
Student Charles Jeffress remembered telling the committee 
that Chancellor Sitterson should speed the redress of 
foodworker grievances , but , said Jeffress , "the trustees 
didn't really ~isten, most of them . They certainly didn't 
look us in the eye . No questions were asked afterwards . 
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most felt like we were an intrusion into their meeting. 111 9 
After the student group left to resume their efforts 
across town to persuade legislators of the justice of the 
foodworkers' cause , the executive committee endorsed 
Governor Scott's budget recommendation that non-academic 
employees in state institutions of higher education be 
given raises averaging 10 percent, effective July first . 
But the committee took a less conciliatory stand against 
academic dissidents. The governor vilified UNC and said , 
according to the .Qh..su~~l_tlilLWe e,kly , what "every redneck, 
linthead , woolhat , branchhead boy in North Carolina" wanted 
to hear . 20 The executive committee then adopted, with 
William Friday ' s concurrence, a policy calling for the 
expulsio n of students and faculty members who disrupted 
the normal "educational process . "21 
I n Chapel Hill at Memorial Hall on Friday afternoon, 
Chancel lor Sitterson began his promised address to students 
by complimenting them , and particularly black students , for 
their dignified "manner" during Thursday's evacuation of 
Manning . He confessed a "deep sense of sadness" about the 
presence of outside police and internal tensions on campus . 
With obvious emotion , he no ted that "we are all in this 
19charles Jeffress interview, 17 April 1974 . 
20Editorial , .Qh~_HilLJY~kl.Y , 13 April 1969. 
21 Executive committee resolution , adopted 14 March 
1969 , Chancellors ' Records , file on Demonstrations . 
·. 
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together." Sitterson admitted for the first time to 
s t udents and workers that "injustices" actually had been 
committed in the operation of the food service, though 
none , he said, had been done with his prior knowledge. 
Specifically , the chancellor announced that 
auditors had found 168 cases of overtime due workers since 
February 1968 . The total amount owed to employees was 
about $2000 , with the possibility of more being owed as 
auditors searched records back to February 1967, when 
the university had first come under the jurisdiction of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act . Sitterson said that efforts 
and progress continually were being made to resolve job-
classification problems and to institute forty-hour , 
five-day work weeks for employees . He indicated that 
Doris Stephens had been invited back to work (she had been 
fired without sufficient notice prior to the walkout) , 
and that supervisors would be hired without . regard to color . 
As he had on Tuesday, Sitterson moved away from the food -
worker issue and into a monologue on freedom and responsi-
bility . He told the assembled students to follow the lead 
of their representatives who that morning had reaffirmed 
to the trustee executive committee their belief in diss ent 
without disruption . 22 Sitterson did not mention what the 
22Text from QY£h~m_M..Q£ning_tl~£El£, 15 March 1969; 
R.£l~igh_li~~~-~ng_QQ~~£YQ£ , 15 March 1969; Q~ily_Ta,r_tl~~l, 
15 March 1969 ; also se e outline of remarks , Chanc ell ors' 
Re cords , f ile on Strike . 
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committee had pledged to do to those who chose a different 
course . As on Tuesday, the chancellor left the stage without 
answering questions . 
With Ken Day chairing the meeting of two thousand 
students , Elizabeth Brooks and Mary Smith responded to the 
absent chancellor's remarks . Th ey valued his compliments 
about the behavior of blacks , but pointed out that the 
administration had negotiated with workers only after 
blacks had turned over the tables in Lenoir Hall . Forceful 
act ion by students therefore appeared more effective than 
good manners . The foodworkers acknowledged that Sitterson 
had indeed made concessions to their demands, but they 
asserted that his allowances were still vague and incomplete . 
The employees wanted assurances of the $1 . 80 minimum wage , 
Pri llaman's ouster, and a black supervisor. 
At four o ' clock , Sitterson began to address a 
closed General Faculty meeting in Hill Hall. There, nearly 
one hundred students who had followed him from Memorial 
Hall started shouting and banging outside , demanding to 
be let in. Vigorous disagreement ensued among the faculty 
over wheth er students should be allowed inside . Finally , 
after what Daniel Pollitt called a "really emotional scen e , 11 23 
a faculty under duress invited students to participate . With 
what Anne Queen admired as the "mature 1 eadership" of Fred 
---------
23Daniel Pollitt interview , 4 September 1979. 
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Cleaveland , 24 the faculty subsequently managed to pass 
several resolutions . In one , they commended the BSM , the 
foodworkers , Chancellor Sitterson , President Friday , William 
Blake , and Howard Fuller for their " responsible action" on 
Thursday . In another , the facu l ty adopted a modified 
Brandis resolution against campus disruption . After the 
meeting of the General Faculty , the Faculty Council convened 
and formally set up a committee on non - academic affairs . 25 
As the week closed , tensions across the state began 
to subside . Durham ' s curfew was rescinded and the National 
Guard withdrawn . In Greensboro , all demands of the striking 
employees of the ARA Slater catering service were reported 
to have been met . Even on the other side of the country , 
protracted disputes at San Francisco State and at Berkeley 
seemed fina l ly to have been settled . In Chapel Hill , people 
felt fortunate that violence on the UNG campus had been 
narrowl y averted . Nonetheless , most appraisals of the UNG 
strike situa tion showed misgivings about the future . 
Foodworkers cou l d see scant evidence of progress in bargain-
ing ; they were unable to find out whether their counsel had 
reached definite agreements with state authorities . 
24 Anne Queen interview, 12 June 1974 . 
25Minutes of General Faculty and Faculty Council 
meetings , by Clifford Lyons , Chancellors' Records, file 
o n Strike , subhead Faculty Meetings . 
,. 
Certainly a neat resolution of the strike seemed unlikely 
if the foodworkers remained obstinate about the minimum 
wage and the removal of George Prillaman . 
The NilI.ih_Q~.Qlins_A.D..Yil , an early supporter of 
the foodworkers , saw settlement still jeopardized by 
administrative bungling . Lumping university and state 
official s together , the hnyil saw their behavior as 
analogous to the national administration ' s conduct of the 
Vietnam war . In each case administrators were at best 
stumbling along with little control over events and few 
policy guidelines ; at worst , purposely misrepresenting 
the main issues and provoking dissidents to acts which 
would then justify harsh gover nme ntal responses having 
widespread popu l ar appeal . 26 
The Qh.a~~-tl.iil_~kl~ , however , differentiated 
betwee n university and state administrators; it was more 
sangu ine about the conduct of the former and more worried 
about the gov~rnor's behavior and the General Assembly's 
co n s i d er at i on o f 11 nut bi 11 s 11 to qu e 11 student u n r e st • 
Th e yt,g_g,kly a'n a 1 y z e d Gove r n o r S c o t t ' s i n t er po s i ti on a s a 
political ploy for the purpose of easing tension in the 
legislative debate over his proposed tax on tobacco . 27 
26N.Q.I.th_g~~Qlins_~nYil, 15 March 1969. 
2 7 W , H . S c a r b o rough , gh.9.Q.gl_!:!ill_~~ e k l y , l 6 M a r ch 
1969 . 
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In the g.r.g.QD~QQ£Q_Q~ilY_li~~~' William Snider said that 
Duke ' s black students had infected the state with the 
"virus of turmoil ." Seeing the difficulty of pacifying 
black students as being simi l ar to stopping the spread of 
disease , Snider feared (as Henry Brandis had) that in the 
continuing confrontation between "advocates of order and 
disorder , " freedom would be the ultimate victim . 28 In the 
state ' s capital , the li~~~-fil1Q_QQ~~~Y~£ also found 
little reason to praise either radical students or 
222 
Governor Scott ' s " blind and dangerous ..• high - handedness . 1129 
In the QY..Ih~m-~~ning_tl~~lg , Ann Colarusso said 
that to the governor and the General Assembly , too much 
"bigness and concentration of intellectuals" existed in 
Chape l Hi l l . Governor Scott ' s support of a new medical 
school at East Carolina Uni versity and the legislature ' s 
predilection for silencing dissidents and restricting the 
number of out - of - state graduate students gave credence to 
the suspicion that state authorities wanted to strip the 
Chapel Hill campus of its traditional influence in the 
state . Then tying politics direct l y to the family , she 
advised North Carolinians who were upset with student unrest 
to consider that "parents who can't control a seven - year-old 
28 Willia:n Snider , Grg~~QQ~.Q._Q.si.!.Y_lig~~ ' 16 March 1969. 
29 Editorial , B~lgigh_lig~~-~ng_Q£~g~yg~ , 15 March 1969 . 
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shouldn ' t be surprised when a stranger (the administr a~ ion) 
can ' t GontroD a seventeen- year - old . 1130 
The link between family and politics was not just 
a journalist's artifice . Throughout the strike , Anne Queen 
had eaten at the workers ' alternative food service . On 
Saturday night , she went for supper to the Baptist Student 
Union , where the Manning food service had been relocated. 
She sat at a table which included Mary Smith, among others . 
Qu e en r e c a 11 e d th at " I so r t o f h av e a h ab i t o f a ski n g p e op 1 e 
where they ' re from . " She asked Mary Smith where she was 
from and Mary Smith rep l ied that originally she came from 
a community in Alamance County known as Pleasant Grove . "" 
After dinner , Anne Queen went home and called her good friend \ 
1 
Ralph H . Scott , a rural landowner in Alamance County . She 
asked him if he knew that Mary Smith was from Pl easant Grove . 
Surprised , he said , "Oh , you don ' t mean so . . I bet my 
brother delivexed her . " 
-·-·· Ralph Scott's bxother had b~en a physician in a 
clinic in Al amance County . Anothex of Ralph Scott ' s 
brothers , Kerr Scott , had been a U. S . senator , governor 
of North Caxo l ina , and father of Robert , the curxent 
gover nor of the state . Ralph Scott was himself a state 
se nator from Haw River , and chairman of the Senate Finance 
30 Ann Colarusso , ~Y~h~m_M~~ning_tl..e.~~l~, 1 6 March 1969 . 
Committee and member of the Advisory Budget Commission . 
Anne Queen telephoned Mary Smith and told her what 
Senator Scott had said . Mary Smith said that th e senator 
had been correct : his brother had delivered her . 
\ On Sunday , as Anne Queen remembered, Senator Scott 
'-...... 
called her and asked if an article by Bob Stephens in th e 
Greensboro newspaper had "any truth" to it . She told him 
that it was the most accurate report of the strike she 
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had seen . Scott said , "Well , if that's the truth , these 
workers have every right to strike . . And if I 'd known 
that , l'dhavehad her [Mary Smith_) and @overno~ Bob 
[scot!} together a long time ago. II 
Later that morning, Senator Scott went to church. 
His nephew the governor was not there , but the governor's 
wife was . The senator asked Mrs . Scott to tell her 
husband that Mary Smith was from Pleasant Grove and that 
he and the workers should get together . 31 Sunday night , 
Senator Scott called Mary Smith at her home because, he 
said later , "I felt like I could talk to her . 1132 During 
their conversation , Mary Smith assured the senator that 
the foodworkers were primarily interested in the quality 
rather than in the color of their supervisors , and that 
the foodworkers were strongly opposed to violence and th e 
31 Anne Queen interview , 12 June 1974, includ e s 
above quotations . 




destruct ion of state property. Speaking about the governor , 
Senator Scott advis ed Mary Smith to "b ear in mind his side 
of the thing ..• he's being hammered from both sides . 11 
Said the senator , "Ya'll need to understand each other ' s 
problems." He suggested that she cal l the governor for 
an appointment . "Don ' t get yourse lf a whole busload of 
folks , just get a earful . 
. , Go to Raleig~ and tell 
him what your problems are . 11 33 Mary Smith agreed to try. 
Without saying so, Senator Scott was doing what no other 
public official had succeeded in doing. He was 
with the foodworker issue separate from al l the other 
., 
,-----------
issues with which it had become entangled . 
-~ 
On Monday morning, c:~vigil began which had been 
organized over the weekend by Buck Goldstein and Joe Shedd , 
the president of the YMCA . ; Between speeches in Polk Place 
/ 
by Bill Coats , Lou Lipsitz, Charles Wright, Fred Cleaveland , 
Elizabeth Brooks , and Preston Dobbins, students sang 
folksongs . They were fortified by the announcement that 
student Charles McGowan had arranged for Joan Baez to give 
a be nef it concert on campus Tu esday night. Even state 
legislators Jim Beatty and Skipper Bowles stopped by 
to see how things were going . Though Preston Dobbins 
33Ralph Scott interview , 22 April 1974; letter from 
Ralph H. Scott to Mary Smith , 18 March 1969 , in her 
possession . 
warned that a "long hard fight 1134 still lay ahead , the 
prevailing mood , in beautiful weather , was described as 
"generally light and spirited. 1135 
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In the afternoon , news came that cast a shadow over 
the proceedings . The foodworkers announced that they had 
just received the overt i me checks promised to them by 
Sitterson the previous Friday . They were not satisfied 
with the amounts paid . Again accusing the administration 
of bad faith (the largest overtime check was thirteen 
dol l ars) , the disappointed workers waited to discuss the 
matter with their attorneys , who were then in Raleigh 
meeting with the attorney general's staff . Meanwhile, 
Claiborn e Jones said that the payments were accurate 
according to the books , but he admitted that the books 
were not necessarily an unerring means for determining 
actual amounts owed. If the employees had questions , said 
Jones , they could pose them directly to auditors on 
Tuesday . 
Al so on Monday afternoon , English professor Charles 
Wright distributed the QQ~Yill.filli , a summarized chronicle of 
strike events . Wright stated that the three main unresolved 
issues were the $1 . 80 minimum , adequate grievance procedures , 
and employee working conditions in case a private firm 
34Q~ilY_Is~-tl~~l, 18 March 1969 . 
35Buck Goldstein and Joe Shedd summary . 
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assumed management of the food service . 36 Although the 
latter point (which the faculty had asked Chancellor 
Sitterson about in executive session) suggested that the 
full impl i cations of a switch to private cafeteria manage -
ment deserved everyone ' s attention , the issue received 
little special notice on campus . Rumors of such a change 
had circulated for some time and had been substantially 
confirmed in various announcements by administrators . Most 
foodworkers , however , were so absorbed with correcting 
past grievances that they assumed that future dealings with 
private management (especially if accompanied by the right 
of collectiv e bargaining) could only be more fruitful than 
the pa st . 
While the campus waited to learn what negotiators 1 r oof) 
in Raleigh had achieved , . Governor Scott said in a news 
conference that he had originally sent the highway patrol 
at the request of the Chapel Hill police . Since that time--
the day after the table turning - -administrators had planned 
to evacuate Manning Hall but conti nually refused to carry 
out the project . Scott admitted his impatience with 
university vacil l ation and said that he had acted on 13 March 
because of his " constitutional duty " to protect the "right 
to education" and to give "firmness" to a deteriorating 
situation . He had not cleared his order with campus 
36QQ.£1!ill~n1 , 17 March 1969 , as reported in 
Dai!.Y_I.~ .. LJi~~l , 18 March 1969 . 
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administrators b~forehand , but he hoped that his move to 
t h d th . . t 37 vaca e Manning Hall had strengt ene e un1vers1 y. 
Senator Ralph Scott , in a Monday interview broadcast 
over UNC's educational television station , said that he and 
the General Assembly supported hi s nephew "one - hundred 
percent . " If the governor had not acted , said Senator 
Scott , then the legislature would have . Th e senator did 
not mention his communication with Mary Smith , but in a 
general comment about the foodworkers , he noted that 
"many of their comp laints are just . 11 38 
The next day , the senator- - "strictly on my own , " 
he said, and without a promise of success--disclosed a plan 
to push through a 10-percent raise , effective immediately, 
for state non - academic employees . The Advisory Budget 
Commission would have to be consulted , but the governor 
and the State Personnel Board could authorize the increase 
without the full approval of the General Assembly. As for 
the foodworkers in Chapel Hill , Senator Scott said publicly 
that "they ' ve been promised a lot they've never gotten ..• 
They need some concrete results to get them back to work. 1139 
On the UNG campus , Chancellor Sitterson indicated that he 
approved of Senator Scott 's proposal. State personnel 
37ft,gl~iflh_Ng~~-~ng_QQ~gIY~I' 18 March 1969; 
QI~gD~Q2I2-12~ily_N~E~' 18 March 1969; ghaQ~l-tlill-~~gfly , 
19 March 1969 . 
38£YLh~m_M~Inins_tl~I~lg , 18 March 1969 . 




director Claude Caldwell said that his office was amenable , 
and he indicated to Claiborne Jones that based on the 
interviews done the previous week , all job reclassifications 
for foodworkers would be either lateral or up; no classifica -
40 
tion grades would be lowered . 
On Tuesday came other hints of progress. Besides 
the highway patrol beginning its withdrawal from campus , 
Chancell or Sitterson released a statement that George 
Pri llaman was being reassigned to a position in the 
u niversity accounting department , where he would be 
"revising food - service records systems . 11 41 (Prillaman was 
reported to have sai d that after enduring nearly a month 
under "seige , .. 
t . )4 2 a promo ion . 
. a job stocking boilers" would have been 
I n a letter to a faculty member that same 
day , Chancellor Sitterson n oted that the "most serious part 
of the ITood servic~ operation is our inability under present 
State Classification and Personnel Restrictions to command 
expert managerial talent 11 43 Apparently the adminis-
tration had considered Prillaman as he considered his 
workers : not good enough but the best available . 
In spite of the new developments , the foodworkers 
40 Q~~gmgn1 , 19 March 1969 . 
41 ourh~m_M~Inin£_tlgI.Sl£, 19 March 1969 . 
42R.slgi£h_Ng~~-~n£_QQ~gIY~I , 19 March 1969. 
43chancellor Sitterson to Richard Smyth , 18 March 1969 , 
Chancellors' Records , file on Strike. 
·. 
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were not particularly encouraged . Speaking to a sparse 
gathering inside Gerrard Hall , where rain had forced 
Tuesday afternoon's vigil , Elizabeth Brooks said that 
workers had not heard from their attorneys all day and 
feared that negotiations were not going well . She noted 
further than workers were anything but happy about 
Prillaman's reassignment , since he had been put in charge 
of correcting the very system he had fouled up in the 
first place (Claiborne Jones countered by saying that 
Prillaman would have "no decision-making responsibility 1144 
in his new job) . Elizabeth Brooks promised a major announce -
ment that night at the Joan Baez concert . 
More than two thousand people attended the concert . 
Their admission money increased the employee benefit fund 
py $5000 . Speaking before the performance began , Elizabeth 
Brooks called for a general strike by students and teaching 
assistants to begin at nine o ' clock the following morning. 
Not all students were ready to oblige her request, however . 
Student government lead ers , for instance , were caught off-
guard . Upset that they had not been involved in making 
plans , the group--describing themselves as "increasingly 
skeptical about their capacity to lead 11 45 - - met near midnight 
on Tuesday and decided to withhold their support from the 
student strike . 
44gQf.~fil~n1, 19 March 1969 , in Mary Smith ' s possession . 
45auck Goldstein and Joe Shedd summary . 
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On Wednesday , scattered BSM and SSOC picketers in 
front of classroom bui ldings were only partly successful I 
in persuading other students to stay away from their courses . 
Later in the day , Char l es Jeffress and Buck Goldstein 
convinc ed their group to meet again . They decided that 
their refusal to support the BSM and SSOC in the student 
strike might force the radical groups to undertake even 
more drastic tactics . Unwilling to risk the return of the 
state patrol , especially now that agreement in Raleigh on 
the wo rke rs' $1 . 80 minimum seemed c l ose , eleven student 
leaders subsequently but unenthusiastically issued a 
statement urging all UNG students to support the general 
t 'k 46 s ri e . 
No one on campus seemed to kn ow quite what was going 
on in Raleigh that Wednesday. Even Adam Stei n , meeting with 
students that night in Gerrard Hall , was not sure where 
the state would find the money for the $1.80 minimum wage . 
The state had the resour ces , i f it were ·willing to uncover 
them , said Stein . Onc e the wage arrangement was worked out , 
settlement of the strike would quickly follow . Ste in had 
reached tentative agr eeme nts on most other issues , he said, 
although back overtime pay was still a nettlesome problem . 
State auditors were disregarding federa l regu l ations which 
pres crib ed how overtime hours were to be counted and 
indemnit i es paid . If the overtime issue were not resolved 
46rbid . 
to his and the workers' satisfaction , Stein said that the 
workers would sue the state . 47 
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In the meantime, Mary Smith cashed in on her 
connection with the Scott family . She called the governor's 
office and asked for an appointment . Senator Scott had made 
sure that her request would not be refused . On Thursday, 
while the student strike continued at UNG with little 
increase in support , Mary Smith , Elizabeth Brooks , and 
Lenoir Hall worker Raymond Cooley went with Jheir lawyers 
to Raleigh . There they met for over an hour with Governor 
Scott and various people from the Advisory Budget Commission 
and the state personnel office. · According to the foodworkers , 
the meeting was perfunctory. The governor , Mary Smith said , 
"didn ' t talk that much; he li'stened to us ." His attitude 
toward the salary r ·aise , she said , was that "it was a just 
reason . 
1148 Back in Chapel Hill after the vi sit , Elizabeth 
Brooks told Anne Quee n that "for the first time , we have 
hope . 11 49 
By Thursday evening , workers and black students were 
optimistic , but their white supporters were impatient . 
Charles Jeffres s later would look back and say that the 
blacks had "much more of a sense of what was going on 
47QgilY_I~~-1!~~1, 19 March 1969; Durh_am_~.Ql:ning 
tlu.al.Q , 20 March 1969 . 
48Mary Smith interview, 9 October 1974. 





and what needed to happen than the white students did . 1150 
At the time , Jeffress and his cohorts in their frustration 
joined SSOC at a Thursday meeting and made "elaborate plans" --
including the use of two -way radios and provisions for 
delivery of food--to occupy South Building if the strike 
was not settled by noon on Friday . Even though the BSM 
did not attend the meeting , the plans , said Scott Bradley , 
had "black approval." Certainly the plans did not have 
administrative approval, but sit -in organizers assumed that 
the chancellor would soon find out "what was happening. 1151 
The would - be occupiers figured that the police would 
be called to clear them out; they were willing to take 
that risk . 
2~11~m~n1_g.:L.La~1 
About noon on Friday , a crowd of over one thousand 
began to gather in Polk Place . Most, including television 
camerame n and reporters , were there to hear the announce-
ment of the strike's resolution . But noon passed and no 
word of settlement came . It was l earn ed that the rally 
would have to be delayed until 1: 30 . Sam Au stell of SSOC 
"started going around giving people the word to assemble at 
the point where we were going to take off from to sit in 
South Building . 1152 
50charles Jeffress interview , 17 April 1974 . 
51
scott Bradley interview , 30 October 1974 . 
52charles Jeffress int e rview , 17 April 1974 . 
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Inside the YMCA , Anne Queen received a call from 
Ralph Scott in Raleigh , telling her than an agreement had 
been reached and that the governor and the workers ' attorney 
were meeting to work out a press release. Queen sought out 
Preston Dobbins to tell him what she had learned. He already 
knew . Neither was Mary Smith surpr i sed at the news; she had 
been assured of settlement the night before in a phone call 
from the governor ' s office . Some student government leaders 
were stil l nervously readying themselves to take over South 
Building when Fred Cleaveland to ld them about the settlement . 
Taking the mi crophone , Preston Dobbins introduced Amy Lyon? , 
treasurer of the foodworkers' association. Very softly 
she s a i d , "We have l e a r n e d from our l a wy er th at our govern o r 
has met our demands for a wage increase , and the strike is 
now ended . 11 53 
In the speeches that followed , Preston Dobbins 
denounced those who had not supported the strike and warned 
that " th i s is not the end ." His remarks were echoed by Lou 
Lipsitz , who cr i ticized the handling of the strike at the 
top l ev els of the admi ni stration and included a~ong the 
university ' s "unfini shed business" the reso l ution of the 
BSM' s December demands and improv ement of faculty-student 
relations . Howard Fuller also was there . He applauded the 
black women foodworkers for puttin9 their "lives on the line." 
53Buck Goldstein and Joe Shedd summary; Anne Queen 
interview , 12 June 1974 . 
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He praised as well the BSM for shaking off "Uncle Tomism , " 
and the white students for following black leadership and 
for doing something besides "g oi ng on panty raids . 
P o we r co n cedes no thing wi thou t a d em and , " he added . 5 4 
In the immediate aftermath , i t was learn ed that as 
of the first of April , the foodworke rs and over five 
thousand other state emp l oyees would make at least $1 . 80 
an hour . In all but the lowest salary scale , additional 
raises would come on 1 July, if the General Assembly 
approved Governor Scott ' s budget proposal . 55 At UNG , some -
foodworker issues were still to be resolved --overtime back 
pay , a forty - hour week , weekends off , a black supervisor , 
job classification , and prospective working conditions 
under private management . But for the moment , those other 
issues were forgotten . Next week , for the first time in 
a month , UNG cafeteria workers would be back behind their 
serving counters . 
54Buck Goldstein and Joe Shedd summary; QailY-1~~ 
tl~l, 22 March 1969 . 
55g~~~n~£Q~Q_Q~ily_N~~~' 22 March 1969 ; R~l~i.9.h 




I hate that it had to all come up and out in the 
open like that and last so lon g . 
Mary Smith 
The strike left foodworkers "worn out" and glad to 
be back at work , said Mary Smtih , who gained neither super-
visory status nor a salary raise from the walkout. The 
month had been difficult at home as well as on campus . 
Strike activities had kept the foodworkers away from home 
even more than their regular jobs had. Mary Smith's 
husband sympathized with her grievances on the job (he too 
had worked for th e university), but with a two - year-old 
daughter and five other children , he needed her help at 
home. Similarly , Elizabeth Brooks rememberd that her 
husband talked "a little bad" about her during the strike. 
In spite of his doubts, however , he had more interest in 
the strike than he would admit , she said. Once apprised 
of the issues, the families of both Mary Smith and Elizabeth 
Brooks encouraged the women to persevere in doing what 
Elizabeth Brooks called "what we had to do. 111 
1Mary Smith interviews, 14 April 1974 , 9 October 1974; 




Financial support was as important as moral encourage -
ment in enabling the foodworkers to hold out during the month 
of the strike . The employee benefit fund gave an income to 
all strikers , and some employ ees said that their salary was 
even better during the walkout than before . 2 No one was 
fired as a result of the strike , and permanent food service 
emp l oyees could take added satisfaction in knowing that the 
minimum wage was increased for other workers on campus and 
for such state employees as hospital aides , l aboratory 
technicians , office workers, ferry deckhands , laundry 
workers , recreation assistants , and truck drivers throughout 
North Caro l ina . Henceforth , al l would make at least 
$3 , 756 a year . 3 
Back on the job , most of the food service employees ·Y 
had their job classifications upgraded by the state perso nn el 
office . Employees work ed forty -hour weeks with two days off; 
they worked a split shift only if they wanted to; they got 
a review of temporary work status after ninety days ; they 
got new n ame tags , and a new ma nager . Most of all, emp l oyees 
fe lt that they ~ow possessed new dignity . In the weeks after 
the str ik e , the foodworkers said that they were treated with 
respect as the university tried earnestly to uphold the 
letter and the spirit of the settlement . 
~ ~verlie Moore and Freddie Parker were two that said 
their salari es were higher during the strike than before . 
3R~l~i£h_N~~~-~n2_QQ~~IY~£ , 22 March 1969 , gives 





One issue , overtime back pay , took an especially I 
long time to resolve. Attorney Ge neral Morgan agreed with 
the foodworkers ' attorneys that the university had violated 
the Fair Labor Standards Act ; litigation would therefore 
not be necessary to insure payment to workers . But restitu -
tion figures arrived at by UNC auditors only rekindled 
employee allegations about the university's bad faith . 
In April , administrators asked the U. S . Department of 
Labor to investigate . Four months later , in August , UNC 
President William Friday announced that based on the 
federal audit , the university would pay employees $180,000 
in overdue back wages (at double indemnity) . 4 
Principal beneficiaries were those who had worked 
split shift in Lenoir Hall . Sophia Purefoy got $9000 and 
9ecided to send two of her children to college; Arthur 
Foushee got about the same amount , plus a call from a local 
Cadillac sal esman . Neither employee had been an avid 
supporter of the strike . The Pine Room workers seemed to 
have won the battle both for themselves and others like them. 
Employees who had not participated in the strike came to 
Elizabeth Brooks afterwards to apologize . They told her , 
as she remembered , "If you ,gy,g,.!:, decide to do _g.nything e lse , 
we're going to be with you . "5 
4Cl aiborne Jones and Joseph Eagles said in a letter 
to William Friday , 30 July 1969 , that as a result of the 
audit , "no indication of a pattern or int~nt was found . " 
Business Records , file on Food Services ; other correspondence 
about th~ overtimP. issue in Chancellors ' Records . 
5Elizabeth Brooks interview, 13 September 1979 . 
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If in fact there were ever to be another food 
se rvice conflict , it would not be with univ ersity manage-
ment . Only a few weeks after the end of the strike , the 
university announced that beginning on 19 May , SAGA Food 
Servic e s would assume management of the campus's meal 
s ervice. The university contract with SAGA stipulated 
that SAGA offer employment to all "present regular , full-time 
production type food service employees." Pay would be at 
rates consistent with the university's recent financial 
settlement and the state's July first wage scale . The 
SAGA package included generous leave, insurance, and overtime 
benefits for workers. 6 The university would receive a 
percentage of SAGA's receipts as a fee, and the state would 
gain by having the commercial operation on its tax rolls . 
At first , employees were pleased with news of the 
arrangement . SAGA employment for some lasted only two we eks , 
however . By the end of May , low business volum• and the 
"simple matter of economics 117 caused SAG.A to lay off many 
temporary and part-time workers . SAGA promised to hire them 
back if business picked up sufficiently in the fall, but 
foodworkers were unwilling to trust such assurances. In 
case management was unable or unwilling to fulfill its 
6see SAGA contract with university, signed by Joseph 
C. Eagles , Jr . , 12 May 1969, Business Records , file on 
Food Services . 
7 Joseph C. Eagles , Jr. , to Lawrence V. Asch, 






pledge, workers planned to keep in touch during the summer 
with their lawyers and union offic als . 
. 
. . 
That was ma , I really wasn ' t anything else . It 
just absorbed me entirely . 
Preston Dobbins 
That kind of stuff is tremendously tiresome .. 
When you come out of it . . you say , "Man , I got 
grades out here on the line ." 
Ashley Davis 
The UNG Black Student Movement was entitled to claim 
some credit for the compensations made by the university to 
the foodworkers . Even before the walkout began , the black 
students had decided to be a cohesive pressure group on 
behalf of the employees . In the process of playing out a 
role that included the threat of violence , the black students 
gained public recognition (not all of it complimentary , of 
course) and learned various organizational ski l ls . After 
the strike , none of the black students was expelled from 
school , in spite of the 14 March policy adopted by the UNG 
trustee executive committee . So BSM members could return 
to their studies and work toward receiving full education 
credentials from the university they sought to improve. 
Black students came through the strike physically 
unscathed , but many were exhausted and some faced other 
direct costs . Six of them had to stand trial for tipping 
the tables in Lenoir Hall . Orange County District Judge 
L. J . Phipps acknowledged on 9 April that he did not want 
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to jeopardize UNC ' s chances of getting funds from the state 
legislature . He was content therefore to accept a plea of 
n~l.Q_.£.2n1ende~~ from the defendants . He gave them each a 
Prayer for Judgment Continued , a fine of $135 plus court 
costs , and a two-year sentence suspended on the condition 
that each of them refrain from moral turpitude or disruptive 
activity . 8 
The court sett lement "could have been worse ," said 
Preston Dobbins , who was concerned about another cost of 
the black students' activities . By devoting so much energy 
to the foodworkers , "we knew we jeopardized other things we 
wanted from the administration , " Dobbins recalled . 9 BSM 
members still were determined to push for a black-studies 
-- -· .. -
program , but they did so in the spring in ways less militant 
than before . Besides their own fatigue and legal restraint, 
they perceived that the administration was more determined 
than ever not to rush into academic concessions . Nonetheless , 
campus support generated by the black students translated 
itself into pressure on the administration and the faculty 
to admit more blacks to the university , to move toward an 
Afro - American curriculum , and to consider other programs 
of special interest to blacks . 
8gh~2~l-tlill_~~~kly , 13 April 1969; N~~1h_.Q..a~Qlin~ 
~nvil , 12 April 1969 . Charles Hafter , a white student , was 
t ried one week later ; he received the same judgment . 
9Preston Dobbins interview , 5 December 1974. 
., 
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Relevant curricula and black representation in 
official school functions were also the focus of attention 
in nearby public schools , and UNC's black students con -
tinued during the spring to share those community interests . 
Preston Dobbins was served with two restra i ning orders --
one at Orange High School in Hillsborough , another at 
Chapel Hill High School--to prevent his agitation on those 
public school campuses. At the end of the school year , 
Dobbins was one of three UNC seniors receiving the Frank 
Porter Graham award for "outstanding and unique contribution 
to the University community , 1110 but when he and Jack McLean 
tried that summer to get jobs for the Upward Bound program 
on campus , they were turned down . As he prepared to leave 
Chapel Hill after his 1969 graduation , Dobbins said that 
he was "g l ad to be getting away . " His commitment to 
, . 
"political education , " however , was as strong as ever. 11 
Wh i te Students 
We were exploited by black students , but we loved it . 
Buck Goldstein 
UNC white students probably could claim some degree 
of higher consciousness as a result of the strike . At least 
they saw the foodworkers as people more clearly ~han before . 
To active white supporters like Buck Goldstein , strike 
lOy~~k~1Y_Y£~k , yearbook of UNC at Chapel Hill , 1969 . 
llpreston Dobbins interviews , 4, 5 December 1974 . 
) Jf,.fl' 
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invo l vement had the added compensation of building new and 
lasting friendships based on common political concern . 
Also gratifying for strike supporters was proof that blacks 
were capabl~ 9f leadership and that some whites were willing 
to be l ed . Radical whites often hoped to create disruption 
during the strike , whereas moderate whites generally hoped 
to temper the firebrands . Together , however , the white 
supporters could f i nd reward in the thought that they 
respectfully took their cues from b l acks and a l truistically 
gave extra credibi l ity to the blacks ' demands on the 
university . 
Having no primary personal stake in the strike left 
its l i ngering frustrations , nonetheless , especially for 
some members of the student government group . Their activity 
had been a melange of reactions to others' actions ; it had 
lacked initial mot i vation , con sistent strategy , or effective 
power . 12 They wou l d have preferred wil l ing l y to have loaned 
their leadership roles to blacks but discovered to their 
consternation that they had not been proprietors of such 
roles in the first place . 
Not al l UNC students had been sympathetic to the 
foodworkers . Shortly after the strike , UNC Dean James 0 . 
Cansler told a Kiwanis Club audience that 90 percent of UNC 
students had be en and still were content with their lot . 13 
12Joe Sh edd, conclusion in summary (with Buck 
Goldstein) . 
13R~lgigh_tl~~§_sn2_QQ§~KY~~ ' 23 March 1969 . 
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Ev en Buck G1) ldst e in ackn owledg e d t hat no more than 10 percent 
of th e UNC stud e nts had actively involved themse lv es in the 
strike. 14 Political sci ence professor Lou Lip sitz , in a 
post - strike survey he co nducted , confirmed that only a 
small minority of UNC students saw themselv es as political 
. 
activists , either on th e foodworker issu e or any other . 
Lip s itz ' s survey indicat ed , how ev e r , that there was within 
the UNC community a large r e servoir of sympathy for the 
striking foodwork e rs . Seventy-five percent of UNC students 
fe lt that the employe es were justified in str iking ; o nly 
about 3 percent actually opposed the stxike . Since the 
survey used a "non - r epr esentative sample , " it has to be 
interpreted cautiou s ly . 15 Nev ertheless , its findings give 
credence to the fe e ling among active whites that they had 
had during the strike what Joe Shed d called a "consi d erable 
consensus" 
16 
of support . 
Lipsitz found in h is su rv ey that students who had 
bee n active in the foodworkers ' strike were lik ely to be 
active in other po li t ic al cause s . Not surprisingly , then , 
strike s upporters ' susp icion of administrative authority was 
not allay ed by the foodworke r sett lement . As student 
14Bu ck Goldstein int erview , 17 October 1 974 . 
15Lewis Lipsitz , "Political Dissatisfactions and 
University I ssues : Student and Faculty Attitudes at the 
University of North Carolina ," December 1970 ; see also 
Lewis Lipsitz interview , 17 October 1 974 . 
16Joe Shedd conclusion , in summary . 
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activists turned to other issues of university governance 
and curriculum , they were still animated by national issues 
of war and race and were still unconvinced that the campus 
administration was equipped to deal with future student 
demands . In addition , active students felt that state 
po liticians were dangerously near to closing off all path s 
to campus reform . 
Although most students no doubt were pleased with 
the amelioration of employee working conditions , in many 
ways they were the ones who paid for the ~mprovem e nt . Th e 
im~ e diat e increase in meal prices at Lenoir Hall left 
students with a bitter aft ertaste . Coffee refill s no 
longer were free . Food service operating hours were 
curtailed . Chase Cafet eria stayed closed for the rest 
of the semest er ; th e Pine Room and Monogram Club clos ed 
on weekends . Students who sensed a different ambiance 
in L enoir Hall were perhaps getting t h e f ir st intima tion s 
that L enoir's role as a campus institution had irr evocably 
chang ed . 
A larg e fa culty meeting i s the wor st place to 
get anything done . 
Ald en Lind 
From th e early days of t h e str i ke , th e majority of 
the faculty memb e rs seemed , as student Joe Shedd saw them , 
to b e " e ntirely sincere in their desire to settle the 
strike equitably . 1117 Professor .Alden Lind said that his 
col l eagues were more than sincere , that there was among 
them a strong " reservoir of sympathy and activ e support" 
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for the foodworkers . 1 8 But the experience of both white 
student lead ers and faculty members showed that a wellspring 
of sympathy was not in itself especially useful to the 
foodworkers . Strategies for resolving the strike were 
essentially determined by strikers (together with black 
students) and by variou s admi n istrators , not by eithe r 
white students or faculty members . 
Tak en as a group , the faculty was n ever a forceful 
sponsor of the foodworkers ' cause . The faculty ' s most 
unif i ed response to the foodworker issue came in the 
str i ke ' s first ten days , whe n nearly all faculty members 
stayed uninvolved . Onc e stud e nts dramatiz ed the foodworker 
issu e on 4 March and once the state patrol challenged what 
was to th e faculty their proprietary interest in academic 
freedom , many faculty members wanted to act . But by then 
the situation was complicated and tense , and the various 
faculty groups were unable even to agree on a definition 
of the issues . It was unreasonabl e , therefore , to expect 
any large faculty meeting to decide on a unified course 
of action . 
17Ibid. 
18Alden Lind int e rview , 8 October 1974 . 
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Th9 faculty acted , said Jo e Shedd , in ways similar 
t o those of his own student " leader" group . In each case , 
whites seem to have been primari l y motivated not by the 
emp l oyees ' grievous working conditions (which had been 
k nown but lo n g ignored) but rather by the continual "threats 
o f w o r s e th i n g s to come • " 1 9 Wh at e v er th e i r i n c en ti v e s , the 
facu l ty nonetheless did seem to exert what Shedd called a 
"mod e rat i ng influence" on the activities of work e rs , 
stu de n ts , admi nistrators , a nd po l iticians . 
Al though g en e ral faculty meetings were cumbersome 
and relatively i n effectual , such a conclusion do es not imply 
that smal l er faculty groups or individuals wer e unimportant 
i n determining the ways by which the strike ' s central 
participants worked through their confrontation. A cru cial 
contribution of th e sundry faculty groups was their servic e 
as channels of communication . Faculty members (not all of 
whom were sympathetic t o the fo odwork ers ) were c entral to 
the exchange of informatio n in numerous unorganized settings 
as well as in mor e - formal gatherings . Without the efforts 
by faculty mediators , the strik e could conceivably hav e 
come to a quicker (and perhaps more violent) e nd than it 
did . Th e mediators , h owev er , saw themselves as preve nting 
t he protraction of the str iker -admi n i strator impasse . 
Th e faculty also made a s~gnificant monetary 
co n tribution to the strike--about $13 , 000 . The work e rs 
19Joe Shedd co nclus i on , in summary . 
I 
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needed the money and the "influential , white , high - prestige 
sympathy " which P.P.nry Landsbcrger said lay behind it . 20 
By the end of th e strike , even skeptical faculty members 
admitted that the foodworkers had had valid grievances. 
Faculty nembers who wer e radi cal in their support of the 
foodworkers may thus have fe l t vindicated , but some --
Larry Kess l er , Dick Roman, and Chick Goldsmid -- learned 
by summertime that they had been denied merit raises in 
th . 1 . 21 eir own sa aries . Whether or not this could be 
attributed to thei r strike activity is a matter of 
conjecture . 
In co ncl usio n, some UNC faculty members may have 
come out of the strike satisfied with their involvement 
in a worthwhile social caus e , and some may have been 
satisfied with the effic acy of university procedures for 
thrashing out resolution to an internecine squabble , yet 
many were worried about future political interference . 
The week after the strike , 242 faculty members signed a 
petitio n to Governor Scott , urging him to rely more fully 
on the judgment of campus admin i strators . 22 The strike 
demonstrated l ess the effective n ess of faculty action , 
however , than the divisive effect on the faculty of a 
20He nry Landsberger i n terview, 3 December 1974 . 
21NJu:ih_~s~Qlins_hnvil , 2 August 1969 . 
22Rsl~ish_~~~~-~nQ_QQ~Q~.Y.§.£ , 28 March 1969 . 
volat il e political issue . Five years later, Anne Queen 
talk ed about the strains the strike had put on faculty 
"factions": "Out of this conflict came some breaks in 
relationships that may have n ever been healed yet . 1123 
. one dramatic episode in a vastly changing 
campus . 
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former chancellor Carlyle Sitterson 
Th e strike was symptomatic of a larg er long-term 
structural change in UNG - Chapel Hill from rather 
quiet sedentary days when the administration was 
not important . 
sociology professor Henry Landsberger 
There was no power in any place in the university ; 
that was the teaching of the strike to me . 
attorney Adam Stein 
During a period wh e n the na tio n and the South were 
experiencing dramatic soc i al changes , the public university 
in Chapel Hill shared , not surprisingly , in what Carly l e 
Sitterson called afterwards the " emotional trauma " of the 
times . Sitterson felt that his responsibility during the 
foodworker strike had been to keep the university functioning 
with a minimum of disruption. Public evidence of the 
si nc erity of his commitment to an equitabl e str ik e settlement 
came slowly during that time. From within the university --
still a "hi ghly personal institution ," according to Sitterson- -
information about t he va li dity of the foodworkers ' needs 
only gradually reached him . Although Sitterson ' s restrained 
23 Anne Quee n interview , 12 June 1 974 . 
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diplomacy was never outwardly inflamatory , he personally 
was unable to effect a quick strike settlement . Many 
observers criticized his l eadership as inadequate to times 
of rapid social chang e . Nonethe l ess , in Sitterson's mind 
and in his words , there was " no way" he could have been 
more personally invol ved in the strike settlement than 
h e was . 
Sitterson said that after the strike he hoped to 
erase the scars of the conflict . In the non - academic 
departments of the university , he personally talked to 
supervisors about the n eed to change their "mind s and 
habits" and to deal respectfully with employees . 24 
A higher wage rate and other administrative concessions 
helped him to abate employe e dis sat i sfactio n with university 
management . In August , by "voluntarily" paying foodworkers 
$180 , 000 in back wag es , the university took another larg e 
(and exorbitant , to some observers ) step toward reparation 
of past injustices to employees . 
Whatever humanitarian interests the administrators 
had in foodworker problems , a compelling parallel interest 
was in ridding themselves of a troublesome business respon-
sibi lity . In April , J . A. Branch , a man of considerable 
experience and knowledge , wrote to Vice- Chancellor Eagles 
that "I l ear n something n e w every day about dining hall 
oper ation s . The only trouble i s I frequently hav e to 
24carlyle Sit terson intervi ew , 10 Decemb er 1974 , 
includes ao ov e quotations . 
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unlearn that which I l e a r ned the day before . 11 25 Achievement 
of an efficient overall busi ness organization at UNC 
demanded the excisio n of operations so difficult to manage . 
For the ten months preceding 30 April 1969 , dining hall 
expenditures exceeded receipts by n e arly $200 , 000 . 26 By 
turning control of its meal services over to SAGA in May , 
the university business office hop ed to be able subse -
quently to tighten it s own organization, clear internal 
channels of communication, and keep it s other eco n omic 
enterprises productive . The university could not afford 
to be sentimental about Lenoir Hall , even though it had 
traditionally been a community center for the campus . 
Ne ither could the university afford to be sentimental about 
George Prillaman , who resigned in May to manage the food 
services at Carnegie - Mellon University . He was still in 
the throes , he said later , of a three - month depression 
fol lowing the humiliating strike experi e nce and numerous 
threats on his lif e . 27 
For administrators outside the business sphere of 
university operations , the controlling motive in the weeks 
after the strike seems to have been to get the academic 
house in order . For the most part , that meant reinstitution 
25James A. Branch to Joseph C. Eagl es , Jr ., 11 April 
1969 , Busines s Records , file on Food Services . 
26operating r epo rt, 30 April 1969 , Business Records . 
27G eorge Prillaman interview , 6 September 1979 . 
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of normal pxocedures for change . The Merzbacher committee's 
recommendations on curriculum reform and the Phillips 
committee ' s recommendations on admissions policy reform 
were two examples of issues that academics and administra-
tors wou l d weigh. Only after careful consideration would 
new policies actually emerge . 
Institutional academic integrity also prompt ed 
administrators to examine state political realities . The 
prospective shift of l egislative economic support to other 
schools in the state was on e political ramification of 
which UNC administrators were mindful . Furthermor e , campus 
officials had learned that especially during in ter nal unrest , 
the l ines of authority in a public university were difficult 
to draw . Adam Stein commented, for instance , that Governor 
R ob e r t S co t t h ad u s e d th e am bi g u i t y to come o u t " e x a c t l y 
where he wanted" after the strike . Stein said that Scott 
had given campus authorities the first opportunity to 
resolv e th e conflict , but then , after their failure, had 
exploited the chance himself to bring order to the campus 
and thereby receive political credit for end ing the crisis 
28 and for raising the wages of state employees . 
UNC ' s wariness of politicians did not mean that the 
political process was someth ing that swirled out beyond the 
campus , to be worried about only when the university ' s 
28 Ad St . . t . am ein in e rvi e w, 27 November 1974. 
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educational island was threatened . Campus administrators 
were themselves public officials whose actions before , 
during , and after the strike were charged with their own 
political reality . University executive officers were 
politicians with their own powerful constituencies . 
Recognizing that , the UNG Board of Trustees moved to 
clarify internal lines of authority and to strengthen the 
hands of campus officials by givi n g them added safeguards 
against interference by either state politicians or 
student and faculty dissidents . In May , the board 
instituted a disruption policy which encouraged the 
president and campus chancellors to screen faculty 
appointments for evidence of prior disruptive activity , 
cleared the way for administrators to seek injunctive 
relief through the courts during disturbances , and 
prohibited officials from offering amnesty to faculty 
members or students who did disrupt the educational 
process.29 Meanwhile, UNG at Chapel Hill reaffirmed the 
adequacy of its internal grievance procedures for academic 
and non-academic personnel . 
QQ~~~Y~1iQn~_Qn_1h~_EQli1i~~l_E~Q~~~~ 
Perhaps the coincidence of family relations and the 
political process , which in the Ralph Scott episode helped 
resolve the strike , could , as some said , "only happen in 
~-==~~~-----------------------.. -~ 
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the South . 113° Certainly the UNC foodworkers's strike could 
neither have begun nc;r ended as it did , except in the South . () _Jtl 
The contrast in social status between black labor ers and /r 
th e w hi t e man a g er s o f th e po 1 i ti c a 1 and e c o no mi c s y st em w a s 
I 
part of a tradition rooted particularly deep in southern I 
histo:ry. In the South ' s "second Reconstruction " during the 
1950s and 1960s , black activists had set new precedents of 
p:rote3t against exploitative political tradition. In the 
late sixties , the spirit of that black protest and of 
student discontent made the climate at UNC ripe for 
confrontation. 
The UNC cafeteria workers , with the support of 
black students , openly challenged the university to close 
the gap between promise and reality. At the beginning of 
the walkout , compromise was possible . If administrators 
had acted forthrightly to correct the most obvious of the 
injustices , then the employees might have gone back to 
work with less than a full and immediate redress of their 
grievances . The university would then have been spared 
four weeks of disruption , near -violence , and political 
wrangling with workers , students , and the state . 
University administrators , however , did not take 
advantage of that opportunity for early settlement . First , 
they were unprepared to correct injustice on its merit 
30 Anne Que e n interview, 12 June 1974 . 
because t hey had not been thorough enough in earli e r 
investigations of the workers ' allegations agai nst food 
service manag eme n t . Second , they were unwilling to 
co n cede that th e employee strike was a legitimat e method 
of voicing protest . The strike , whi ch would prove the 
inadequacy of administrative proc edur es to cope with a 
crisis situation , initiated discussion through a me an s 
that admin i strators did not want to co ndon e , what ever 
val idity th e grievances should eventually prov e to have. 
Third , administrators perceived that the strike was 
induced by students interested not in compromise but 
rather in destroying conventional mechanisms for ord e rly 
chang e . Def e n se of the univ e r s ity system of governance 
demanded that officials avoid both th e app earan ce and 
substance of capitu l ation to radical dissidents. 
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The unive rsity , through i ts campus administrators , 
t h e refore upheld traditional political process instead of 
quickly , in the nam e of just ic e , t rying to work out a 
compromise with the gr oup of employ ees . University 
intransig enc e in turn forced the foodworkers into a more 
rigid position and even closer co llaboration with radical 
students . For over a week , administrators temporized , 
content to l et the strike drift on whi l e they activated , 
in their own way , procedural inquiry into food service 
mismanagement . Spread thinly over time , compromise would 
not appear to be concession . 
~~~~----------------------~ 
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~!though not inte ntionally mali c i ous , system a t i c 
n egl i gence and malpractice had non etheless resulted in 
injury to the employees ' prid e and pocketbooks. Th e system , 
as defined by univer s ity and state authority , had 
encouraged p e ople l ike Georg e Pri ll aman to achieve financial 
so lve n cy at the expense of d ece nt treatment of workers . 
Without an abrupt change in the pattern of di scuss i on , 
administrators would nev er hav e given first priority to 
the n ee d s of the foodworkers . Th e s y stem wa s at fau l t , 
but that conclusion d oes not exonerate individual administra -
tors who cou l d hav e , if they had been willing to accept the 
costs , corrected mo st of the ab uses and averted the necessity 
of the str i ke . Onc e the strike began , UNC administrators 
ralli ed around t h e rhetoric of trad i t i onal process . 
Individuals at the middle l evels , as the political stakes 
were raised , relinquished accountability to those further 
up th e administrative chain . 
Until th e table - turning in cident and the closing of 
Lenoir , admini strat iv e circumspection frustrated strike 
support e r s , but i t seemed to be consist e nt with co n servative 
political vi ews in the state . Th e n , from outside the 
university boundaries as customari l y understo od , campus 
official s were bombarded wi th the fresh political real ity 
of the governor ' s behav i or . His actio n , overriding as it 
did t h e judgment of university offic i als , l eft the 
administrators caught between radical hard - liners on ca~pus 
~~-----------------------... -~ 
and conservative hard - liners off campus. In trying to be 
politic , university officials had instead l et themselves 
get out of step with the political times . 
Gradually, the administration recovered from its 
floundering and tried to reassert university authority, 
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but by then it had given up to t he state much of the power 
to deal with the situation. The university began to acknow-
ledg e the validity of employee grievances , for instance , at 
a time when campus officials could give little actual remedy . 
Eventually the stalemate was broken , and violence luckily 
averted . Ironically , the same weight of tradition which 
had excited and then shaped the strike also provided an 
ave nue for its reso l ution . Se nator Ralph Scott , who as 
a member of the state ' s political and economic elite was 
representative of the forces which oppressed the workers , 
was also a rural compatriot of Mary Smith and uniquely able 
to trans l ate his sympathy for her cause into a political 
solution . His involvement seemed adventitious , a quirk of 
personal relationship . In part i t was , but in part it was 
not . During the three previous weeks , lawyers , auditors , 
and other specialists had dug up the raw material for a 
strike settlement . The political tim e s had season ed and 
were ready for the senator to initiate a final breakthrough . 
Another irony was that impatient protes te r s , who 
we r e cynical about the bureaucratic complexities which 
inhibit e d s e ttl eme nt , d ep e nd e d on th e political sy s t em fQ~ 
..___-=---=~~~-------------------... ~ 
settlement . Indeed , thr ough Ralph Scott , workers took 
advantage of the most traditional aspect of southern 
politics-- the old order of family ties and paternalism- -
to subvert time- consuming procedures and cut through 
the political tangle. In a sense , traditional politics 
was thus able to subvert itse l f and then triumph in 
spite of itself. 
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By the end of the four -week strike , noticeable 
changes had occurred . Principally , employees had gained , 
and administrators given in to , most of the demands for 
improvement of food service working conditions . But times 
also had not changed , since the system endured . Workers 
were beholden to conventional political channels for their 
relief , and the administration was able to avoid the 
appearan ce of giving in to radical student behavior. In 
the longer run , employees would continue to worry about 
conditions on the job , and administrators would worry about 
the political ramifications of the new precedents set by 
worker protest and harsh state reaction . The university , 
by leasing the food service to SAGA , hoped to prevent a 
recurrence of foodworker unrest , but it sti ll had to face 
its responsibility for other employees and students . On 
f uture p roblems , as in the pa s t , the university would have 
to wor k in conc e rt wi t h the s t a te . Campus consolidation 
and racial int egration , for instanc e , would present an 
~~~~~--------------------~ 
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"ironic ally cruel" dilemma 31 for the Consolidated University : 
that of combining campus programs statewide while respecting 
at the same time the proud tradit ion s of separate university 
campuses . The working out of such relationships would be 
complicated , but i t would use the sam~ el ements of political 
process-- s li ghtly shuff l ed and modified by experience --
as had been used during the foodworkers ' strike . 
That strike was thus an important event in its own 
right for all participants , and it was also significant 
as part of a larg er and continuing problem in North Carolina 
government . To some partic~ants , settlement had been 
excruciati n gly slow in coming, but to other observers , 
the system had accommodated the protest remarkably quickly. 
During those four weeks in the spring of 1969 , a drama of 
labor , race, and student unrest had been played out in 
Chapel Hill . Long-festering disaffections had been wrested 
into visibility and worked out before the eyes of all the 
state . Tradition had been broken, but radical movement 
would produce only moderate change . The pattern of tension, 
tedium , and ambiguity had shifted , but the flux of relation -
sh ips political and personal would cause it to shift again . 
The strike had bee n sett led , but the drama was not , and 
n ev~r will be at an end . 
31vermont Royster , Wall_§tre~LJ..Qg£Q.fil. , 7 March 1969, 
clippi ng in Chancellors ' Records , file on BSM . 
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Wednesday and 
Thursd ay , 26 , 27 Feb . 
.APP EN DIX 
CHRONOLOGY 
Tet offensive in Vietnam . 
President Lyndon B. Johnson withdraws 
as candidate for re - election . 
Martin L . King , Jr ., assassinated in 
Memphis . 
Robert F . Kennedy assassinated in 
L o s Ang e 1 e s • 
El ecti on of President Richard M. Nixon 
and Governor Robert W. Scott . 
Stoke l y Carmichael speaks at UNC at 
Chapel Hill . 
UNC Black Student Movement presents 
Chancel l or J . Carlyle Sitterso n with 
list of 23 demands . 
Sitterson responds to BSM with 19 - page 
letter . 
Second-shift Pine Room workers walk off 
their jobs . 
Other university foodworkers join 
walkout . 
Meeting betweP-n workers and management . 
UNC Board of Trustees meets . 
Manning Hall set up as headquarters for 
strike and Lenoir Hall boycott . 
Mobilization of som e student and f aculty 
support . 
Picketing and boycott continue . 
Friday , 28 Feb. 
Monday , 3 March 
Tuesd ay , 4 March 
Wednesday , 5 March 
Thursday , 6 March 
Fr i day , 7 March 
Su nday , 9 Ma:rch 
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Anne Queen co nveys worker grievances 
to Chancellor Sitterson . 
Admini stration begins investigation . 
Most food service employees stay out 
of work . 
SSOC and BSM lead slowdown in Le noir 
serving line . 
St;:ill - in continues , scuffles among 
students . 
BSM turns over tables and chairs in 
Lenoir Hall. 
Chap e l Hill police arrive , Lenoir 
cl osed . 
Workers and black students consult 
attorneys . 
UNC administrators decide to keep 
Lenoir closed temporarily . 
Strike supporters organize campus 
rally in af ternoon . 
Governor Scott pledges publicly to keep 
Le noir open , summons Sitterson and 
President William Friday to Raleigh , 
mobilizes National Guard and state 
patrol . 
Lenoir Hall r eo pened in morning under 
guard . 
Sitterson explains his position to 
faculty group . 
Workers meet for three hours with 
chancellor ' s assistant Claiborne 
Jo n es ar.d Vice Chan cellor Joseph 
Eag l es . 
Legis l ative concern about student 
disruption . 
Facu l ty concern about presence of 
patrol . 
Student rally interrup ted by bomb 
threat . 
Student government l eaders try to 
mediate . 
Faculty Council meeting postponed , 
Alden Lind convenes open meeting , 
discussion about rescheduling 
classes . 
Downtown vigil . 
Lind calls together ad - hoc faculty 
group . 
Julius Chambers notifi es university 
of his representation of workers . 
Monday , 10 March 
Tuesday , 11 March 
Wednesday , 12 March 
Thur sd ay , 13 March 
Friday, 14 March 
Sunday , 1 6 March 
Monday , 17 March 
Tuesday , 18 March 
Strikers balk at meeting with state 
classification specialists . 
Picketing continues , with some class 
disruption . 
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Attorn ey Adam Stein meets with Claiborne 
Jones and is notified that Attorney 
General Robert Morgan will r epresent 
university . 
Dean Henry Brandis circulates petition . 
UNG maintenance workers claim to have 
had substantive tal ks with adminis -
tration . 
Sitterson speaks to faculty and students 
in Memorial Hall , reviews foodworker 
grievances and status of negotiations . 
Foodworkers claim administration has 
actually done very little . 
General Faculty meets . 
Stein meets with attorney general 's 
staff and with campus groups after-
wards. 
Sitterso n orders BSM to shut off 
Manning Hall loud speaker . 
Sitterson responds to faculty ' s qu es tions 
in closed meeting at Hill Hall . 
Governor Scott orders closing of Manning 
Hall and arrest of students for Lenoir 
Hall table turning . 
Confusion and tension , march on South 
Building. 
Picketing at Lenoir Hall and South 
Building . 
Sitterson tells Memorial Hall audience 
about injustices in food service . 
Students demand and get entrance to 
closed faculty meeting in Hill Hall. 
Senator Ralph H. Scott calls foodworker 
Mary Smith . 
Stein continues negotiations with 
attorney ge neral' s staff 
Director George Prillaman transferred 
to accounting department . 
State patrol begins to leave campus . 
Workers question progress in neg otia-
tions , ask for student strike at 
Joan Baez benefit concert . 
Wednesday , 19 March 
Thursday , 20 March 
Friday, 21 March 
Littla support for general strike . 
Bargaining continues in Raleigh. 
Strike leaders meet with governor in 
Raleigh. 
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Strike settlement announced, obviating 
drastic action by students . 
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